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and Immigration
Services


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FILE: Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA Date: APR 28 2009

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:


INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation on June 18, 1991. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and has two U.S. citizen children. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) to reside in the United States with her family.

The district director concluded that the applicant failed to establish that her spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of her removal from the United States. The application was denied accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated September 23, 2004.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States and that because the applicant committed a single act of misrepresentation and has since become a dedicated public servant, a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *Counsel's Brief*, dated 2004.

The record indicates that on June 18, 1991, the applicant presented an El Salvadorian passport and B-2 Visitor's Visa in the name of [REDACTED] in an attempt to gain entry into the United States.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship

on the applicant's U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse and/or parent. Hardship the applicant or her children experience due to separation is not considered in section 212(i) waiver proceedings unless it causes hardship to the applicant's spouse and/or parent.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

This matter arises in the San Francisco district office, which is within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court has stated, "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States," and also, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) ("We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.") (citations omitted). In *Salcido*, the court remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for failure to consider the factor of separation despite respondent's testimony that if she were deported her U.S. citizen children would remain in the United States in the care of her mother and spouse. *See also Babai v. INS*, 985 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1993) (failure to consider hardship to U.S. citizen child if he remained in the United States is reversible error). Separation of family will therefore be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse must be established in the event that he resides in Mexico and in the event that he resides in the United States, as he is not required to

reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The AAO will consider the relevant factors in adjudication of this case.

The applicant's spouse states that he and the applicant have been married for eight years and that she is a very important part of his life. *Spouse's Statement*, dated December 15, 1999. He states that he and his son need the applicant because she is like the glue that keeps the family together. He states that he is currently unemployed and the applicant is the only person bringing in an income to support the family. The applicant's spouse expresses concern for his son's education if he leaves the United States but also his son's emotional wellbeing if he is separated from the applicant. He states that he fears separation will destroy his family. *Id.*

The applicant states that being removed from the United States would mean sacrificing her family because they have never been separated and that separating the family will cause a lot of trauma, frustration, and sadness to their son. *Applicant's Statement*, December 15, 1999. The applicant also states that she has worked for seven years as a social worker in the United States and considers her work very valuable. She states that she would not be able to find employment in El Salvador because employers discriminate based on age. *Id.*

The AAO notes that El Salvador has been designated by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for Temporary Protected Status until September 9, 2010. Because of this designation the AAO finds that it would be extreme hardship for the applicant's spouse to relocate to El Salvador to be with the applicant. However, the record does not show that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of being separated from the applicant. The record does not provide supporting documentation nor does it provide details in regards to the financial and emotional difficulties the applicant's spouse asserts will result from the applicant's inadmissibility. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. The AAO notes that various letters of reference were submitted in support of the applicant's good moral character and her commitment to her community. However, having found the applicant statutorily

ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.