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U.S. Citizenship  
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


FILE: [REDACTED] Office: LOS ANGELES, CA Date: **JUL 03 2007**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation in January 1995. The applicant is married to a lawful permanent resident and has three U.S. citizen children. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

The district director determined that the applicant failed to establish that her spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of her inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated March 28, 2006.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant's spouse and children will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is found to be inadmissible. He asserts that the applicant's spouse and children greatly depend on her for a lot of things, not the least of which are the care, love and companionship of a wife and mother. *Counsel's Brief*, dated December 26, 2004.

The record reflects that on July 19, 2005, the applicant signed a sworn statement stating that in January 1995 she entered the United States through a port of entry near Tijuana, Mexico by presenting a fraudulent U.S. passport.

The AAO notes that aliens making false claims to U.S. citizenship on or after September 30, 1996 are ineligible to apply for a Form I-601 waiver. See Sections 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 afford aliens in the applicant's position, those making false claims to U.S. citizenship prior to September 30, 1996, the eligibility to apply for a waiver.

In considering a case where a false claim to U.S. citizenship has been made, Service [CIS] officers should review the information on the alien to determine whether the false claim to U.S. citizenship was made before, on, or after September 30, 1996. If the false claim was made before the enactment of IIRIRA, Service [CIS] officers should then determine whether (1) the false claim was made to procure an immigration benefit under the Act; and (2) whether such claim was made before a U.S. Government official. If these two additional requirements are met, the alien should be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and advised of the waiver requirements under section 212(i) of the Act.

*Memorandum by Joseph R. Greene, Acting Associate Commissioner, Office of Programs, Immigration and Naturalization Service*, dated April 8, 1998 at 3. Because the applicant's fraudulent entry occurred in 1995, the applicant is eligible for a waiver pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on the applicant's U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse and/or parent. Hardship the alien herself experiences or her children experience due to separation is not considered in section 212(i) waiver proceedings unless it causes hardship to the applicant's spouse and/or parent.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA has held:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

*Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted). In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States," and, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). See also *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th

Cir. 1987) (remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). The AAO notes that the present case arises within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Separation of family will therefore be given the appropriate weight under Ninth Circuit law in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to the applicant’s spouse must be established in the event that he resides in Mexico or in the event that he resides in the United States, as he is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request. The AAO will consider the relevant factors in adjudication of this case.

The first part of the analysis requires the applicant to establish extreme hardship to her spouse in the event that he resides in Mexico. The AAO notes that the applicant did not make any assertions regarding the possibility of her spouse and children relocating to Mexico. Thus, the current record does not reflect that relocation will result in extreme hardship to the applicant’s spouse.

The second part of the analysis requires the applicant to establish extreme hardship in the event that her spouse remains in the United States. Counsel explains that the applicant and her spouse both work to support their family and that the applicant’s spouse would suffer multiple hardships if the applicant were removed from the United States. *Counsel’s Brief*, dated May 18, 2006. The applicant’s spouse states that the applicant’s sister cares for their children until 4:00pm, when the applicant returns home from work. *Spouse’s Affidavit*, dated May 20, 2006. He states that the applicant is the primary caregiver for their children and he would not be able to cope with the children without her. He explains that their son has problems with his vision and requires special attention. He states that the applicant coordinates with his teachers and makes sure he goes to the eye doctor. *Id.* The applicant’s spouse states that he does not know how he would pay for a babysitter and the family’s expenses without the help of the applicant. *Id.* He asserts that the pain and sadness he would feel as a result of the applicant’s removal would be unbearable. *Id.* In support of these assertions, the applicant submitted medical and financial documentation. The medical documentation confirms that the applicant’s son is suffering from vision problems. The financial documents submitted include: employment verification for the applicant and her spouse, a rental agreement, two utility bills, and an insurance premium statement. The AAO notes that these financial documents do not give a complete picture of the applicant’s family’s situation and no documentation was submitted to show that the applicant’s sister could not continue to help with childcare in the absence of the applicant. In addition, the AAO recognizes that the applicant’s spouse will endure emotional hardship as a result of separation from the applicant, but no evidence was submitted detailing the effects of this emotional hardship on the applicant’s well-being. Therefore, the AAO finds that the current record indicates that the hardship felt by the applicant’s spouse is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96

F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS, supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.