The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-1B nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-1B program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position.

The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation.

The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. See Matter of Christo’s Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term “specialty occupation” as an occupation that requires:

(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and

(B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position must also meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation:
A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;

The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;

The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or

The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

We note as a threshold issue that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989); Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), we construe the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing “a degree requirement in a specific specialty” as “one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position”). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified individuals who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, we do not rely simply upon a position’s title or the broader occupational category within which a petitioner claims the position is located. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning
entity’s business operations, are factors to be considered. We must examine the ultimate employment
of the individual and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See generally
Defensor, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position or an employer’s self-
imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application
of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in
the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

By regulation, the Director is charged with determining whether the petition involves a specialty
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(1) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2). The Director
may request additional evidence in the course of making this determination. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8).
In addition, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition and must continue to
be eligible through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1).

II. THE PROFFERED POSITION

The Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary will work as a business analyst and submitted a labor
condition application (LCA) certified for a position located within the “Management Analysts”
occupational category, corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification code 13-1111. The
record contains a description of the proffered position’s duties that aligns generally with the duties of
positions located within that occupational category.

The Petitioner stated in its support letter that the proffered position requires a degree in business
administration, engineering, or closely related field, “coupled with progressive work experience in
quantitative disciplines.” In its response to the Director’s request for additional evidence (RFE), the
Petitioner claimed, in part, that due to the specialty and complexity of the position, the end-client
requires the position to have the minimum qualification of a bachelor’s degree in business
administration, finance, economics, and accounting. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the
educational requirement for the proffered position is a bachelor’s degree in business administration,
economics, accounting, finance, information technology, or a closely related field.¹

III. ANALYSIS

As a result of the Petitioner’s own stated requirements, the proffered position does not meet the
statutory or regulatory definition of the term “specialty occupation.”² As noted, both definitions
require the Petitioner to demonstrate that the proffered position requires: (1) the theoretical and
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (2) the attainment of a bachelor’s
degree in the specific specialty. The record of proceedings satisfies neither.

¹ The Petitioner provided several iterations of the minimum requirement but did not provide an explanation for these
inconsistencies. The Petitioner must resolve these inconsistencies with independent, objective evidence pointing to where
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Unresolved material inconsistencies may lead us to
reevaluate the reliability and sufficiency of other evidence submitted in support of the requested immigration benefit. Id.
² The Petitioner submitted documentation in support of the H-1B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered
position and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and
considered each one.
That the Petitioner would find acceptable a bachelor’s degree in business administration, with no further specialization, alone precludes a determination that the position involves a “body of highly specialized knowledge” or that it requires the attainment of a bachelor’s degree in a “specific specialty.” The First Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147, that:

The courts and the agency consistently have stated that, although a general-purpose bachelor’s degree, such as a business administration degree, may be a legitimate prerequisite for a particular position, requiring such a degree, without more, will not justify the granting of a petition for an H-1B specialty occupation visa. See, e.g., Tapis Int’l v. INS, 94 F.Supp.2d 172, 175-76 (D. Mass. 2000); Shanti, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-66; cf. Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 I & N Dec. 555, 560 ([Comm’r] 1988) (providing frequently cited analysis in connection with a conceptually similar provision). This is as it should be: elsewise, an employer could ensure the granting of a specialty occupation visa petition by the simple expedient of creating a generic (and essentially artificial) degree requirement.3

3 Id. But see India House, Inc. v. McAleenan, --- F. Supp. ----, 2020 WL 1479519 (D.R.I. 2020). In India House the court distinguished Royal Siam on factual grounds but did not dispute its central reasoning: that a position whose duties can be fulfilled by an individual with a general-purpose bachelor’s degree in business administration is not a specialty occupation. Instead, it distinguished Royal Siam on factual grounds. Here, the Petitioner specifically recognizes an unspecialized bachelor’s degree in business administration as being one of the many degrees it considers as providing an adequate preparation to perform the duties of the proffered position.

