U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: DEC 20 2010

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g), and section 212(a)(9)(B)(v), of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently $585, but will increase to $630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the $630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Michael Shumway

for Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year; and section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I), as an alien classified as having a physical/mental disorder with associated behavior that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety or welfare of the alien or others. The applicant seeks waivers of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(g) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and 1182(g). The acting district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that her bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, counsel contends that the director failed to state the applicant's physical or mental disorder and specify the applicant's credibility issues. Counsel avers that consideration was not given to the extreme hardship to all of the applicant's qualifying relatives. According to counsel, no consideration was given to the applicant's child's behavioral and developmental problems.

We will first address the finding of inadmissibility. The applicant was found to be inadmissible for unlawful presence under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. That section provides, in part:

> (B) Aliens Unlawfully Present
>
> > (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
> >
> > > (I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or
> > >
> > > (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
>
> . . . .

USCIS records reflect that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in November 2000 and remained in the country until her departure in June 2007. She therefore began to accrue unlawful presence from November 2000 until June 2007, when she left the country and triggered the ten-year bar, rendering her inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

The waiver for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. That section provides that:

> (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios are possible should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action to be taken is difficult, and it is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige,* 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board stated in *Matter of Ige*:

> [W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang,* 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme

hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g.*, *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

In rendering this decision, the AAO will consider all of the evidence in the record including photographs, letters, birth certificates, a marriage certificate, and other documentation. We note that the letter from [redacted] does not have an English language translation. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) states:

> (3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to USCIS shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

In that letter is written completely in Spanish and has no translation, the letter will carry no weight in this proceeding.

The applicant's husband indicates in an undated letter that he has a close relationship with his wife and need to be in the United States, where they are a part of his church community, and have access to good hospitals, pediatricians, health insurance, education, and employment. The applicant's husband conveys that his parents and siblings live in the United State and that he wants his son raised here. r states in the letter dated July 17, 2007 that the applicant's son, who was born on August 28, 2004, was diagnosed with developmental delay, language delay, and behavioral problems, which he has had since September 15, 2006. He indicates that the applicant's son was referred to their Children's House at Baylor and to different psychologists in Dallas, Texas, and that they "feel strongly that it is most appropriate for [the applicant's son] to continue receiving treatments for his complex problems in the United States, his native country" in the company of his mother and father. We note that the applicant's wife was diagnosed with features of major depressive disorder in the psychological report from dated July 6, 2007. Dr. Assael also conveys that the applicant has major depressive disorder, which she reports having since she was 17 years old as a result of physical and sexual abuse. We note that former counsel states in the letter dated June 28, 2007 that the applicant was the primary care provider of her son, and that the applicant's husband would experience extreme hardship without his wife. Ms. avers in the letter dated June 21, 2007 that the applicant's husband earns $14.00 per hour as a Collector Level II at Friedman's Jewelers. Letters from neighbors, family members, and friends attest to the close relationship of the applicant and her husband and son.

Family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the type of familial relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing "physical proximity to her family" in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and otherwise establish a life together, such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 ("[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents."). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly

where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS,* 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of familial relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-,* 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Indeed, the specific facts of a case may dictate that even the separation of a spouse and children from an applicant does not constitute extreme hardship. In *Matter of Ngai*, for instance, the Board did not find extreme hardship because the claims of hardship conflicted with evidence in the record and because the applicant and his spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years. 19 I&N Dec. at 247. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The hardship factors asserted in the instant case, and demonstrated by the evidence in the record, are the emotional impact to the applicant's husband as a result of separation from his wife and the influence of her separation on their son, who requires treatment for developmental and behavioral problems. In view of the substantial weight that is given to this type of family separation in the hardship analysis, and in light of the significant effect that the record establishes that separation from the applicant will have on the applicant's husband, we find the applicant has demonstrated that the hardship that her husband will experience as a result of separation is extreme.

If the applicant's husband joined her to live in Mexico, we find that the evidence in the record demonstrates that he would experience extreme hardship. [redacted] indicates that the applicant's son was referred to Children's House at Baylor in July 2007 to receive treatment from different psychologists, and that their son should continue receiving treatments in the United States, which is his native country. The applicant's husband indicates in an undated letter that his parents brought him and his siblings to live in the United States when he was very young. In view of the applicant's mental health problems and their son's developmental and behavioral problems, we find that the applicant's spouse would experience extreme emotional hardship if he had to cope with both his son's and wife's problems without the support of his parents, siblings, and church community, and while living in a country where he has not lived since he was a child. We note that [redacted] indicates that both the applicant and her husband are needed to provide family-focused care for their son.

The acting district director also determined that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of the Act as an alien classified as having a physical/mental disorder with associated behavior that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety or welfare of the alien or others.

Section 212(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Classes of Aliens Ineligible for Visas or Admission.--Except as otherwise provided in this

Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(1) Health-related grounds.--

(A) In general.-Any alien-

(iii) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in consultation with the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security])—

(I) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others . . . is inadmissible.

