





U.S. Citizenship
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Services


(b)(6)



DATE: **FEB 28 2013** OFFICE: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker under Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:


101(a)(15)(L)
D7

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to classify the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a foreign company registered in the states of California and New Jersey, engages in IT infrastructure management service. The petitioner is a branch office of [REDACTED] based in Bangalore, India. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as a quality consultant for a period of three years.

The director denied the petition, concluding that the beneficiary's placement at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer is essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated employer, in violation of the L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004.

The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel asserts the director erred by mischaracterizing the petitioner as a "labor for hire" provider. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in support of appeal.

I. The Law

To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the U.S. temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate.

If the beneficiary will be serving the United States employer in a managerial or executive capacity, a qualified beneficiary may be classified as an L-1A nonimmigrant alien. If a qualified beneficiary will be rendering services in a capacity that involves "specialized knowledge," the beneficiary may be classified as an L-1B nonimmigrant alien. *Id.*

Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge:

For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company.

Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as:

[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form I-129 shall be accompanied by:

- (i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) of this section.
- (ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
- (iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition.
- (iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the United States; however the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad.

Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act (the "L-1 Visa Reform Act") provides:

An alien who will serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to an employer for purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L) and will be stationed primarily at the worksite of an employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate, subsidiary, or parent shall not be eligible for classification under section 101(a)(15)(L) if—

- (i) The alien will be controlled and supervised principally by such unaffiliated employer; or
- (ii) The placement of the alien at the worksite of the unaffiliated employer is essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated employer, rather than a placement in connection with the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary.

II. Facts and Procedural History

The petitioner is an IT infrastructure management services provider. The petitioner employs approximately 1780 employees worldwide, and 20 employees in the United States. The petitioner's gross annual income is approximately \$33 million.

The petitioner stated the beneficiary will be working as a quality consultant, assigned to the company's [REDACTED] account. The petitioner specified that the beneficiary would be assigned to work at [REDACTED] facilities in Cincinnati, Ohio. The petitioner specified that the beneficiary would be assigned to work on a project which "involves integration of [REDACTED] proprietary tool, [REDACTED] into a [REDACTED] Tool which [REDACTED] is in the process of deploying." The petitioner asserted that, since January 2011, the beneficiary has "been involved with evaluating, planning, and implementing Service-Now for [REDACTED] and lead day to day operations on [REDACTED]."

The petitioner asserted that the beneficiary "is needed on the [REDACTED] project because of his specialized knowledge in the [REDACTED] tool," which the petitioner claimed was developed in 2009. The petitioner asserted that from January 2009 to December 2009, the beneficiary "led the technical team in the deployment of the [REDACTED] tool." The petitioner asserted that the beneficiary was "involved in the designing of the frame work for [REDACTED]'s integration with various applications." The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary "became certified in the [REDACTED] tool in August 2009," and explained that this certification is reserved for "a select number of individuals who have acquired knowledge and expertise in the [REDACTED] tool." The petitioner concluded: "The Beneficiary's many years of professional experience, his certification in Microwhiz, coupled with his specialized knowledge of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] tool, differentiates the Beneficiary from other IT professionals both within [REDACTED] and the IT industry."

The petitioner listed the beneficiary's proposed job duties in the United States as the following:

- Discuss and finalize on different feasible options and integration plans for [REDACTED] with technical team;
- Conduct periodic meetings with different technical teams to discuss progress and roadblock of [REDACTED] tool;
- Customize [REDACTED] tool to meet the requirements of different network products and applications;
- Interface with different technical teams and acquire understanding on the implementation of the current infrastructure;
- Documentation of installation and configuration of [REDACTED]'s tool related to the [REDACTED] environment;
- Work with customers and technical teams to pre-stage the environment for Integration phase;
- Evaluate, plan, and implement [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] and lead day to day operations on [REDACTED];
- Conduct VOCs for business requirement during project initiation stage;
- Consolidate requirement, conduct feasibility analysis and define requirement, build functional design and specification including logic of various workflow modules and interfaces and documentation;

- Perform UATs on stage environment based on the functional design and specification;
- Finalize documentation of Integration Plans and timelines with client; and
- Conduct post integration tests for the functionality of the [REDACTED] tool.

