



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services


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FILE:



Office: ROME, ITALY

Date: **MAY 30 2008**

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to  
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Rome, Italy, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Poland who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), which the Acting District Director denied, finding the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. *Decision of the Acting District Director, Rome, Italy*, dated June 15, 2005. The applicant filed a timely appeal.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that on January 25, 2003, the applicant, and five other Polish citizens, attempted to gain admission into the United States at the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge Port of Entry by presenting a Belgium passport along with an I-94W in a name not their own. The applicant used the name J [REDACTED]. Another passenger in the applicant's vehicle stated that they paid USD \$2,000 for the Belgium passports, Mexican permits, I-94W, and plane tickets to travel from Warsaw, Poland, to Amsterdam, Holland, then to Mexico City. Based on the documentation in the record, the AAO finds that the applicant willfully misrepresented a material fact, her identity, so as to gain admission into the United States. She is therefore inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

The AAO will now address the finding that the grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is not warranted.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A section 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant is not a consideration under the statute, and will

be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant's naturalized citizen spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

"Extreme hardship" is not a definable term of "fixed and inflexible meaning"; establishing extreme hardship is "dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case." *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors it considers relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566. The BIA indicated that these factors relate to the applicant's "qualifying relative." *Id.* at 565-566.

In *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996), the BIA stated that the factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists "provide a framework for analysis," and that the "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." It further stated that "the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality" and then "determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994).

Extreme hardship to the applicant's husband must be established in the event that he remains in the United States without the applicant, and in the alternative, that he joins the applicant to live in Poland. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The June 24, 2005 letter by the applicant stated she has been married to her husband, who has lived in the United States since 1999, for two years. She indicated that she does not work and is pregnant and expects to give birth in September. She conveyed that she has a problem with her pregnancy, but her husband cannot be with her. She stated that he visits her twice a year, which is not enough to maintain their relationship, and requested that she be given permission to join her husband in the United States.

The December 13, 2004 letter by the applicant's husband conveyed that his commuting three to four times a year to be with his spouse is an extreme hardship financially and emotionally. He stated that the time taken off work to travel may jeopardize his employment and the commute to Poland depleted his finances. He indicated that the separation has caused difficulties in his marriage and that he wishes to be with his wife.

The Biographic Information Record reflects that the applicant's husband is employed as a mechanic.

In rendering this decision, the AAO has carefully considered all of the evidence in the record.

The AAO finds that the record fails to establish extreme hardship to the applicant's husband in the event that he were to remain in the United States without the applicant.

The applicant's husband claims that his job is jeopardized by traveling to Poland to be with his wife. The AAO finds that the record, however, does not contain any substantiating documentation of this claim. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Furthermore, there is no documentation in the record to substantiate the claim that the applicant's husband is experiencing extreme economic hardship because of the expense involved in traveling to be with his wife. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici, supra*.

With regard to family separation, courts in the United States have stated that "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States," and also, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) ("We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.") (citations omitted).

However, in *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it "was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent's bar to admission." (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). In *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994), the court upheld the finding of no extreme hardship if Shooshtary's lawful permanent resident wife and two U.S. citizen children are separated from him. *Id.* 1050-1051. As stated in *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996), "[e]xtreme hardship" is hardship that is "unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected" upon deportation and "[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship." (citing *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991)). In *Sullivan v. INS*, 772 F.2d 609, 611 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit stated that deportation is not without personal distress and emotional hurt.

The AAO is mindful of and sympathetic to the emotional hardship that is undoubtedly endured as a result of separation from a loved one. After a careful and thoughtful consideration of the record, however, the AAO finds that the situation of the applicant's husband, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship as required by the Act. The record before the AAO is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship, which will be endured by the applicant's husband, is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected upon removal. *See Hassan, Shooshtary, Perez, and Sullivan, supra*.

The record is insufficient to establish that the applicant's husband would experience extreme hardship if he were to join the applicant to live in Poland.

The applicant makes no claim of extreme hardship to her husband if he were to join her to live in Poland.

In considering the hardship factors raised here, the AAO examines each of the factors, both individually and cumulatively, to determine whether extreme hardship has been established. It considers whether the cumulative effect of claims of economic and emotional hardship would be extreme, even if, when considered separately, none of them would be. It considers the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and then determines whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with removal.

In the final analysis, the AAO finds that the requirement of significant hardships over and above the normal economic and social disruptions has not been met so as to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. Having carefully considered each of the hardship factors raised, both individually and in the aggregate, it is concluded that these factors do not in this case constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.