The agency has longstanding concerns regarding general-purpose bachelor’s degrees in business administration with no additional specialization. For example, in Matter of Ling, 13 I. & N. Dec. 35 (Reg’l Comm’r 1968), the agency stated that attainment of a bachelor’s degree in business administration alone was insufficient to qualify a foreign national as a member of the professions pursuant to section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(32). Twenty years later, the agency looked to the nature of the position itself and clarified that a requirement for a degree with a generalized title, such as business administration, without further specification, was insufficient to qualify the position as one that is professional pursuant to section 101(a)(32) of the Act. Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 I&N Dec. at 560. See also Matter of Caron Int’l, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm’r 1988) (vice president for manufacturing in a textile company was not a professional position because individual holding general degree in business, engineering or science could perform its duties).

Congress created the modern H-1B program as part of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. In doing so, it pivoted away from the prior H-1 standard of whether a position was “professional.” Instead, petitioners were now required to demonstrate that a proffered position qualified as a “specialty occupation.” Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act. In the final rule setting forth the requirements for the revamped H-1B program, the agency, responding to commenters suggesting that the proposed regulatory “specific specialty” requirement “was too severe and would exclude certain occupations from classifications as specialty occupations,” stated that “[t]he definition of specialty occupation contained in the statute contains this requirement.” Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61112 (Dec. 2, 1991).


To the extent the Petitioner is arguing that a bachelor’s degree in business administration, with no further specialization (or the equivalent), is a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty, then consistent with agency history and federal case law, we must disagree.
For this reason alone, the record satisfies neither the statutory nor the regulatory definitions of the term “specialty occupation,” and we could end our analysis here and dismiss the appeal on that basis. But we will not do so, because even if we were to set the issue of the “business” degree aside we would still find that the Petitioner’s acceptance of a bachelor’s degree from a wide variety of fields would similarly preclude it from satisfying both definitions.

As examples of the specific types of fields from which it would accept bachelor’s degrees for this position, the Petitioner has specifically identified business administration, engineering, economics, accounting, finance, and information technology. However, the Petitioner did not sufficiently explain what ties together the wide variety of fields the Petitioner would find acceptable.

The Director found this acceptable range of degrees too wide, and she denied the petition. Among other arguments advanced on appeal, the Petitioner contends that courts have routinely rejected the position that in order to qualify as a specialty occupation for H-1B visa purposes, the degree must be in only one specific academic major or have a specific title, and it cites, among other cases, RELX, Inc. v. Baran, 397 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2019) to assert that a position may qualify as a specialty occupation even when the position permits more than one specific specialty. While we agree that the degree does not have to be in a single specific specialty, the statutory and regulatory definitions of a specialty occupation under section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) requires a body of highly specialized knowledge and at least a bachelor’s degree or higher in specific specialties that directly relate to the proffered position. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, while we agree that the bachelor’s degree does not have to be a degree in a single specific specialty, we do not agree with the analytical framework set forth by the RELX court. That is, the RELX court does not undertake the proper inquiry regarding the position’s specific educational requirements and instead concludes that a requirement for a general bachelor’s degree is sufficient to discharge the petitioner’s burden. The court overlooks the statutory and regulatory provisions as they pertain to the

