


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Services

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FILE:



Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date:

NOV 25 2009

CDJ 2004 669 394

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED], is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is the spouse of [REDACTED] a naturalized citizen of the United States. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), so as to immigrate to the United States. The director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that her bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated January 22, 2007. The applicant filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, [REDACTED] states that he works full time and needs his spouse to take care of their children. He indicates that he has two U.S. citizen children and a step-son who is a lawful permanent resident.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility.

Inadmissibility for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. That section provides, in part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records reflect that the applicant accrued unlawful presence from February 1998, when she entered the United States without inspection, until January 2006, when she left the country and triggered the ten-year-bar, rendering her inadmissible

under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The waiver for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), which provides that:

- (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant is not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, children are not included under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and her child will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant’s naturalized citizen spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in determining whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors considered relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors relate to an applicant’s qualifying relative and include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566.

The factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists “provide a framework for analysis,” and the “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). The trier of fact considers the entire range of hardship factors in their totality and then determines “whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994)).

In rendering this decision, the AAO has carefully considered all of the evidence in the record.

The AAO notes that the record contains a letter by [REDACTED] which does not have an English language translation. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Bureau"] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

In that the letter by [REDACTED] is written completely in Spanish and has no translation, the letter will carry no weight in this proceeding.

Applying the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors here, extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse must be established in the event that he remains in the United States without the applicant, and alternatively, if he joins the applicant to live in Mexico. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

In his letter dated February 8, 2006, [REDACTED] states that he needs his wife to take their children to and from school because his work is approximately 50 miles away, and at times, is out of state, whereby he stays away for weeks. [REDACTED] indicates that he has work in Louisiana. The applicant's children are 18, 10, and 6 years old. [REDACTED] conveys that he pays children support and if his spouse were employed in the United States she would be able to help financially.

Although there is documentation in the record of [REDACTED] child support invoices, which total \$419 each month, and of medical bills for his wife, there is no documentation of [REDACTED] income or his other monthly expenses. In the absence of such documentation, the record fails to establish that [REDACTED] income is insufficient to cover his monthly financial obligations, and that he his wife is needed to financially assist the family and take care of their children.

The letter by the assistant superintendent/counselor with Whitebead Elementary School that is dated February 6, 2007 conveys that the [REDACTED] family was actively involved with their children and since [REDACTED] has been in Mexico the [REDACTED] children have not been as engaged in school.

Family separation must be considered in determining hardship. *See, e.g., Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States").

However, courts have found that family separation does not conclusively establish extreme hardship. In *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it "was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent's bar to admission." (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996), states that "[e]xtreme hardship" is hardship that is "unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected" upon deportation and "[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship." (citing *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991).

In his February 8, 2006 letter, [REDACTED] conveys that he is concerned about separation from his wife. The AAO is mindful of and sympathetic to the emotional hardship that is endured as a result

of family separation. The record before the AAO, however, fails to establish that the situation of [REDACTED] if he remains in the United States without his spouse, rises to the level of extreme hardship. The record is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship to be endured by [REDACTED] is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected from an applicant's bar to admission. *See Hassan and Perez, supra.*

Furthermore, although the letter by the assistant superintendent/counselor with Whitebead Elementary School indicates that the [REDACTED] children have been affected by separation from their mother, [REDACTED] does not describe the hardship that he has or will experience as a result of his children's hardship.

[REDACTED] asserts in his February 8 letter that his children will have better opportunities if they attend school in the United States, rather than Mexico. But [REDACTED] fails to describe the hardship he would experience if his children attended school in Mexico.

When the factors raised in this case are considered both individually and collectively, the AAO finds those factors do not constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.