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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE: Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ)

Date: SEP 29 2009

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED] is a native and citizen of Mexico. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking admission within 10 years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to return to the United States to join her U.S. citizen spouse, [REDACTED].

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that her bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, his United States citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that his separation from his family is an extreme hardship. In support of the application, the record contains, but is not limited to, medical documentation related to the applicant's prenatal care and immunization record for her child, and mortgage, telephone and insurance invoices. The record contains a statement the applicant's spouse initially filed with the waiver application that is written in Spanish without a corresponding certified English translation. Because the applicant failed to submit certified translations of the documents, the AAO cannot determine whether the evidence supports the applicant's claims. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3). Accordingly, the evidence is not probative and will not be accorded any weight in this proceeding. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such

immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record shows that the applicant initially entered the United States without inspection when she was 17 years old in December 2001. The applicant remained in the United States until departing in March 2006. An alien whose unlawful status begins before his or her 18th birthday does not begin to accrue unlawful presence for purposes of section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act until the day after his or her 18th birthday. *See* Section 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I) of the Act. The applicant's date of birth is October 2, 1984. The director found that the applicant accrued unlawful presence from October 2002 until March 2006. The applicant does not dispute this on appeal. The applicant is attempting to seek admission into the United States within ten years of her March 2006 departure from the United States. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year and seeking admission to the United States within ten years of her last departure.

A section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien herself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to United States citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

An analysis under *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* is appropriate. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the

applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The applicant's spouse asserts that he has a U.S. citizen daughter who has the right to be raised in the United States and cannot be in the United States due to the fact that he has to work. He states that his wife went to her appointment when she was eight months pregnant and did not have her baby in the United States. He states that he has to support two sides of the border and has to file for another child born in another country and has to start the whole process again. He states that this costs money and time. He states that money is getting scarce since the new one arrived. He states that there is extreme hardship in not having his child be in the United States to study the English language and go to school in the United States. He states that there is extreme hardship of saving money to go and see his family at least once a year when he could use the money on them. He states that the hurt of being without one another is having an effect on him and his wife physically and mentally.

The AAO recognizes that the refusal of the applicant's admission to the United States may cause some economic detriment to her spouse. However, the financial hardships described by the applicant's spouse are the typical hardships of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility and do not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The record contains the applicant's mortgage, telephone and insurance billing statements. No documentation has been provided to demonstrate that the applicant's spouse is sending the applicant remittances or otherwise supporting his family in Mexico. Nor is there any documentation related to the applicant's spouse's employment, income and other household expenses. As such, the AAO does not have sufficient documentation to fully assess the applicant's spouse's capacity to financially support two households. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Although the applicant's spouse's unsupported assertions are relevant and have been considered, they can be afforded little weight in the absence of supporting evidence.

The AAO acknowledges that the applicant's spouse is suffering emotionally as a result of his separation from the applicant. His situation, however, is typical of individuals separated as a result of removal or inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The point made in this and prior decisions on this matter is that the current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810

(BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship).

Finally, the applicant's spouse has indicated that he will remain in the United States if the applicant is denied admission to the United States. The applicant's spouse has not asserted, or submitted evidence to demonstrate, that he would suffer extreme hardship in Mexico if he relocated there. Accordingly, the AAO cannot determine that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the applicant's spouse, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.