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4 We are not bound to follow the published decision of a U. S. district court. See Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 719-20 (BIA 1993).
5 Specifically, the RELX court states “[n]owhere in the statute does it require the degree to come solely from one particular academic discipline,” and references Residential Finance Corp. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 839 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (S.D. Ohio 2012) to state that “[d]iplomas rarely come bearing occupation-specific majors. What is required is an occupation that requires highly specialized knowledge and a prospective employee who has attained the credentialing indicating possession of that knowledge.” It also cited to Tapis Int’l v. I.N.S., 94 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175-76 (D. Mass. 2000) (rejecting a similar agency interpretation because it would preclude any position from satisfying the “specialty occupation” requirements where a specific degree is not available in that field).
6 While the statutory “the” and the regulatory “a” both mandate a requirement for a bachelor’s degree in a singular “specific specialty,” we do not so narrowly interpret these provisions to exclude positions from qualifying as specialty occupations if they permit, as a minimum entry requirement, degrees in more than one closely related specialty. This also includes even seemingly disparate specialties providing, again, the evidence of record establishes how each acceptable, specific field of study is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position. In general, provided the specialties are closely related, e.g., chemistry and biochemistry, a minimum of a bachelor’s or higher degree in more than one specialty is recognized as satisfying the “degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent)” requirement of section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act. In such a case, the required “body of highly specialized knowledge” would essentially be the same. However, since there must be a close correlation between the required “body of highly specialized knowledge” and the position, a minimum entry requirement of a degree in two disparate fields, such as philosophy and engineering, would not meet the statutory requirement that the degree be “in the specific specialty (or its equivalent),” unless the Petitioner establishes how each field is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position.
requirement that the bachelor’s degree, or its equivalent, be in a specific specialty. In other words, though we agree with the RELX court that the bachelor’s degree does not have to be a degree in a single specific specialty, this agreement is predicated upon the fields of study including a “body of specialized knowledge” attained through a bachelor’s or higher degree in a specific specialty and that are directly related to the position. We must analyze whether the duties actually require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation. The record here is deficient in this regard.

The Petitioner further cites to Residential Finance Corp. v. USCIS, 839 F. Supp. 2d 985 (S.D. Ohio 2012). The court stated in Residential Finance that “[t]he knowledge and not the title of the degree is what is important. Diplomas rarely come bearing occupation-specific majors.” Id. at 997. We agree with both the Petitioner and with this principle stated by the judge in Residential Finance. However, the Petitioner misreads the Director’s decision denying the H-1B petition. The Director did not indicate, for example, that the proffered position, which is located within the “Management Analysts” occupational category, could only qualify as a specialty-occupation position if the Petitioner mandated a degree in “management analysis” or “management consulting.” Instead, the Director found the Petitioner’s stated spectrum of acceptable degrees too broad to support a finding that the proffered position requires a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty, or the equivalent.

We similarly conclude that the proffered position is not a specialty occupation: the Petitioner’s stated range of acceptable degree-fields is simply too wide and divergent. In general, provided the specialties are closely related, e.g., chemistry and biochemistry, a minimum of a bachelor’s or higher degree in

7 In contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, we are not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court, even in matters arising within the same district. See Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 719-20 (BIA 1993). Although the reasoning underlying a district judge’s decision will be given due consideration when properly before us, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. Id. Consistent with the Board’s holding in K-S-, we decline to follow the RELX court’s reasoning.

8 The RELX court does not address how a general bachelor’s or higher degree is the equivalent of a bachelor’s or higher degree in a specific specialty.

9 Though the RELX court briefly discusses the duties of the position, it did not engage in analysis of whether the duties actually required the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation. Instead, it accepted the petitioner’s stated standards concerning its position. However, the record must establish that a petitioner’s stated degree requirement is not a matter of preference for high-caliber candidates but is necessitated instead by performance requirements of the position. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. Were we limited solely to reviewing a petitioner’s claimed self-imposed requirements, an organization could bring any individual with a bachelor’s degree to the United States to perform any occupation as long as the petitioning entity created a token degree requirement. Id.

10 The district judge’s decision in Residential Finance appears to have been based largely on the many factual errors made by the Director in the decision denying the petition, and we note that the Director’s decision was not appealed to the AAO. Based on the district court’s conclusions and description of the record, if that matter had first been appealed through the available administrative process, we may very well have remanded the matter to the service center for a new decision for many of the same reasons articulated by the district court if we could not have remedied those errors in our de novo review of the matter.

