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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

H2

[REDACTED]

FILE:

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date:

**MAR 20 2009**

IN RE: Applicant

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that the applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, attempted entry to the United States in January 1997 using a fraudulent document, namely, a border crossing card that was not validly issued to her. She was thus found inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for attempting to procure entry to the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with her U.S. spouse and children, born in 1999 and 2002.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated October 24, 2006.

In support of the appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief, dated November 16, 2006.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative “is not . . . fixed and inflexible...” and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States,

country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA held in *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted) that:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

This matter arises in the Los Angeles district office, which is within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court has stated: “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States,” and also, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). *See also Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). Separation of family will therefore be given the appropriate weight under Ninth Circuit law in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides that a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to his or her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, section 212(i) does not mention extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child. Nor is extreme hardship to the applicant herself a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant’s spouse, a U.S. citizen, is the only qualifying relative and hardship to the applicant and/or their U.S. citizen children cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant’s spouse.

The applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse contends that he will suffer extreme emotional hardship if the applicant’s waiver request is not granted due to the close and dependent relationship he has with his spouse. The applicant’s spouse further states that if the waiver is not granted, he will be separated from his two daughters, as they will reside in Mexico with the applicant. *Declaration of* [REDACTED] dated October 4, 2006.

It has not been established that the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse will suffer extreme emotional hardship were the applicant unable to reside in the United States. The applicant has also failed to document that her children are unable to reside in the United States with their father, thereby alleviating the hardship referenced by the applicant’s spouse with respect to being separated from his children. Counsel states that were the children to reside in the United States with their father while the applicant remains abroad, the applicant’s spouse would be forced to either stop working to care for his children, or to continue working and “basically leave his children without any supervision or support....” *Brief in Support of Appeal*, dated November 16, 2006. Without documentary evidence to

support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The AAO notes that the applicant's spouse has maintained long-term gainful employment, earning over \$70,000 in 2004. See *Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return for 2005*. It has thus not been established that he would be unable to obtain appropriate care for his children while he continues to be gainfully employed, and that such alternate arrangement would cause him extreme hardship. Finally, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse, a native of Mexico, is unable to travel to his home country on a regular basis to visit the applicant.

Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases.

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. In this case, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse asserts that he is unable to reside in Mexico. *Supra* at 2. However, no documentation has been provided that outlines the specific hardships he would face were he to relocate abroad. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States due to her inadmissibility. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States. There is no documentation establishing that his emotional hardship would be any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the emotional hardship he would face rises to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law. Having found the applicant ineligible for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.