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**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

DF

AUG 31 2005
Date:

FILE:

[Redacted]

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

WAC 05 009 51425

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

[Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of South Africa, as the fiancée of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner had not offered documentation evidencing that he and the beneficiary had personally met within two years before the date of filing the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. *Decision of the Director*, dated January 4, 2005.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

- (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
- (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
- (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

. . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation at section 214.2 does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on October 14, 2004. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on October 14, 2002 and ended on October 14, 2004.

In response to the director's request for evidence and additional information, the petitioner submitted a statement, a letter documenting a contract to which the petitioner's company is a party and copies of telephone bills.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a letter stating that he is unable to travel because his business is "at a delicate stage." The petitioner contends that he is personally required by contract to be on-site until the project's completion and that he acts in a variety of capacities in ensuring that work under the contract proceeds as required. The petitioner asserts that if his business is placed in jeopardy, it will impact the livelihoods of five employees of the company in addition to him. *Letter from Gregory M. Ellis*, dated January 17, 2005. The petitioner provides copies of his employment identification cards as well as portions of a pro forma contract used by the State of Tennessee in contracting for services.

Under section 214(d) of the Act, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met between October 14, 2002 and October 14, 2004. Although section 214(d) of the Act requires the petitioner and the beneficiary to meet, it does not require the petitioner to travel to the beneficiary's home country. The record on appeal does not demonstrate that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored options for a meeting beyond the petitioner traveling to South Africa, including, but not limited to the beneficiary traveling to meet the petitioner in the United States or a bordering country. The petitioner states that he is unable to travel due to his employment and articulates why his employment prevents him from traveling, but fails to provide information relating to the duration of the contract under which his travel is restricted. As noted, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are likely to last for a considerable or indeterminable duration when considering a claim of extreme hardship; the record fails to establish the length of the contract existing between the State of Tennessee and the petitioner's company. Moreover, the time commitment required for travel to a foreign country is a requirement common to those filing the Form I-129F petition and does not constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner.

The evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner and the beneficiary met as required. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances as the petitioner has presented them, the AAO does not find that compliance with the meeting requirement would result in extreme hardship to the petitioner or would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. The petitioner may file a new Form I-129F petition on the beneficiary's behalf when sufficient evidence is available.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.