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U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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HL

FILE:

Office: ROME, ITALY

Date: FEB 06 2006

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Rome, Italy, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED], is a native and citizen of Palestine who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), which the OIC denied, finding the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. *Decision of the OIC*, dated November 7, 2005.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that the applicant applied for a nonimmigrant visa at the United States Consulate in Jerusalem on May 29, 2003. On that day, she wore a hijab with a Jordanian passport in the name [REDACTED]. One year later, on February 3, 2004, she applied for a nonimmigrant visa at the same consulate. On this occasion she presented a Palestinian passport in the name [REDACTED]. Because the applicant failed to disclose her prior refusal, her second application was denied. The record supports the finding that the applicant willfully misrepresented a material fact, her true identity, so as to gain admission into the United States. Accordingly, she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

The AAO will now address the finding that the grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is not warranted.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant and her child are not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, they are not included under section 212(i) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and her child will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant's naturalized citizen spouse.

Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors it considers relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566. The BIA indicated that these factors relate to the applicant’s “qualifying relative.” *Id.* at 565-566.

In *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996), the BIA stated that the factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists “provide a framework for analysis,” and that the “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” It further stated that “the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality” and then “determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994)).

Extreme hardship to the applicant’s husband must be established in the event that he joins the applicant; and in the alternative, that he remains in the United States. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

The record reflects that the applicant has a U.S. citizen daughter, who was born on April 30, 2006, in Palestine.

The record shows that the applicant’s husband, [REDACTED], is paid to care for his mother, [REDACTED]. *Addus Healthcare letter, dated November 8, 2005; In Home Visit Report, dated September 12, 2005; Illinois Department of Aging, Community Care Program, dated September 23, 2003; Letter dated November 8, 2005 from the applicant’s husband; affidavit from the applicant.* The record contains medical records of [REDACTED], including a document dated April 6, 2004 from Chicago Ridge Radiology, that indicate that due to a fall [REDACTED] injured her right shoulder. The record also contains a document indicating that [REDACTED] has an arterial disease that causes rigidity of brain arteries and affects her brain function globally. The document states that her chronic high blood pressure and anemia result in rigid brain blood vessels and microemboli (small tiny recurrent strokes), producing global brain impairment that affects her memory and cognition, and results in weak and delayed global motor skills. It states that she has chronic depression and severe arthritis of the shoulders, hands, back, and knees.

In a letter dated August 30, 2006, the applicant’s husband indicates that he would like to be with his wife and newborn daughter. In a letter dated July 12, 2005, the applicant’s husband states that he has been with his wife for four years and married her on September 1, 2004. [REDACTED] states that he loves his wife and

cannot live without her, and that separation has been hard. He states that if his wife's application is denied he will quit his job and move to the Middle East, although he would not want to do this.

In an interview, the applicant's wife states that separation has affected her husband's professional performance, as he is distracted.

The record contains telephone records, money transfer receipts, photographs, and other documents.

The AAO has carefully considered all of the evidence in the record in rendering this decision.

The record fails to establish that [REDACTED] would experience extreme hardship if he remained in the United States without his wife.

The record reflects that since October 2004 [REDACTED] has been paid to personally care for his mother, who has serious health problems. *Letter from Addus HealthCare, dated November 8, 2005*. However, the applicant has not established the connection between her mother-in-law's medical problems and the extreme hardship which she alleges her husband would experience if he remained in the United States without her. It is noted that [REDACTED]'s mother is not a qualifying relative under the Act.

Courts in the United States have stated that "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States," and also, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) ("We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.") (citations omitted).

Although [REDACTED] has a U.S. citizen child, this is not sufficient, in itself, to establish extreme hardship. The general proposition is that the mere birth of a deportee's child who is a U.S. citizen is not sufficient to prove extreme hardship. The BIA has held that birth of a U.S. citizen child is not per se extreme hardship. *Matter of Correa*, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984). In *Marquez-Medina v. INS*, 765 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit has stated that an illegal alien cannot gain a favored status merely by the birth of a citizen child. The Ninth Circuit has found that an alien illegally present in the United States cannot gain a favored status merely by the birth of his citizen child. *Lee v. INS*, 550 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977). In a per curiam decision, *Banks v. INS*, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit found that an alien, illegally within this country, cannot gain a favored status on the coattails of his (or her) child who happens to have been born in this country.

Moreover, in *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the BIA's finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it "was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent's bar to admission." (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). The Ninth Circuit in *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The AAO is mindful of and sympathetic to the emotional hardship that is undoubtedly endured as a result of separation from a loved one. After a careful and thoughtful consideration of the record, however, the AAO finds that the situation of [REDACTED] if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship as defined by the Act. The record before the AAO is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship, which most certainly will be endured by the applicant's husband, is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected upon removal. *See Hassan and Perez, supra.*

The record is insufficient to establish that [REDACTED] would endure extreme hardship if he joined his wife in Palestine.

[REDACTED] does not indicate that he would experience extreme hardship if he were to join his wife to live in Palestine.

In considering the hardship factors raised here, the AAO examines each of the factors, both individually and cumulatively, to determine whether extreme hardship has been established. It considers whether the cumulative effect of claims of economic and emotional hardship would be extreme, even if, when considered separately, none of them would be. It considers the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and then determines whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

In the final analysis, the AAO finds that the requirement of significant hardships over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in removal has not been met so as to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. Having carefully considered each of the hardship factors raised, both individually and in the aggregate, it is concluded that these factors do not in this case constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under section 212(i) of the Act.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.