In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted, *inter alia*, the following documents:

1. Master Services Agreement for Information Technology between [REDACTED] (“Company”) and the petitioner (“Service Provider”) dated January 29, 2011. This agreement states, in pertinent part, that all “Type 1 Materials,” including computer programs, computer systems, data compilations, designs, and other tangible and intangible materials by the Service Provider “shall be considered works made for hire, are the sole and exclusive property of Company, and shall include all newly developed materials including, but not limited to, the Deliverables”;
2. A presentation explaining the petitioner’s [REDACTED] tool, which demonstrated [REDACTED]’s performance and efficiency achieved since 2007; and
3. “Certificate of Training Participation,” issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary, stating: “We are pleased to confer you with this certificate In lieu of successful completion of [REDACTED] Aug 2009 [sic].”

The director denied the petition, concluding that the placement of the beneficiary at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer is essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated employer, rather than a placement in connection with the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. The director emphasized the language in the Master Services Agreement between [REDACTED] and the petitioner, which stated that the materials developed, authored, or prepared for [REDACTED] shall be considered “works for hire.” The director concluded that the petitioner is providing is, essentially, quality consultancy services for hire to maintain [REDACTED] already existing system and/or software, rather than developing the petitioner’s own software. The director also concluded that “the beneficiary’s knowledge may only be tangentially related to the performance of the proposed offsite activity.”

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner is not merely a “labor for hire” company but rather a “globally renowned service provider.” Counsel explains that [REDACTED] has hired the petitioner to perform on various projects and deliverables, and that these engagements are not “per person or ‘labor for hire’ contracts but overall completion of services contracts which involve many people.” Counsel emphasizes the petitioner’s 10-year working relationship with [REDACTED], and emphasizes that that during this time, [REDACTED] has never once hired any of the petitioner’s employees.

Regarding the Master Services Agreement, counsel asserts that the director misinterpreted the term “works for hire” as synonymous with “labor for hire.” Counsel explains that the term “works for hire” refers to [REDACTED] attempt to protect their intellectual property rights, specifically, that the “works for hire” provision clarifies that the work being done by the petitioner for [REDACTED] “becomes [REDACTED] property.” Counsel asserts: “Therefore, it should not be interpreted that the sole reason for this contract was ‘labor for hire’.”

III. Analysis

a. *Employment in a Specialized Knowledge Capacity*

Although the director denied the petition on the sole ground that the petition was an impermissible arrangement to provide labor for hire, the AAO will first discuss the preliminary issue of whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Prior to evaluating whether the L-1 Visa Reform Act applies, USCIS must first determine whether the beneficiary is employed in a specialized knowledge capacity.¹ Upon a thorough review of the record, the AAO finds that the record fails to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D).

In order to establish eligibility, the petitioner must show that the individual will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The statutory definition of specialized knowledge at Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act is comprised of two equal but distinct subparts or prongs. First, an individual is considered to be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge if that person "has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets." Second, an individual is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge if that person "has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company." See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D). The petitioner may establish eligibility by submitting evidence that the beneficiary and the proffered position satisfy either prong of the definition.

USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. See *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). The director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *Id.*

As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's knowledge is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge against that of others in the petitioning company and/or against others holding comparable positions in the industry. The ultimate question is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that

¹ If the beneficiary is not employed in a specialized knowledge capacity, the petition may be denied on this basis and there is no need to address the requirements of the L-1 Visa Reform Act. Nevertheless, because the director solely addressed the L-1 Visa Reform Act issue and counsel objects to the applicability of the L-1 Visa Reform Act on appeal, the AAO will discuss both the specialized knowledge and the L-1 Visa Reform Act issues in this decision. The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g. *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is special or advanced, and that the beneficiary's position requires such knowledge.

In the present case, the petitioner's claims are based upon the first prong of the statutory definition. The petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of its product, the [REDACTED] tool. However, other than broadly claiming that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the [REDACTED] tool, the petitioner has neither adequately articulated nor documented any basis to support its claim.

