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Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

H2

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY (PANAMA CITY) DATE: **SEP 2 1 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Ellen C. Johnson

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant, a native and citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without authorization in April 1997 and did not depart the United States until April 1999. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. [1] The applicant does

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[1] The District Director, in his decision, noted that the applicant was also inadmissible under Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and under Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) of the Act, as further discussed below.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

> (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The district director failed to address in his decision how the applicant was subject to section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act. Based on a thorough review of the record, the AAO concludes that the applicant did not, by fraud and/or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, seek to procure (or procured) an immigrant benefit. As such, the district director erred in concluding that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, for Fraud and/or Willful Misrepresentation.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or

not contest this finding of inadmissibility. Rather, she seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her lawful permanent resident spouse and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director,* dated April 5, 2007.

In support of the appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief, dated May 2, 2007, and referenced exhibits. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

> Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
>
> (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
>
> . . . .
>
> (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

> removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

With respect to this ground of inadmissibility, the district director noted that "[o]n December 3, 1998, the Immigration Judge granted you voluntary departure in lieu of deportation with an alternate order of deportation should you fail to depart on or before April 3, 1999. On April 12, 1999 you departed the United States...." *See Decision of the District Director,* dated April 5, 2007.

As counsel asserts and documents, the applicant departed the United States on April 1, 1999 in compliance with the Voluntary Departure Order, despite the district director's conclusion to the contrary. *See Order of the Immigration Judge,* dated December 3, 1998, *Boarding Pass confirming a flight from New York to Guayaquil via VASP Brazilian Airlines on April 1, 1999, Entry Stamp from the Republic of Ecuador,* dated April 2, 1999, and *Notation from the American Consulate General in Guayaquil on the Form O-151-649, noting the applicant's departure from New York on April 1, 1999,* dated April 12, 1999. As such, the district director erred in concluding that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act, Aliens Previously Removed.

> (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien…

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to his or her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) does not mention extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child. Nor is extreme hardship to the applicant herself a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant's lawful permanent resident spouse is the only qualifying relative, and hardship to the applicant and/or their children cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

> Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-,* 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

The applicant's lawful permanent resident spouse contends that he will suffer emotional hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. In a declaration he states that he is experiencing extreme emotional hardship due to the long and close relationship he has with his spouse. In addition, the applicant's spouse notes that his son is residing with him in the United States, while the applicant's daughter resides in Ecuador with her mother. He contends that the children are experiencing hardship based on this arrangement, thereby causing extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse, the only qualifying relative in this case. *Letter from* [redacted] dated April 5, 2006.

It has not been established that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. Nor has it been established that the applicant's children are suffering extreme hardship due to their current living arrangements and/or that alternate arrangements for their case would cause them extreme hardship, thereby causing the applicant's spouse extreme hardship. Finally, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to travel to Ecuador, his native country, on a regular basis to visit his spouse. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Although the depth of concern over the applicant's inadmissibility is neither doubted or minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS,* 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS,* 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch,* 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy,* 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai,* 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of continued separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The AAO concludes that based on the evidence provided, it has not been established that the applicant's lawful permanent resident spouse is suffering extreme emotional hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility.

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she relocates abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The AAO notes that this criteria has not been addressed. As such, the applicant has failed to establish that her lawful permanent resident spouse, a native of Ecuador, would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant.

As such, a review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her lawful permanent resident spouse would suffer extreme

hardship if she were not permitted to reside in the United States, and moreover, the applicant has failed to show that her lawful permanent resident spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant. The record demonstrates that the applicant's spouse faces no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or refused admission. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.