



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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


FILE: [Redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date:
CDJ 2004 747 052

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED], is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is the spouse of [REDACTED], a citizen of the United States. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), so as to immigrate to the United States. The director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that his bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated February 16, 2007. The applicant filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, counsel states that [REDACTED] is unable to move to Mexico to be with her husband because she needs to remain employed in the United States to support her family. He states that she will experience extreme hardship in Mexico because of its high unemployment and because her U.S. citizen child will be forced to live in Mexico and attend school there, placing the child at a disadvantage with other children in the United States. Counsel states that a U.S. citizen mother and wife would suffer extreme hardship if her U.S. citizen children were to suffer because of relocation to Mexico. Counsel states that the letter of the applicant's spouse constitutes evidence of extreme hardship to a qualifying family member. Counsel states that, at present, [REDACTED] two children live in the United States because [REDACTED] cannot find employment in Mexico. Counsel contends that when all of the relevant factors are considered, the hardships of [REDACTED] are extreme when weighed against [REDACTED] punishment for departing from the United States. Counsel asserts that [REDACTED] was not informed that she could submit additional evidence in support of her waiver application. Counsel contends that the denial letter is a form letter and that the incorrect standard is applied.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility.

Inadmissibility for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. That section provides, in part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records reflect that the applicant accrued unlawful presence from his entry in the United States without inspection in May 1998 until December 2005, when he left from the United States and triggered the ten-year-bar, rendering him inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The waiver for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). That provides that:

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant is not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, children are not included under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and his children will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in determining whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors considered relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors relate to an applicant’s qualifying relative and include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566.

The factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists “provide a framework for analysis,” and the “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). The trier of fact considers the entire range of hardship factors in their totality and then determines “whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994)).

In rendering this decision, the AAO has carefully considered all of the evidence in the record.

The AAO notes that the record contains a letter dated February 20, 2006 by Ms Serna which does not have an English language translation. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Bureau”] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator’s certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

In that letter is written completely in Spanish and has no translation, that letter will carry no weight in this proceeding.

Applying the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors here, extreme hardship to the applicant’s spouse must be established in the event that she remains in the United States without the applicant, and alternatively, if she joins the applicant to live in Mexico. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

Counsel indicates separation from family members constitutes extreme hardship. Family separation must be considered in determining hardship. *See, e.g., Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (“the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States”).

However, courts have found that family separation does not conclusively establish extreme hardship. In *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it “was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent’s bar to admission.” (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996), states that “[e]xtreme hardship” is hardship that is “unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected” upon deportation and “[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.” (citing *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991)).

The AAO is mindful of and sympathetic to the emotional hardship that is endured as a result of family separation. The record before the AAO, however, fails to establish that the situation of if she remains in the United States without her spouse, rises to the level of extreme hardship. The record is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship to be endured by is unusual

or beyond that which is normally to be expected from an applicant's bar to admission. *See Hassan and Perez, supra.*

With regard to joining the applicant to live in Mexico, counsel states that [REDACTED] will experience extreme hardship in Mexico because of its high unemployment. However, there is no documentation in the record demonstrating that [REDACTED] and her husband would be unable to obtain employment in Mexico. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).

Counsel states that [REDACTED] U.S. citizen children will be disadvantaged by living in Mexico and attending school there, and [REDACTED] will suffer extreme hardship if her child suffered because of relocation to Mexico. While hardship to [REDACTED] children is considered to the extent that it results in hardship to [REDACTED], the AAO finds that in this case the hardship to [REDACTED] children, as a result of living in Mexico and attending school there, is not, in itself, sufficient to establish extreme hardship to [REDACTED]. The AAO notes that there is no documentation in the record reflecting that [REDACTED]'s oldest child, who was born on May 5, 2005, has, as of yet, attended school in the United States.

When considered both individually and collectively, the factors presented do not in this case constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

It is noted that although counsel asserts that [REDACTED] was not informed that she could submit additional evidence in support of her waiver application, the letter dated February 7, 2006, which was provided to [REDACTED] conveys that she had 30 days from the date of the letter in which to submit a response or evidence in support of her waiver application.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v), the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. *See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.* The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.