The petitioner's claims regarding the beneficiary's qualifications are not supported by the record, and are not entirely credible or consistent. For instance, the petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary "became certified in the [REDACTED] tool in August 2009." The petitioner implied that this certification is proof of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge, claiming that the certification "is reserved for a select number of individuals who have acquired the knowledge and expertise in the [REDACTED] tool." However, the petitioner failed to support this claim with credible documentation. The actual certificate issued to the beneficiary in August 2009 was a "Certificate of Training Participation" issued "[i]n lieu of successful completion of [REDACTED] (emphasis added)." This certificate establishes only that the beneficiary participated in [REDACTED] training. This certificate does not in any way establish or suggest that the beneficiary successfully completed the [REDACTED] training program, or that he acquired "expertise" in the [REDACTED] tool; to the contrary, the certificate suggests that the beneficiary did not successfully complete the [REDACTED] training program, as the certificate was issued "in lieu of" successful completion. The petitioner also submitted no evidence support its claim that this certification "is reserved for a select number of individuals," as the petitioner provided no background information and evidence establishing how many of its other employees have successfully completed or participated in its [REDACTED] training. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

The petitioner claimed that the beneficiary was part of the team that designed the [REDACTED] tool, and that he "led the technical team in the deployment of the [REDACTED] tool" from January 2009 to December 2009. The petitioner also claims that the beneficiary was "involved in designing the frame work for [REDACTED] intergration with various applications" and "designed the approach, functional modules, scripting and integration. However, the petitioner submitted no documentation to support its claim. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). Nevertheless, the fact that the beneficiary was not given the "Certificate of Training Participation" until August 2009 – midway during the period of time he purportedly "led the technical team in the deployment of the [REDACTED] tool" - undermines the petitioner's claims regarding the importance of the beneficiary's role in the design and development of the [REDACTED] tool.

Moreover, although the petitioner claimed that the [REDACTED] tool was developed in June 2009, the documentation in the record establishes that the [REDACTED] tool had been deployed as early as June 2007.

This discrepancy is especially significant considering the petitioner's claims regarding the beneficiary's involvement in the design and deployment of the [REDACTED] tool in 2009. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Id.*

The petitioner failed to differentiate the beneficiary from others in its organization or in the IT industry. The petitioner asserted: "[t]he Beneficiary's many years of professional experience, his certification in [REDACTED] coupled with his specialized knowledge of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] tool, differentiates the Beneficiary from other IT professionals both within [REDACTED] and the IT industry." However, other than this broad, unsupported statement, the petitioner did provide any other explanation or documentation to support its claim. The fact that the beneficiary has many years of professional experience does not establish in any way that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. As discussed above, the petitioner failed to explain and document how the beneficiary's knowledge of the [REDACTED] tool amounts to specialized knowledge, and the beneficiary's "certification" in [REDACTED] is nothing more than a certification of training participation. The record is completely devoid of any evidence to establish how the beneficiary is different from his peers, both inside and outside of the petitioning organization, as claimed.

For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

b. L-1 Visa Reform Act

Assuming *arguendo* that the petitioner had established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, the terms of the L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 would still mandate the denial of this petition.

If a specialized knowledge beneficiary will be primarily stationed at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer, the statute mandates that the petitioner establish both: (1) that the beneficiary will be controlled and supervised principally by the petitioner, and (2) that the placement is related to the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act. These two questions of fact must be established for the record by documentary evidence; neither the unsupported assertions of counsel or the employer will suffice to establish eligibility. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158; *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988). If the petitioner fails to establish *both* of these elements, the beneficiary will be deemed ineligible for classification as an L-1B intracompany transferee. The petitioner bears the burden of proving eligibility. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1).

Here, the record is undisputed that the beneficiary will be primarily stationed at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer, [REDACTED], located in Cincinnati, Ohio. The director concedes that the beneficiary will be controlled and supervised principally by the petitioner. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the beneficiary's placement is essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated employer, rather than a

placement related to the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. Section 214(c)(2)(F)(ii) of the Act. The petitioner must demonstrate in the first instance that the beneficiary's offsite employment is primarily connected with the provision of the petitioner's product or service which necessitates specialized knowledge that is *specific to the petitioning employer*. If the petitioner fails to prove this element, the beneficiary's employment will be deemed an impermissible arrangement to provide "labor for hire" under the terms of the L-1 Visa Reform Act.