(B) Waiver authorized.--For provision authorizing waiver of certain clauses of subparagraph (A), see subsection (g).

Section 212(g) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(g) The Attorney General may waive the application of—

(3) subsection (a)(1)(A)(iii) in the case of any alien, in accordance with such terms, conditions, and controls, if any, including the giving of bond, as the [Secretary], in the discretion of the [Secretary] after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may by regulation prescribe.

The record reflects that the panel physician who conducted the applicant's medical examination referred the applicant to a psychologist for an evaluation after reporting that she was arrested for driving under the influence on January 28, 2007. The psychologist classified the applicant as having a Class A medical condition, Alcohol Abuse, with associated Harmful Behavior. The Acting District Director found the applicant inadmissible under section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act on this basis.

Regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(b) govern aliens with certain mental conditions, who are eligible for immigrant visas but require the approval of waivers of grounds of inadmissibility. The regulations require that the applicant submit the waiver application and a statement to the appropriate U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services (USCIS) office indicating that arrangements have been made to provide the alien's complete medical history, including details of any hospitalization or institutional care or treatment for any physical or mental condition; the alien's current physical and mental condition, including prognosis and life expectancy; and a psychiatric examination. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(b)(4). "For an alien with a past history of mental illness, the medical report shall also contain available information on which the U.S. Public Health Service can base a finding as to whether the alien has been free of such mental illness for a period of time sufficient in the light of such history to demonstrate recovery." *Id.* The medical report must then be forwarded to the U.S. Public Health Service for review. *Id.* These regulations further provide:

(ii) *Submission of statement.* Upon being notified that the medical report has been reviewed by the U.S. Public Health Service and determined to be acceptable, the alien or the alien's sponsoring family member shall submit a statement to the consular or [USCIS] office. The statement must be from a clinic, hospital, institution, specialized facility, or specialist in the United States approved by the U.S. Public Health Service. The alien or alien's sponsor may be referred to the mental retardation or mental health agency of the state of proposed residence for guidance in selecting a post-arrival medical examining authority who will complete the evaluation and provide an evaluation report to the Centers for Disease Control. The statement must specify the name and address of the specialized facility, or specialist, and must affirm that:

(A) The specified facility or specialist agrees to evaluate the alien's mental status and prepare a complete report of the findings of such evaluation.

(B) The alien, the alien's sponsoring family member, or another responsible person has made complete financial arrangements for payment of any charges that may be incurred after arrival for studies, care, training and service;

(C) The Director, Division of Quarantine, Center for Prevention Services, Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, GA. 30333 shall be furnished:

(*1*) The report evaluating the alien's mental status within 30 days after the alien's arrival; and

(*2*) Prompt notification of the alien's failure to report to the facility or specialist within 30 days after being notified by the U.S. Public Health Service that the alien has arrived in the United States.

(D) The alien shall be in an outpatient, inpatient, study, or other specified status as determined by the responsible local physician or specialist during the initial evaluation.

The record reflects that the applicant fails to meet the requirements for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(g) of the Act. The record contains a Centers for Disease Control (CDC) form 4,422-1, Statements in Support of Application for Waiver of Inadmissibility. Part I of CDC form 4,422-1 reflects that the Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Service (PHS) received the required medical documentation regarding the applicant's present condition. The PHS reviewing official, [redacted] M.D., Director, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Infectious Diseases, classified the applicant as having a Class A medical condition, Alcohol Abuse and Mood Disorder, which renders her inadmissible under section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of the Act. Part II of CDC form 4,422-1 shows that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(b)(4)(ii), the applicant obtained the required statement from [redacted] Ph.D., Licensed Psychologist, at a PHS-approved facility, Neuropsychology Associates of Dallas. The applicant's husband completed Part III of Form CDC 4,422-1, attesting that necessary arrangements for further examination of the applicant will be made upon her entry to the United States. However, [redacted] has not yet approved the applicant's Form CDC 4,422-1, thus there is no certification of PHS's opinion that appropriate follow-up care will be provided upon the applicant's entry to the United States, and that PHS has no objection to her entry. Therefore, the AAO finds that

the applicant has not established eligibility for a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility arising under section 212(g) of the Act pertaining to aliens who have been classified as having a Class A medical condition.

Lastly, we need not make a determination as to whether the applicant's theft conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, which would render her inadmissible under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because the record establishes that her theft conviction is a misdemeanor, and the maximum penalty possible for a class A misdemeanor is not more than 180 days in county jail; and for a class B misdemeanor it is not more than 1 year in jail. Her conviction meets the requirements set forth for a petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act.

The applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to her spouse if he remained the in United States without her and if he joined her to live in Mexico. However, the applicant has not demonstrated eligibility for a section 212(g) waiver. Thus, we find that she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of the Act as an alien classified as having a physical/mental disorder with associated behavior that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety or welfare of the alien or others.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under sections 212(h) and 212(g) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act. Here, the applicant has not met that burden with regards to section 212(g). Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the waiver application will be denied.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.