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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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NOV 25 2009

FILE:

CDJ 2004 848 204

Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date:

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v),
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, and is before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED], is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant's spouse, [REDACTED] is a citizen of the United States. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), of the Act so as to immigrate to the United States. The director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that his bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated March 3, 2006. The applicant filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, [REDACTED] states that she is experiencing extreme hardship without her husband because she is late paying bills, she almost lost her home, and her four children need their father. She states that she has been separated from her husband for one year and three months and cannot make it without him.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility.

Inadmissibility for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9) of the Act. That section provides, in part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(iii) Exceptions

(I) Minors

No period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account in determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States under clause (i).

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records reflect that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in November 1995 and remained until February 2006. The applicant turned 18 years of age on November 8, 1998. He therefore accrued over seven years of unlawful presence from November 8, 1998 until February 2006, and triggered the ten-year-bar when he left the country, rendering him inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The waiver for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). That section provides that:

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant and to his or her child are not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, children are not included under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and his U.S. citizen children and his step-child will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in determining whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors considered relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors relate to an applicant’s qualifying relative and include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health,

particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566.

The factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists “provide a framework for analysis,” and the “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). The trier of fact considers the entire range of hardship factors in their totality and then determines “whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994).

The evidence in the record consists of birth certificates, a marriage certificate, letters, invoices, a deed of trust, a drawing, and other documentation.

In rendering this decision, the AAO has carefully considered all of the evidence in the record.

Applying the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors here, extreme hardship to the applicant’s spouse must be established in the event that she remains in the United States without the applicant, and alternatively, if she joins the applicant to live in Mexico. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

The AAO notes that the record contains a letter by [REDACTED] dated March 3, 2006 that is not accompanied by an English language translation. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) states:

Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “USCIS”] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator’s certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

As the March 3, 2006 letter by [REDACTED] is without an English translation, that letter will carry no weight in this decision. *See*, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3).

With regard to hardship as a result of remaining in the United States without the applicant, in her letters [REDACTED] conveys that it is difficult for her to pay monthly financial obligations without her husband’s assistance. The record contains invoices of household expenses such as utility and mortgage statements; however, there is no documentation of [REDACTED]’ income. In the absence of documentation of [REDACTED]’ income, the AAO cannot determine whether [REDACTED] income is insufficient to meet monthly financial obligations. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).

[REDACTED] conveys in letters that she and her children miss and need the applicant, to whom she has been married for 10 years. The record shows [REDACTED] children are five, six, and ten years old. Family separation must be considered in determining hardship. *See, e.g., Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (“the most important single hardship factor may be the

separation of the alien from family living in the United States”).

However, courts have found that family separation does not conclusively establish extreme hardship. In *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it “was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent's bar to admission.” (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996), states that “[e]xtreme hardship” is hardship that is “unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected” upon deportation and “[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.” (citing *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991).

The AAO is mindful of and sympathetic to the emotional hardship that is endured as a result of family separation. The record before the AAO, however, fails to establish that the situation of [REDACTED] if she remains in the United States without her husband, rises to the level of extreme hardship. The record is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship to be endured by [REDACTED] is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected from an applicant’s bar to admission. *See Hassan and Perez, supra.*

Having carefully considered the hardship factors raised collectively, AAO finds that in this case those factors are not sufficient to establish extreme hardship to [REDACTED] if she were to remain in the United States without her husband.

There is no claim made by the applicant that [REDACTED] would experience extreme hardship if she were to join her husband to live in Mexico.

Based upon the record before the AAO, the applicant in this case fails to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)of the Act.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v), the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.