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FILE:

(CDJ 2005 504 270)

Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
(CIUDAD-JUAREZ)

Date:

OCT 01 2009

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more and seeking admission within ten years of his last departure. He is married to a United States citizen and is the father of a U.S. citizen child.¹ He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to his admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, his U.S. citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on March 07, 2007.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant states that the District Director's decision was an abuse of discretion and not supported by evidence in the record.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection sometime in 1990 and remained until he departed in November 2005. As the applicant has resided unlawfully in

¹ The AAO notes that at the time the waiver application was submitted, the applicant's spouse was pregnant with their second child.

the United States for over a year and is now seeking admission within ten years of his last departure from the United States, he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. The applicant does not contest this finding.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his child is not directly relevant in section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) proceedings and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, the applicant's spouse. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established whether he or she accompanies the applicant or remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's brief; a photocopy of a sonogram indicating the applicant's spouse was pregnant in February 2006; copy of a "confirmation of pregnancy" letter from the Clinic for Women in Santa Ana, California, indicating the applicant's spouse was pregnant in February 2006.

The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant provided all of the family's income, that the applicant's spouse would be unable to support herself or her children without the applicant and, alternately, that she would have to work two jobs to cover the family's financial obligations in the applicant's absence, further reducing the time her children would have with either parent. Counsel further asserts that the applicant is suffering intense pressure and anxiety and may be unable to work in Mexico; that the applicant and his spouse cannot reside in Mexico because they would have problems finding jobs and, even if employed, would probably earn significantly less than in the United States; and the minimum wage in Mexico would be insufficient to support their family. He also states the applicant's spouse was born in the United States, has never lived in Mexico, and that, if the family relocated to Mexico, they could be homeless and financially destitute.²

The record contains no documentary evidence to support counsel's claims. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors cited above, does not establish that a qualifying relative of the applicant will suffer extreme hardship if he is excluded from the United States. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. In this case, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the assertions of hardship. Consequently, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

² Counsel refers to a statement submitted by the applicant's spouse with the I-601 application. However, this statement is in Spanish. The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) require that any document containing foreign language submitted to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services be accompanied by a full English-language translation. As such, the AAO will not consider this statement.