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U. S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

[redacted]

H2

FILE: [redacted] Office: BANGKOK Date: APR 18 2011

IN RE: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Michael Shumway

for Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for waiver of inadmissibility was denied by the District Director, Bangkok, Thailand, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Vietnam and a resident of Japan who was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is applying for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen parents and siblings.

The director determined that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated August 15, 2008.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's mother and father are suffering extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility. *Statement on Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B)*, dated September 11, 2008.

In support of the waiver application, the record includes, but is not limited to, a psychological evaluation, letters from the applicant's parents and siblings, medical documentation, family photographs, and conviction records. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

> (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
>
> > (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.
>
> (ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-
>
> > (I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or
> >
> > (II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not

> exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

> [M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....
>
> In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an "actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude." *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, "the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude." 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the "record of conviction" to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708. If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However,

this "does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien's conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself." *Id.* at 703.

The record reflects that on December 29, 2004, the applicant was convicted in the Takamatsu District Court, Japan, of receipt of stolen goods for profit. She was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment, and fined $3,000.

The applicant's conviction for receipt of stolen goods is a species of theft, a type of offense that has long been recognized as involving moral turpitude. U.S. Courts have held that the crime of theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, involves moral turpitude. See *Matter of Scarpulla*, 15 I&N Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1974)(stating, "It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . ."); *Morasch v. INS*, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966)(stating, "Obviously, either petty or grand larceny, i.e., stealing another's property, qualifies [as a crime involving moral turpitude]."). However, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended. *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973).

The record contains a copy of the charging document, which provides:

> Both of the defendants, in conspiracy, purchased two video camera recorders (with a total value of 224,600 yen) with the total payment of 78,000 yen in the room [redacted] the [redacted] around September 13th, 2003, from [redacted], knowing that the mentioned goods are stolen articles and therefore, received the stolen goods for profit.

Charging Document, dated July 16, 2004.

The charging document indicates that the applicant knowingly purchased stolen goods at a fraction of the value of the goods, and thus received the stolen goods for profit. The AAO finds that by purchasing the goods the applicant intended a permanent taking, thus her conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act on this basis. The applicant does not contest her inadmissibility on appeal.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

> (h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –
>
> . . . .
>
> (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the

> alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen parents are the qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige,* 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

> [W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996)

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang,* 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an

unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g.*, *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme

hardship from losing "physical proximity to her family" in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 ("[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents."). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS,* 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-,* 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's father suffers from insomnia, depression, paranoid thoughts, fears, somatic problems, anxiety attacks, nightmares, hypervigilance and hypersensitivity. Counsel states that the applicant's father has psoriasis with skin lesions, chronic Hepatitis B, lumbar degenerative joint disease with chronic lower back pain, and polyosteoarthirits of extremity joints with chronic pain. Counsel contends that the applicant's father tested in the "severe range" for depression and anxiety. Counsel notes that the applicant's father has "no basis to permanently immigrate to Japan." Counsel asserts that the applicant's father would suffer separation from his children who reside in the United States if he moved to Japan. *Appeal Brief*, undated.

Counsel asserts that the applicant's mother has acute major depression, somatic problems, anxiety, sleeping problems, chronic lumbar and cervical pain, knee pain, hypertension, erratic and uncontrollable blood pressure, and dementia. Counsel notes that the applicant's mother takes [redacted] for anxiety and panic attacks, Atenolol for high blood pressure and chest pain, and Piroxicam for arthritis. Counsel states that the applicant's mother tested in the "severe range" for depression and anxiety. Counsel asserts that the applicant's mother and father are "becoming more and more dependent on others as time goes on." Counsel contends that the applicant's siblings have their own families and are unable to care for their parents. *Appeal Brief*, undated.

