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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

D5



DEC 27 2010

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date:

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the director, California Service Center. The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) dismissed the subsequently filed appeal and affirmed the director's decision to deny the petition. The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reconsider. The motion will be dismissed and the director's and the AAO's decision will be undisturbed.

The petitioner is a [REDACTED] that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a trainee in operations and graphics services management and photography sales specialization for a period of four months. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker trainee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(iii).

On January 30, 2009, the director denied the petition on multiple grounds: (1) the petitioner failed to establish that the proposed training is unavailable in the beneficiary's home country; (2) the petitioner failed to establish that the proposed training program would benefit the beneficiary in pursuing a career abroad; (3) the petitioner failed to establish that the proposed training program does not deal in generalities with no fixed schedule, objectives, or means of evaluation; and, (4) the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it has sufficiently trained manpower to provide the training specified.

In a decision dated February 16, 2010, the AAO affirmed all of the grounds for dismissal and added a fifth ground for dismissal. The AAO affirmed the director's decision and dismissed the appeal. On March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed a Form I-290B and identified it as a "Motion to Reconsider." The petitioner submits a brief in support of the motion to reconsider.

The petitioner's assertions do not satisfy the requirements of either a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen.

8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2) states, in pertinent part:

A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision.

Although the petitioner submitted a motion titled "Motion to Reconsider," it does not submit any document that would meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider. The petitioner reiterates its claims for eligibility as stated in the initial filing, in the response to the director's request for evidence and on appeal. The petitioner does not respond to any of the concerns addressed in the AAO's decision.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Here, the submitted evidence does not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. As noted in the director's decision and the AAO's decision, the petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the petitioner's proposed training program meets the regulatory requirements to establish eligibility for the H-3 nonimmigrant visa.

In addition, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(2) states, in pertinent part: "A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be provided in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence."

Based on the plain meaning of "new," a new fact is found to be evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented in the previous proceeding.¹

A review of the evidence that the petitioner submits on motion reveals no fact that could be considered *new* under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(2). The evidence submitted was either previously available and could have been discovered or presented in the previous proceeding, or it post-dates the petition.

Motions for the reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. *INS v. Doherty*, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)(citing *INS v. Abudu*, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)). A party seeking to reopen a proceeding bears a "heavy burden." *INS v. Abudu*, 485 U.S. at 110. With the current motion, the movant has not met that burden.

¹ The word "new" is defined as "1. having existed or been made for only a short time . . . 3. Just discovered, found, or learned <new evidence>" WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 792 (1984)(emphasis in original).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 8 CFR 103.5(a)(4) states that "[a] motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed." Accordingly, the motion will be dismissed, the proceedings will not be reconsidered, and the previous decisions of the director and the Associate Commissioner will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The motion will be dismissed. The director's and AAO's decision will be undisturbed. The petition is denied.