U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

H2

DEC 02 2009

FILE: [redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUAD JUAREZ) DATE:
(CDJ 2004 675 010 relates)

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Ellen C. Johnson

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in 1988 and did not depart the United States until November 2005. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date of the enactment of the unlawful presence provisions, until her departure in November 2005. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director,* dated November 14, 2006.

In support of the appeal, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse submits a letter, dated December 11, 2006. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

> Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
>
> > (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
> >
> > > (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
> >
> > . . . .
> >
> > (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien…

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to his or her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) does not mention extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child. Nor is extreme hardship to the applicant herself a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative, and hardship to the applicant and/or her children, born in 1992 and 1996, cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

> Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-,* 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse contends that he will suffer emotional and financial hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. In a declaration he states that he is experiencing emotional hardship as he is dependent on his spouse to help with the maintenance of the household, including cooking, cleaning, washing, and making the home warm and comfortable, and for his social life. He further notes that he has been diagnosed with diabetes and needs his spouse to care for him on a daily basis, to ensure that he takes his medications and eats adequate meals. In addition, he contends that he wishes to have biological children with the applicant but he needs his spouse to be in the United States to assume the role of primary caregiver. *Affidavit from* [redacted] dated November 2, 2006. Furthermore, he asserts that his salary as a maintenance utility crew is barely enough to support two households, one in the United States for him and his step-daughter, and one in Mexico for his spouse and his step-son. Finally, he references the hardship his step-daughter, residing in the United States with him, is experiencing based on her separation from her mother and brother, which in turn is causing the applicant's spouse emotional hardship. In addition, the applicant's spouse notes that his step-son is residing in Mexico with the applicant and such a separation is causing the applicant's spouse extreme hardship. *Letter from* [redacted] dated December 11, 2006.

It has not been established that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. Nor has it been established that the applicant's son is unable to relocate to the United States to reside with the applicant's spouse, his step-father, and/or that the applicant's daughter is unable to relocate to Mexico to reside with her mother, thereby ameliorating the hardships referenced by the applicant's spouse. In addition, no letter has been provided from the applicant's spouse's treating physician, outlining the applicant's spouse's current medical diagnosis, the gravity of the situation, the short and long-term treatment plan, and what specific hardships he will face were the applicant unable to reside in the United States. Moreover, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to travel to Mexico on a regular basis to visit his spouse. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Finally, while the AAO sympathizes with the applicant spouse's desire to have biological children with the applicant and have her assume the role of primary caregiver, all couples separated by removal have to make alternate arrangements if they want to conceive and raise children. It has not been documented that such arrangements rise to the level of extreme hardship.

Although the depth of concern over the applicant's inadmissibility is neither doubted or minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS,* 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS,* 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch,* 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy,* 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai,* 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984).

As for the financial hardship referenced by the applicant's spouse, the AAO notes that courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS,* 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment . . . simply are not sufficient.").

No documentation with respect to the applicant and her spouse's financial situation, including income and expenses, assets and liabilities, has been provided, to establish that the applicant's spouse is experiencing extreme financial hardship due to his wife's residence abroad. Nor does the record indicate what specific contributions the applicant made to the household prior to her departure from the United States, to establish that her physical absence is causing extreme financial hardship to her spouse. Finally, it has not been established that the applicant is unable to obtain gainful employment abroad, thereby affording her the opportunity to assist her spouse with respect to their finances.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of continued separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. While the applicant's spouse may need to make adjustments with respect to the family's financial situation, the maintenance of the household and his own care while the applicant resides abroad due to her inadmissibility, it has not been shown that such adjustments would cause the applicant's spouse extreme hardship. The AAO concludes that based on the evidence provided, it has not been established that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is suffering extreme emotional and/or financial hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility.

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she relocates abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The AAO notes that this criteria has not been addressed. As such, the applicant has failed to establish that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant.

As such, a review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were not permitted to reside in the United States, and moreover, the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant. The record demonstrates that the applicant's spouse faces no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or refused admission. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.