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
U. S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: BALTIMORE

Date:

MAR 22 2010

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Russia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to remain in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that her bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on her qualifying relative, her U.S. citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that if the applicant's waiver is denied, he "will never be able to have a family, buy a home, and have a real life." He states that the denial will cause him extreme hardship.

In support of the waiver application, the record contains, but is not limited to, medical documentation, financial documentation, photographs, a marriage certificate, and letters from the applicant and her spouse. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In the recently decided *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record shows that the applicant was arrested in [REDACTED] on September 16, 2004 and charged with three counts of theft of property with a value of less than \$500.00. The applicant, who was born on November 18, 1983, was 20 years old at the time she committed the crime that resulted in her arrest.

The record shows that the applicant was convicted in the [REDACTED] County, on September 17, 2004, of one count of "theft: less \$500 value" in violation of section 7-104 of the Maryland Criminal Code (Md. Crim. Code § 7-104), a misdemeanor subject to imprisonment not exceeding 18 months or a fine not exceeding \$500 or both. The applicant was sentenced to one year imprisonment, which was suspended [REDACTED]

Md. Crim. Code Ann. § 7-104 (West 2004) provides, in part:

Unauthorized control over property

(a) A person may not willfully or knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over property, if the person:

- (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property;
- (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or
- (3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.

Unauthorized control over property--By deception

(b) A person may not obtain control over property by willfully or knowingly using deception, if the person:

- (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property;
- (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or
- (3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.

Possessing stolen personal property

(c)(1) A person may not possess stolen personal property knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, if the person:

- (i) intends to deprive the owner of the property;
- (ii) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that

deprives the owner of the property; or

(iii) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing that the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.

(2) In the case of a person in the business of buying or selling goods, the knowledge required under this subsection may be inferred if:

(i) the person possesses or exerts control over property stolen from more than one person on separate occasions;

(ii) during the year preceding the criminal possession charged, the person has acquired stolen property in a separate transaction; or

(iii) being in the business of buying or selling property of the sort possessed, the person acquired it for a consideration that the person knew was far below a reasonable value.

(3) In a prosecution for theft by possession of stolen property under this subsection, it is not a defense that:

(i) the person who stole the property has not been convicted, apprehended, or identified;

(ii) the defendant stole or participated in the stealing of the property; or

(iii) the stealing of the property did not occur in the State.

(4) Unless the person who criminally possesses stolen property participated in the stealing, the person who criminally possesses stolen property and a person who has stolen the property are not accomplices in theft for the purpose of any rule of evidence requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice.

Control over property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake

(d) A person may not obtain control over property knowing that the property was lost, mislaid, or was delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or nature or amount of the property, if the person:

(1) knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows, is aware of, or learns of a reasonable method of identifying the owner;

(2) fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the owner; and

(3) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property when the person obtains the property or at a later time.

Services available only for compensation

(e) A person may not obtain the services of another that are available only for compensation:

(1) by deception; or

(2) with knowledge that the services are provided without the consent of the person providing them. . . .

U.S. Courts have held that the crime of theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, involves moral turpitude. See *Matter of Scarpulla*, 15 I&N Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1974)(stating, “It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . .”); *Morasch v. INS*, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966)(stating, “Obviously, either petty or grand larceny, i.e., stealing another's property, qualifies [as a crime involving moral turpitude].”) A conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended. *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973).