The AAO acknowledges that the separation of parents from a child often results in significant psychological hardship. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293. As stated, the question of whether

family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968), the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. However, in this case, if the applicant's waiver application is denied, the applicant's parents would suffer extreme emotional harm due to concern about the applicant's well-being and safety in Japan. The record reflects that the applicant, her husband, and two children have permanent resident status in Japan. *See Certificate of Alien Registration*. According to the applicant's Biographic Information Form (Form G-325A), she has resided in Osaka, Japan since September 2001. The applicant and her spouse are the owners of "Tuan Thuy Restaurant" in Osaka, Japan. *See Biographic Information Form*, dated February 17, 2008. Although the applicant and her family members are citizens of Vietnam, the AAO recognizes that they are permanently residing in Japan, and have maintained residence in the country for over nine years. On March 11, 2011, Japan suffered a devastating earthquake and tsunami, which have since resulted in numerous hardships in the country, including the shortage of water, food, power, and the possibility of radioactive materials leaking from nuclear power plants. *See U.S. Department of State Travel Warning*, dated March 16, 2011.

The applicant's parents' concern for their daughter's well-being in Japan is compounded by the emotional harm they were suffering prior to the devastating earthquake and tsunami. The applicant's mother has been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (Severe), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and Anxiety Disorder and the applicant's father has been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (Moderate) and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. *See Psychological Evaluation*, dated September 5, 2008. The applicant's parents have described their intense concern and worry about not being reunited with their daughter. *See Declaration of Man Thi Vu*, dated September 11, 2008 and *Declaration of Diem-Thuy Dang*, dated September 11, 2008. The AAO finds that the aggregate emotional harms the applicant's parents are experiencing due to their separation from the applicant, and concern about the applicant's well-being and safety in Japan, are beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility, and rise to the level of extreme hardship.

The AAO also finds that the applicant's parents would suffer extreme hardship if they relocated to Japan or Vietnam with the applicant. The applicant's parents have numerous family ties in the United States, including their six U.S. citizen sons. Leaving their children behind and relocating to Japan would at this time constitute extreme hardship for them based on the problematic conditions from the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck the country on March 11, 2011. *See U.S. Department of State Travel Warning*, dated March 16, 2011. Furthermore, leaving their children behind and moving to Vietnam would also constitute extreme hardship based on their previous experiences in the country. [redacted] reports that during the applicant's parents' psychological evaluation, they reported that they "suffered the horrors of abuse and torture in Vietnam, as they were imprisoned and tortured by the Communists, because they were both Catholic." [redacted] states that the applicant's father "was incarcerated and tortured, because he was a soldier in South Vietnam." A letter in the record from applicant's mother provides that "[d]ue to the movement of the Congregation of Mother Convent against the Vietnamese Communist on May 23, 1987" she was "put in the jail 10 days and was tortured by the Vietnamese Communist Government." *Letter from* [redacted] dated June 5, 1991. The

applicant's mother's claim was confirmed by the Executive Committee of Linh-Dong Village. *Id.* The applicant's parents have been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder based upon the hardships they experienced in Vietnam. *See Psychological Evaluation*, dated September 5, 2008.

All elements of hardship to the applicant's parents, should they relocate to Vietnam or Japan, have been considered in aggregate. The AAO finds the applicant has shown that her parents' relocation to Vietnam would cause them to sever family ties in the United States and suffer from the emotional hardship of returning to a country where they claim they were detained and tortured. The AAO also finds that the applicant's parents' relocation to Japan would also constitute extreme hardship because of family ties in the United States, a lack of ties to Japan and hardships resulting from the recent earthquake and tsunami. Based on the foregoing, the applicant has established that her parents will suffer extreme hardship should they relocate with her to Vietnam or Japan.

The AAO additionally finds that the applicant merits a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion. In discretionary matters, the alien bears the burden of proving eligibility in terms of equities in the United States which are not outweighed by adverse factors. *See Matter of T-S-Y-*, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). The AAO must then, "[B]alance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on the alien's behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of the country. " *Id.* at 300. (Citations omitted).

The adverse factor in the present case is the applicant's conviction for receipt of stolen goods. The favorable factors in the present case are the extreme hardship to the applicant's U.S. citizen parents, the applicant's family ties in the United States, including her U.S. citizen parents and siblings, and that the applicant has not been arrested or convicted for any other crimes.

The AAO finds that the applicant's criminal conviction is serious in nature and cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, the AAO finds that taken together, the favorable factors in the present case outweigh the adverse factor, such that a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.