




U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE: [REDACTED]  
(CDJ 2004 782 301)

Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date:

**NOV 18 2009**

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)  
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

*Perry Rhew*

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who resided in the United States from July 1997, when he entered without inspection, until October 2005, when he returned to Mexico. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. Citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to return to the United States and reside with his wife and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *See Decision of District Director* dated September 14, 2006.

On appeal, the applicant's wife states that she needs the applicant with her and her children, he provides for their needs, and she is unable to support her children without him. *See Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B)*. In support of the waiver application and appeal, the applicant submitted letters from his wife, copies of his children's birth certificates, and copies of bills and a lease for their apartment. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who –
- (II) Has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

- (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant's children would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien's children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relatives for the waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant's children will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship. These factors included the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

U.S. court decisions have additionally held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, in *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), the court held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. In *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968), the BIA held that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

In the present case, the record reflects that the applicant is a thirty-two year-old native and citizen of Mexico who resided in the United States from July 1997, when he entered without inspection, until October 2005, when he returned to Mexico. The applicant's wife is a thirty-one year-old native of Mexico and citizen of the United States whom the applicant married on June 14, 2003. The applicant currently resides in Mexico and his wife resides in Blue Island, Illinois with their two sons.

The applicant's wife states that she and their children are suffering emotional hardship due to separation from the applicant and their older son in particular misses the applicant very much and cries himself to sleep and is unable to cope with the absence of his father. See *Statement in Support of Appeal from* [REDACTED]. She further states that it breaks her heart to see her children having these difficulties and she believes families should be united. See *letter from* [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated December 2005. The applicant's wife states that she is suffering emotional hardship due to separation from the applicant, but there is no evidence on the record concerning her mental health or the potential emotional or psychological effects of the separation. The evidence on the

record does not establish that the emotional effects of separation from the applicant are more serious than the type of hardship a family member would normally suffer when faced with the prospect of a spouse's removal or exclusion. Although the depth of her distress over being separated from her husband is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal or exclusion. The prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families. But in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists.

The applicant's wife further states that she is suffering financial hardship because she must work and pay for childcare for her children and the extra expense "would destroy the way of life which [the] children are accustomed to" and would be a great burden on the family. *See Statement in Support of Appeal from [REDACTED]*. In support of these assertions the applicant's wife submitted copies of utility and phone bills, pay stubs, and an apartment lease. No documentation concerning the applicant's income while he resided in the United States or his wife's annual income was submitted, and no other evidence was submitted to support an assertion that the applicant's wife has suffered or would suffer financial hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. There is no indication that there are any unusual circumstances that would cause financial hardship beyond what would normally be expected as a result of separation from the applicant. Any financial impact of living without the applicant's income therefore appears to be a common result of exclusion or deportation, and would not rise to the level of extreme hardship for the applicant's wife. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra* (holding that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship).

Any emotional or financial hardship the applicant's wife is experiencing due to separation from the applicant appears to be the type of hardship that a family member would normally suffer as a result of deportation or exclusion. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (defining "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation); *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship). No claim was made that the applicant's wife would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Mexico with the applicant. Therefore, the AAO cannot make a determination of whether the applicant's wife would suffer extreme hardship if she moved to Mexico.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. Citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.