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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: **FEB 05 2010**
CDJ 2004 809 590

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v),
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael Shumway".

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant, [REDACTED], is a citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is the spouse of [REDACTED] a naturalized citizen of the United States. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), so as to immigrate to the United States. The director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that her bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated November 14, 2006. The applicant filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, [REDACTED] states that he is worried about separation from his wife and stepson, who are living in Mexico. He states that separation is destroying his marriage.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility. Inadmissibility for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. That section provides, in part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records reflect that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in May 1988. She therefore began to accrue unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date on which the unlawful presence provisions went into effect, until December 2005, when she left the country and triggered the ten-year bar, rendering her inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The waiver for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). That section provides:

- (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant is not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, children are not included under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and her child will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant’s naturalized citizen spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in determining whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors considered relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors relate to an applicant’s qualifying relative and include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566.

The factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists “provide a framework for analysis,” and the “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). The trier of fact considers the entire range of hardship factors in their totality and then determines “whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994).

In rendering this decision, the AAO has carefully considered all of the evidence in the record.

Applying the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors here, extreme hardship to the applicant’s spouse must be established in the event that he remains in the United States without the applicant, and alternatively, if he joins the applicant to live in Mexico. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

With regard to remaining in the United States without his wife, [REDACTED] states that his wife's well-being depends upon her being permitted to return to the United States. He states that she has been treated for breast cancer and remains at risk for relapse, and that she receives follow-up checks for breast cancer and anemia. He states that she cannot remain in Mexico and receive the same medical attention that she receives in the United States and that it would be financially impossible for her to endure this on her own if she remains in Mexico. He states that the majority of his wife's medical expenses are covered by health insurance through his employment, and that without his medical insurance she cannot receive the care that she requires to remain in good health. The letter by [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] dated November 22, 2005 conveys that [REDACTED] has been a patient of his for breast cancer and anemia since November 2003. He states that she is at risk of cancer relapse, even several years out, and that it is imperative that she receive regular follow-up. He states that her health depends on remaining in the United States.

Family separation must be considered in determining hardship. *See, e.g., Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States").

However, courts have found that family separation does not conclusively establish extreme hardship. In *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it "was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent's bar to admission." (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996), states that "[e]xtreme hardship" is hardship that is "unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected" upon deportation and "[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship." (citing *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991)).

In view of [REDACTED] treatment for breast cancer and the possibility of cancer relapse, the AAO finds that the situation of [REDACTED], if he remains in the United States without his spouse, rises to the level of extreme hardship. The record is sufficient to show that the emotional hardship to be endured by [REDACTED] as a result of his concern about his wife's health, combined with the other emotional hardship associated with separation, is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected from an applicant's bar to admission. *See Hassan and Perez, supra*.

With regard to joining his wife to live in Mexico, [REDACTED] states that his wife was treated for breast cancer and is at risk for cancer relapse. He states that she requires regular follow-up care and that the majority of her medical expenses are covered through health insurance that he purchased from his employer. Without his insurance he states that she would not receive adequate follow-up care, which care is required to ensure she remains in good health. In light of [REDACTED]'s history of breast cancer and her need to receive regular follow-up care, the AAO finds that [REDACTED] would experience extreme hardship if he were to join his wife to live in Mexico and not be able to provide health insurance to pay for his wife's follow-up medical care.

The factors presented in this case when considered collectively establish extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

The grant or denial of the above waiver does not depend only on the issue of the meaning of "extreme hardship." Once extreme hardship is established, the Secretary then determines whether an exercise of discretion is warranted.

The favorable factor in this matter is the extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse and son. The unfavorable factors in this matter are the applicant's entry into the United States without authorization, her unlawful presence, and any unauthorized employment. The applicant does not appear to have a criminal record. The AAO finds that the hardship imposed on the applicant's spouse as a result of her inadmissibility outweighs the unfavorable factors in the application. Therefore, a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted in this matter.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The waiver application is approved.