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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



H2




DATE: **AUG 12 2011** Office: NEW YORK, NY FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) and section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, New York, New York. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Georgia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of her last departure from the United States and pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(D)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii), for having engaged in prostitution. The applicant's spouse and child are U.S. citizens and she seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States.

The district director found that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and the application was denied accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated December 5, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant details the hardship her spouse is experiencing. *Applicant's Statement*, dated November 16, 2009.

The record includes, but is not limited to, the applicant's statements, her spouse's statement and letters of support. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States with a B-2 nonimmigrant visa on December 1, 1998; she was granted an initial period of authorized stay until May 31, 1999; she received an extension of her B-2 status until December 1, 1999; she filed Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident or Adjust Status, on June 3, 2002 and she departed the United States sometime between October 1, 2002 and her return date of February 6, 2003. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from December 1, 1999, the date her authorized period of stay expired, until June 3, 2002, the date she filed her Form I-485. The applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of her aforementioned departure from the United States.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks

admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record reflects that the applicant was convicted of engaging in prostitution under New Jersey Statutes 2C:34-1(b)(1) on June 28, 2006. The AAO notes that the record shows that the applicant's convictions were expunged. However, under the statutory definition of "conviction" provided at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, no effect is to be given, in immigration proceedings, to a state action which purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction. An alien remains convicted for immigration purposes notwithstanding a subsequent state action purporting to erase the original determination of guilt. *Matter of Pickering*, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), *Matter of Roldan*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1999). Further, a conviction is not necessary for section 212(a)(2)(D) of the Act to apply.

Section 212(a)(2)(D) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

Any alien who-

- (i) ...has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date of application for...adjustment of status... is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), (D) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that -

- (i) the alien is inadmissible only under subparagraph (D)(i) or (D)(ii) . . . or the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

- (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
 - (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or...
- (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

As the applicant has not established eligibility for a section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver as discussed below, no purpose would be served in addressing her eligibility for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act.

A section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her child is not considered in section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings unless it causes hardship to a qualifying relative, in this case the applicant's spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or

inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant’s spouse states that he was born in the United States; he only speaks English; all of his family resides in the United States; he has never travelled outside of the United States; Georgia is in a state of military conflict; he is afraid of being killed in Georgia; and excess suffering may make him a drug addict again. *Applicant’s Spouse’s Statement*, undated. The applicant states that her spouse would not be able to find a way to support her family in Georgia; there is economic hardship in Georgia; and people live in a constant fear of war. *Applicant’s Statement*, undated. She also details difficulties that she and her son would experience in Georgia due to country conditions. *Id.* The record does not include supporting documentary evidence of country conditions in Georgia. Going on record without supporting documentation will not meet the applicant’s burden of proof in this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Thus, the record does not establish that the conditions in Georgia are such that the applicant’s spouse would face physical, financial or other hardship. There are no other claims of hardship in regard to relocating to Georgia. Although the AAO acknowledges that the applicant’s spouse may face difficulty in relocating to Georgia, the record lacks sufficient documentary evidence of emotional, financial, medical or other

types of hardship that, in their totality, establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Georgia.

The applicant's spouse states that he was arrested several times for drug-related offenses; he was a bad guy; the applicant changed his life; she has helped him quit drugs completely; it would be the biggest loss of his life if she was deported; she helps him run his life, keeps him sober and gives him the strength to deal with difficulties in his soul; he wants to have children with the applicant; he survived a car accident and lost his employment; the applicant helped take care of him after his accident; she assisted him with taking his medications and helped him with his physical therapy; and he still cannot work. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement.* The applicant states that her spouse is depressed; she is spending all of her energy to calm him down and keep him away from bad things; and her son needs her spouse. *Applicant's Statement.* The record does not include supporting documentary evidence of the applicant's spouse's arrests or drug problems. Nor does the record contain evidence that the applicant was in a car accident, or medical evidence that the applicant suffered from any injuries or is or has been on any medications. Further, the record does not contain evidence of the applicant's spouse's claimed loss of employment or of his relationship with the applicant's son. There are no other claims of hardship in regard to remaining in the United States. The record lacks sufficient documentary evidence of emotional, financial, medical or other types of hardship that, in their totality, establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he remained in the United States and was separated from the applicant.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.