Upon review of Maryland court decisions, the AAO finds that a conviction for theft under the Maryland Criminal Code requires the specific intent to deprive the victim of his or her property permanently. In *Price v. State*, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals discussed the distinctions between a conviction for theft and a conviction for carjacking. 681 A.2d 1206 (1996). The Court stated that a theft conviction “requires proof of circumstances that would indicate the offender’s intent permanently to deprive the owner of his or her property whether by way of appropriating it to one’s own use or concealment or abandonment in such a manner as to deprive the owner of the property” while carjacking “does not require that there be any asportation or removal of the vehicle for criminal responsibility to attach.” 681 A.2d at 1214. In *Gamble v. State*, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals discussed whether the offender’s conduct constituted a “trespassory taking.” 552 A.2d 928 (1989). The Court stated that the primary elements of the theft statute are “willfully and knowingly obtaining unauthorized control over the property or services of another, by deception or otherwise, with the intent to deprive the owner of his property by using, concealing, or abandoning it in such a manner that it probably will not be returned to the owner.” 552 A.2d at 931. The Court concluded that the offender committed theft because the evidence indicated that he “took the money with the intent permanently to deprive the rightful owner of it.” *Id.* Therefore, the AAO finds that a conviction for theft under Md. Crim. Code § 7-104 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires the permanent intent to deprive the victim of his or her property. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) as a consequence of her conviction for theft. The applicant has not disputed her inadmissibility on appeal.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

....

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence

if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

The AAO notes that section 212(h) of the Act provides that a waiver of inadmissibility is dependent first upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. In this case, the relative that qualifies is the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse. Hardship to the applicant herself is not relevant under the statute and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the BIA provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. The BIA added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not an exclusive list. *See id.*

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

The AAO notes that in *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States", and that, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." (Citations omitted). Although the present case did not arise in the Ninth Circuit, separation of family will be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors.

The AAO notes further, however, that U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The Court emphasized that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

An analysis under *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* is appropriate. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The applicant's spouse asserts in his statement filed on appeal that he and the applicant are trying to start a family and purchase a home together. He states that rejecting the applicant's waiver "would be the end of my life." He states that he cannot afford to support a baby and pay for a mortgage on his own. He states that without the applicant he will "never be able to have a family, buy a home, and have a real life." He states that he "would have no future" without the applicant.

Subsequent to filing the appeal notice, the applicant and her spouse submitted a joint letter to the AAO. The applicant and her spouse state that they have now purchased their first home. They state that they are trying to have a baby, but "have had some bad luck." They state that they would like to visit their family in Russia. They state that it has been four years since the applicant's conviction and she has "not been in any kind of trouble since." The applicant and her spouse request forgiveness for the applicant's offense. As additional corroborating evidence, they furnished their mortgage statement and documentation related to the purchase of their home. They also furnished a consultation request from [REDACTED] of Atlantic General Health System in Ocean City, Maryland, referring the applicant for evaluation and treatment of "miscarriage x2" and her "desired pregnancy."

The AAO will consider financial hardship as a factor contributing to a finding of extreme hardship. However, such hardship has not been demonstrated in the instant case. In *Shooshtary v. INS*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "the extreme hardship requirement . . . was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy." 39 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994). The applicant's spouse has not stated or demonstrated that he would be unable to sell or rent his home if he were separated from his spouse. Further, the applicant's spouse's 2004 tax return shows that he earned \$25,200 during that year. The Department of Health and Human Service's 2004 federal poverty guidelines reflect that an annual income of less than \$9,310 for a family of one constitutes poverty, thus allowing for financial eligibility for certain federal program purposes.¹ The applicant's spouse's income was far above this amount. There is nothing in the record that shows the applicant's spouse would be unable to support himself if he remains in the United States separated from the applicant.

The AAO acknowledges that the applicant and her spouse will be unable to start a family if they are separated due to the applicant's inadmissibility. However, the AAO finds that this is a typical hardship experienced by most families who are separated as a result of removal or inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme. The fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship, and thus the familial and emotional bonds, exist. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v.*

¹ <http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/04poverty.shtml>

INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship).

Finally, the applicant has not discussed whether her spouse would suffer extreme hardship in Russia if he relocated with the applicant there. The letter the applicant and her spouse submitted to the AAO states, "My husband and I would really like to go back to Russia to be with our family. We were there together once before and would love to go back as soon as possible." There is nothing in the record that demonstrates that the applicant's spouse would suffer any type of hardship in Russia. Accordingly, the AAO cannot determine that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated with the applicant to Russia.

In this case, the emotional suffering and financial difficulties described by the applicant's spouse, when considered in the aggregate, do not rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.