Upon review of the record, the AAO concludes that the beneficiary's placement will not be primarily related to the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge is *specific to the petitioning employer*, and therefore, is essentially an arrangement to provide "labor for hire."

The record reflects that the beneficiary will be assigned to work on a project that involves integration of [redacted] proprietary tool, [redacted] into [redacted] Tool. Significantly, the petitioner described one of the beneficiary's job duties in the United States as to "[e]valuate, plan, and implement [redacted] for [redacted], and lead day to day operations on [redacted] (emphasis added)." The petitioner also explained that, since January 2011, the beneficiary has "been involved with evaluating, planning, and implementing [redacted] for [redacted] and lead day to day operations on [redacted]."

From the petitioner's job description, particularly the beneficiary's past and proposed duty to "lead day to day operations on [redacted]," the record supports the conclusion that the beneficiary's placement will be primarily for the purpose of maintaining and/or developing [redacted] system; rather than to develop the petitioner's own product or service. The petitioner failed to establish how the beneficiary's placement will be primarily related to the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge is *specific to the petitioning employer*, other than to broadly state that the project involves "integration" of [redacted] into [redacted] Service Now system.²

Counsel's assertion that the director mischaracterized the "works for hire" language in the Master Services Agreement is unpersuasive. The director correctly highlighted the "works for hire" language in the Master Services Agreement to support its conclusion that the beneficiary's placement would essentially amount to "labor for hire." According to the Master Services Agreement, the petitioner is charged with developing works that ultimately become the "sole and exclusive property" of [redacted]. Given the terms of the agreement, it is impossible to conclude that the services provided under the agreement will be for the primary purpose of developing the petitioner's product. Rather, the Master Services Agreement indicates that the primary purpose of the petitioner's services is to develop [redacted] own products or systems.

While it is possible that the beneficiary here possesses knowledge that is directly related to both the petitioner and the unaffiliated employer's product or service, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the position for which the beneficiary's services are sought is one that primarily requires knowledge specific to the petitioner. Here, the petitioner has failed to provide corroborating evidence demonstrating that the

² Notably, the petitioner failed to submit the Statement of Work for the actual project the beneficiary would be assigned to work involving [redacted] tool, although the petitioner submitted copies of other Statements of Work between the petitioner and [redacted].

beneficiary's placement with the unaffiliated employer is related to the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary.

Finally, on appeal, counsel emphasizes the petitioner's ten-year working relationship with [REDACTED], the fact that [REDACTED] has never hired one of its employees, and the petitioner's status as a "globally renowned service provider." Counsel asserts that the petitioner's engagements with [REDACTED] "are not per person or 'labor for hire' contracts but overall completion of services contracts which involve many people." Counsel concludes that the company is a reputable service provider, and "not just a labor for hire company [*sic*]."

However, the factors counsel cited are irrelevant to the inquiry of whether the beneficiary's placement constitutes "labor for hire" for L-1 Visa Reform Act purposes. Section 214(c)(2)(F)(ii) of the Act specifies that the placement of the alien at the worksite of the unaffiliated employer is essentially an arrangement to provide "labor for hire" for the unaffiliated employer, *unless* such placement is in connection with the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. The critical inquiry, then, is the nature of the beneficiary's particular placement, not the nature of the working relationship between the petitioner and the unaffiliated employer, or even the petitioner's reputation as a "globally renowned service provider." Even if it were true that the service contracts between [REDACTED] and the petitioner "are not per person or 'labor for hire' contracts but overall completion of services contracts which involve many people," this alone does not preclude the possibility that the services the beneficiary will provide will be for the primary purpose of developing the unaffiliated employer's product.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility. *Matter of Brantigan*, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. In evaluating the evidence, eligibility is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. *Id.*

For the reasons discussed above, the evidence submitted fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary's placement at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer is permissible under the L-1 Visa Reform Act. For this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here the petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.