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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

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**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

H/2



FILE:

Office: FRANKFURT

DATE:

SEP 24 2009

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Frankfurt, Germany, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant, a native and citizen of Poland, entered the United States in September 2004 with a valid nonimmigrant visa. The applicant remained beyond the period of authorized stay and did not depart until August 8, 2006. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility. Rather, she is seeking a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse and children, born in 2005 and 2009.

The officer in charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Officer in Charge*, dated July 23, 2007.

In support of the appeal, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse submitted the Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B), an attachment to the Form I-290B and a letter written in a foreign language.¹ An August 2009, the AAO received additional documentation in support of the appeal which has been added to the record.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

¹ 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

Any documents submitted by the applicant that are not in English and/or are not translated into English are not probative and will not be accorded any weight in this proceeding, as the AAO cannot determine whether said documentation supports the applicant's claims for a waiver.

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to his or her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) does not mention extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child. Nor is extreme hardship to the applicant herself a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative, and hardship to the applicant or their children cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse contends that he will suffer emotional hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. In a declaration he states that he is experiencing extreme emotional hardship due to the long and close relationship he has with his spouse. He also references the hardship his daughter, residing in Poland with the applicant, is experiencing based on separation

from her father, which in turn is causing the applicant's spouse emotional hardship. *See Attachment to the Form I-290B*. The applicant further asserts that their daughter was recently diagnosed with delayed psychological-motor development and in Poland, she is unable to obtain the appropriate care for her condition. *Letter from [REDACTED]* dated July 9, 2009.

It has not been established that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. Nor has it been established that the applicant's daughter is unable to relocate to the United States to reside with her father. Alternately, it has not been established that the applicant's daughter is unable to obtain the appropriate treatment in Poland for her condition. The AAO notes that the letter provided with respect to the applicant's child's condition does not reference that treatment is not available in Poland and/or that she will suffer hardship were she to remain in Poland, thereby causing hardship to the applicant's spouse, the only qualifying relative in this case. *See Psychological-Pedagogical-Logopedy Opinion*, dated February 26, 2009. Finally, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to continue traveling to Poland, his native country, on a regular basis to visit his spouse. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Although the depth of concern over the applicant's inadmissibility is neither doubted or minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of continued separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The AAO concludes that based on the evidence provided, it has not been established that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is suffering extreme hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility.

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she relocates abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. With respect to this criteria, the applicant's spouse asserts that "I can't move to Poland and stay due all my family brother his wife mather [sic] cousins living in U.S.A. for 50 years. We all citizens paying taxes and living working always legally without problems....: *Supra* at 1. No documentation has been provided outlining the specific hardships the applicant's spouse would face were he to relocate to Poland, his native country, due to the applicant's inadmissibility. As noted above, assertions without supporting documentation do not suffice to establish extreme hardship. As such, the applicant has failed to establish that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant.

As such, a review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were not permitted to reside in the United States, and moreover, the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant. The record demonstrates that the applicant's spouse faces no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or refused admission. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.