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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

D6



NOV 18 2009

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date:

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to § 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Pakistan, as the fiancé(e) of a United States citizen pursuant to § 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition because the record contains no evidence that the petitioner and the beneficiary have personally met within the last two years or that the petitioner qualified for a waiver of that requirement. On appeal, the petitioner provides a personal, undated letter, and two letters, one undated and the other dated July 1, 2009, from two persons "with the same background" as the petitioner.

Section 101(a)(15)(K)(i) of the Act defines "fiancé(e)" as:

An alien who is the fiancée or fiancé of a citizen of the United States . . . and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with the petitioner within ninety days after admission

Section 214(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1), states in pertinent part that a fiancé(e) petition:

[s]hall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and

(2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on December 30, 2008. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met in person between December 30, 2006 and December 30, 2008.

When he filed the petition, the petitioner responded “No” to question #18 on the I-129F Petition that asks whether he and the beneficiary had met in person within the two years before the filing of the petition. The petitioner indicated that he and the beneficiary had an arranged marriage and that they had never met in person.

In response to the director’s April 13, 2009 Request for Evidence (RFE), the petitioner submitted a letter dated May 5, 2009 from the president of the Afghan Islamic Center in Schenectady, New York, stating that the petitioner and the beneficiary were engaged on August 31, 2007, that the engagement was arranged by the parents, and that, in accordance with the customs of the Swat region, no photos or videotape were taken of the engagement.

The director denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish that he and the beneficiary had met, as required under section 214(d)(1) of the Act, or that he qualified for an exemption from this meeting requirement, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2).

On appeal, the petitioner states that Pashtoon culture strictly forbids the bride and groom from seeing or talking to each other before getting married. The petitioner also states that USCIS approved a petition for his sister under the same circumstances. The petitioner provides a an undated letter from [REDACTED] who states that, in the Pashtoon culture, an engaged male and female cannot see or talk to each other until they are properly married. The petitioner also provides a letter dated July 1, 2009, from [REDACTED] who states that he is “from the same culture and religion” as the petitioner, and that, although not prohibited by their religion, their culture and tradition do not allow a male and female to meet or see each other before getting married.

At the outset, the AAO acknowledges the petitioner’s assertion that USCIS approved a petition for his sister under the same circumstances. The director's decision does not indicate whether he reviewed the prior approval of the other nonimmigrant petition. If the previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. *See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).

Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petition on behalf of the petitioner’s sister, the AAO would not be bound to follow the

contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), *aff'd*, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001).

The AAO also acknowledges the petitioner's statement on appeal that his culture and tradition strictly forbid him from seeing or talking to the beneficiary prior to their wedding day. The petitioner, however, has not presented any credible evidence that compliance with the in-person meeting requirement would violate his customs, traditions, and culture. Nor do [REDACTED], and the president of the Afghan Islamic Center provide any credible information indicating that compliance with the meeting requirement would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

In view of the foregoing, the AAO cannot find that the petitioner should be exempt from the requirement of an in-person meeting between him and the beneficiary. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The petition must be denied.

The denial of the petition is without prejudice. Should the petitioner wish to file a new I-129F Petition, he should ensure that he has documentary evidence of having met the beneficiary in person within the two years before the filing of the petition, or sufficient evidence to establish that the requirement should be waived. If necessary, the petitioner should consult the instructions to the Form I-129F to understand the specific documents that he should file along with the petition. The petitioner may download the I-129F petition with the instructions from the USCIS website at www.uscis.gov, or he may call the USCIS National Customer Service Center (NCSC) at 1-800-375-5283 to have the form and the instructions mailed to his home.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.