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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

GI

[REDACTED]

FILE:

[REDACTED]

Office: BALTIMORE

Date: FEB 22 2005

IN RE:

Obligor:

Bonded Alien

[REDACTED]

IMMIGRATION BOND:

Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

ON BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Mari Johnson

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the Field Officer Director, Detention and Removal, Baltimore, Maryland, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The record indicates that on November 27, 2000, the obligor posted a \$10,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated March 14, 2003, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at 10:00 a.m. on April 14, 2003, at [REDACTED]. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On April 15, 2003, the field officer director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel states that this matter is a pre-IIRAIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) case, thus the rule established in *Shrode v. Rowoldt*, 213 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1954), applies. Counsel argues that ICE lost detention authority and the authority to maintain the bond after 180 days.

The record reflects that a removal hearing was held on March 2, 1999 and the alien was ordered removed from the United States. The bonded alien appealed the immigration judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On May 11, 1999, the BIA dismissed the appeal as untimely. The alien was arrested and released from custody under a delivery bond posted for the supervision of the alien on November 27, 2002. The bond was issued after the effective date of IIRAIRA, April 1, 1997, and section 241(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) is the governing law of the case.

The AAO has continually held that the Secretary's authority to maintain a delivery bond is not contingent upon his authority to detain the alien. Counsel suggests this ruling is contrary to *Shrode v. Rowoldt*, 213 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1954). 37333055

Following his arrest for violating immigration laws, Rowoldt, the alien in *Shrode*, was released on a bond conditioned upon his appearance for deportation proceedings. Although the order of deportation became final in April 1952, he was not deported. In October 1952, more than six months after the deportation order became final, Rowoldt was placed on supervisory parole. Immigration officials, however, refused to release him from bond.

In upholding the lower court's decision releasing Rowoldt from bond, the appellate court noted that the statute granted the Attorney General supervisory and limited detention authority but did not authorize the posting of bond. The court stated that the requirement to post bail is tantamount to making the sureties jailers, and that the power to require bail connotes the power to imprison in the absence of such bail. Since the only authority the Attorney General could exercise in Rowoldt's case was supervisory, a bond could not be required.

Since *Shrode*, section 305 of the IIRAIRA added section 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). It provides generally that the Secretary shall remove an alien from the United States within 90 days following the order of removal, with the 90-day period suspended for cause. During the 90-day removal period, the Secretary shall exercise detention authority by taking the alien into custody and canceling any previously posted bond unless the bond has been breached or is subject to being breached. Section 241(a)(2) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 241.3(a).

Section 241(a)(3) of the Act provides that if an alien does not leave or is not removed during the 90-day period, the alien shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Posting of a bond may be authorized as a condition of release after the 90-day detention period. 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b). Thus, unlike in *Shrode*, the Secretary has the continuing authority to require aliens to post bond following the 90-day post-order detention period.

The obligor is bound by the terms of the contract to which it obligated itself. The terms of the I-352 for bonds conditioned upon the delivery of the alien establish the following condition: "the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself . . . upon each and every written request until *exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings* . . . are finally terminated." (Emphasis added). Thus, the obligor is bound to deliver the alien by the express terms of the bond contract until either exclusion, deportation or removal proceedings are finally terminated, or one of the other conditions occurs.

The Act at section 241(a)(3) and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 expressly authorize ICE to issue and maintain the delivery bond. This authority has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and *Doan v. INS*, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (legacy INS) to require the posting of a bond as a condition of release after it lost detention authority over the alien, even though a bond was not provided as a condition of release by the statute. In *Doan*, the 9th Circuit held the legacy INS had the authority to require a \$10,000 delivery bond in a supervised release context even though it did not have detention authority. These cases arose in the post-removal period, and it is obvious from the rulings that detention authority is not the sole determining factor as to whether ICE can require a delivery bond.

The bond contract provides that it may be canceled when (1) exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings are finally terminated; (2) the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or deportation/removal; or (3) the bond is otherwise canceled. The circumstances under which the bond may be "otherwise canceled" occur when the Secretary or the Attorney General imposes a requirement for another bond, and the alien posts such a bond, or when the alien is taken into custody. As the obligor has not shown that any of these circumstances apply, the bond is not canceled.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by ICE for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;

(iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;

(iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The evidence of record indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien dated March 14, 2003 was sent to the obligor at [REDACTED] via certified mail. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien on April 14, 2003. The domestic return receipt indicates the obligor received notice to produce the bonded alien on March 17, 2003. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

Pursuant to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement, entered into on June 22, 1995 by the legacy INS and Far West Surety Insurance Company, ICE agreed that a properly completed questionnaire would be attached to all Form I-340s (Notices to Surrender) going to the obligor on a surety bond. The failure to attach the questionnaire would result in rescission of any breach related to that Form I-340.

Based on the provisions of the Amwest Agreement and the fact that the record fails to show that a properly completed questionnaire was sent to the obligor, the appeal will be sustained. The field office director's decision declaring the bond breached will be rescinded and the bond will be continued in full force and effect.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The field office director's decision declaring the bond breached is rescinded and the bond is continued in full force and effect.