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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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FILE: [redacted] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date:
EAC 03 265 51932

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Acting Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native of Afghanistan and resident of Pakistan, as the fiancée of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The acting director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner and the beneficiary had not personally met within two years before the date of filing the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act, and that the petitioner had not established that compliance with the meeting requirement would result in extreme hardship to the petitioner or violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. *Decision of the Acting Director*, dated January 21, 2004.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

> (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
>
> (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
>
> (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

> . . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

(1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or

(2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the

> required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation at section 214.2 does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on September 29, 2003. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on September 29, 2001 and ended on September 29, 2003.

In response to the acting director's request for evidence and additional information, the petitioner submitted a letter indicating that he was unable to travel to Pakistan to meet the beneficiary because he has two children and a job in the United States. The petitioner submitted the terms of the joint custody agreement for his children between he and his former spouse, the children's mother. The acting director determined that the issues raised by the petitioner did not amount to extreme hardship.

On appeal, the petitioner states that seeing the beneficiary would violate strict and long-established customs of his people and that he is a single parent with three kids and a full-time job. *Letter from Mohammed Esmailzada*, dated February 19, 2004. The petitioner also submits a letter from the Islamic Association of Afghans in New York and New Jersey.

The AAO notes that although section 214(d) of the Act requires the petitioner and the beneficiary to meet, it does not require the petitioner to travel to the beneficiary's home country. The record on appeal does not demonstrate that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored options for a meeting beyond the petitioner traveling to Pakistan, including, but not limited to the beneficiary traveling to meet the petitioner in the United States or a bordering country. Moreover, the financial and time commitments required for travel to a foreign country are a common requirement to those filing the Form I-129F petition and do not constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner.

The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's assertion that he is unable to travel to meet the beneficiary owing to his adherence to the Muslim-Afghan faith. *Id.* The AAO notes that the submitted letter from the Islamic Association of Afghan, Inc. does not state that the petitioner is prohibited from meeting the beneficiary. The letter indicates that the petitioner and the beneficiary are allowed to be together unchaperoned after their engagement. The letter further states that the beneficiary's family held an engagement party in honor of the petitioner and the beneficiary on May 3, 2003. *Letter from Noor Iqbal*, dated February 15, 2004. The statements in the submitted letter do not substantiate the petitioner's assertion that a meeting between he and the beneficiary would "violate strict and long-established customs of [his] people." *Letter from Mohammed Esmailzada*. In the absence of substantiating documentation, the assertions of the petitioner standing alone do not form the basis for a finding of extreme hardship to the petitioner or that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice.

The evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner and the beneficiary met as required. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances as the petitioner has presented them, the AAO does not find that compliance with the meeting requirement would result in extreme hardship to the petitioner or would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. The petitioner may file a new Form I-129F petition on the beneficiary's behalf when sufficient evidence is available.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.