11 See, e.g., Irish Help at Home LLC v. Melville, No. 13-cv-00943-MEJ, 2015 WL 848977 at *7 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 24, 2015), aff’d 679 Fed. App’x 634 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Likewise, this case is different from [Tapis Int’l v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 94 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2000)] because the AAO’s decision is not akin to a finding that [the Beneficiary] would need a degree in ‘deputy controllership,’ rather, the issue is that there is no credible evidence supporting that Irish Help’s deputy controller position is specialized in the sense that [it] could only be performed by one with specialized knowledge in a specialized course of study, as opposed to one with a more generic degree.”)
more than one specialty is recognized as satisfying the “degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent)” requirement of section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act. In such a case, the required “body of highly specialized knowledge” would essentially be the same. Since there must be a close correlation between the required “body of highly specialized knowledge” and the position, however, a minimum entry requirement of a degree in two disparate fields, such as economics and engineering, would not meet the statutory requirement that the degree be “in the specific specialty (or its equivalent),” unless the Petitioner establishes how each field is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position. Section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act (emphasis added).

In other words, while the statutory “the” and the regulatory “a” both denote a singular “specialty,” we do not so narrowly interpret these provisions to exclude positions from qualifying as specialty occupations if they permit, as a minimum entry requirement, degrees in more than one closely related specialty. See section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). This also includes even seemingly disparate specialties providing, again, the evidence of record establishes how each acceptable, specific field of study is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position.

Again, the Petitioner claims that the duties of the proffered position can be performed by an individual with a bachelor’s degree in business administration, engineering, economics, accounting, finance, and information technology. Again, the Petitioner did not indicate the connection that ties together the wide variety of fields the Petitioner would find acceptable.

This mass grouping of degree-fields is simply too broad to support a finding that the proffered position meets the definition of a “specialty occupation.” The Petitioner does not establish how each one relates to the duties of the proffered position, and if a degree in any of these disparate fields would equally prepare an individual to perform the duties of a proffered position, then we question how the position involves a “highly specialized body of knowledge” or requires a bachelor’s degree, or the equivalent, in a “specific specialty.” The current record of proceedings does not establish how this wide, far-ranging, and divergent range of degrees could form either a body of highly specialized knowledge or a specific specialty. We therefore cannot conclude that the proffered position requires anything more than a general bachelor’s degree. The Petitioner therefore has satisfied neither the statutory definition of a “specialty occupation” at section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act nor the regulatory definition of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

As the Petitioner has not met the threshold requirement of satisfying the statutory and regulatory definitions of the term “specialty occupation,” it cannot satisfy any of the supplemental specialty-occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(I)-(4) because, again, we must consider those criteria in harmony with the thrust of the related regulatory provisions and with the statute as a whole. In other words, we must construe those criteria’s references to the term “degree” as meaning not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. For example, the Petitioner cannot satisfy the supplemental

12 “A position that requires applicants to have any bachelor’s degree, or a bachelor’s degree in a large subset of fields, can hardly be considered specialized.” Caremax, Inc. v. Holder, 40 F.Supp.3d 1182, 1187-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
13 Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147; Caremax, 40 F.Supp.3d at 1187-88; Payjoy v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-cv-03977-HSG, 2019 WL 3207839 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2019) (statutory and regulatory text appear to support USCIS’s interpretation that the degree requirement must be read in conjunction with the “specific specialty” requirement).
specialty-occupation criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) because even if it establishes, in the words of this criterion, that “a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position,” we would still construe the term “degree” to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. And as discussed above, the Petitioner would not be able to make that demonstration.

The same will be true of the remaining three criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2)-(4): because the Petitioner does not require a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty, or the equivalent, it will not be able to satisfy any of those criteria because we will interpret each reference to a “degree” to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. We therefore will not consider the Petitioner’s arguments, and the evidence it submits, in support of its contention that it satisfies the supplemental specialty-occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)-(4).

The record of proceedings does not establish that the proffered position requires both: (1) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (2) the attainment of a bachelor’s degree in the specific specialty. The Petitioner, therefore, has satisfied neither the statutory definition of a “specialty occupation” at section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act nor the regulatory definition of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). As the Petitioner had not satisfied that threshold requirement, it cannot satisfy any of the supplemental specialty-occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)-(4). The Petitioner, therefore, has not established that the proffered position is a specialty occupation.

IV. CONCLUSION

The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner’s burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.