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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals  
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



**PUBLIC COPY**

[REDACTED]

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FILE:

[REDACTED]

Office: ATLANTA, GA

Date: JAN 11 2011

IN RE:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) and section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

*Michael Shumway*

*for* Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Atlanta, Georgia. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of India who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation on February 11, 1998. The applicant was also found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and has two U.S. citizen children. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility to reside in the United States.

In a decision dated October 15, 2007, the field office director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as a result of his inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B), dated November 13, 2007, counsel states that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility because the applicant's family depends on him for financial and emotional support. Counsel states that the applicant and his spouse are about to have their second child, which could cause additional strain on the household.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime,

the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general...

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In the recently decided *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an "actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude." *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, "the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude." 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the "record of conviction" to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24

I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record indicates that on December 20, 2002 in Alabama the applicant was convicted of two counts of theft in the 3<sup>rd</sup> degree. He was sentenced to one year in prison and two years probation for each count with his sentences to be served consecutively. The applicant, who was born on July 30, 1980, was twenty-two years old at the time of his convictions.

Alabama Criminal Code § 13A-8-2 states:

A person commits the crime of theft of property if he:

- (1) Knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property; or
- (2) Knowingly obtains by deception control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property.

U.S. Courts have held that the crime of theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, involves moral turpitude. See *Matter of Scarpulla*, 15 I&N Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1974)(stating, “It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . .”); *Morasch v. INS*, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966)(stating, “Obviously, either petty or grand larceny, i.e., stealing another’s property, qualifies [as a crime involving moral turpitude].”) However, the BIA has indicated that a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended. *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973).

The AAO notes that although Alabama Criminal Code § 13A-8-2 does not make a distinction as to whether a conviction under this statute constitutes a permanent or temporary taking. However, the record indicates, through the applicant’s statement, that his conviction involved purchasing retail goods with a stolen credit card. In *Matter of Jurado*, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33-34 (BIA 2006), the Board of Immigration Appeals found that violation of a Pennsylvania retail theft statute involved moral turpitude because the nature of retail theft is such that it is reasonable to assume such an offense would be committed with the intention of retaining merchandise permanently. The reasoning in *Jurado* is applicable to the present case. Based on the applicant’s statement in the record, the AAO finds that the applicant’s crime was retail theft. Thus, the AAO finds that the applicant’s convictions for theft under Alabama Criminal Code § 13A-8-2 constitute crimes involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

....

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

The record also indicates that on April 2, 2007, during his adjustment interview, the applicant stated that on February 11, 1998 he used a passport with the name [REDACTED] to enter the United States at the port of entry in New York, New York.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A section 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act dependent upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse and/or parent of the applicant. A section 212(h) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent and/or child of the applicant. Hardship the applicant or his children experience due to his inadmissibility is not considered in section 212(i) waiver proceedings unless it causes hardship to the applicant's spouse. Because the applicant must meet the requirements for a waiver under section 212(h) and section 212(i) he must show that his spouse will suffer extreme hardship. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the

qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec.

at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[redacted] was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The record of hardship includes: counsel's brief, a statement from the applicant, a statement from the applicant's spouse, a letter from a psychologist, copies of prescriptions, medical documentation, and copies of police reports from crimes that have occurred at the family's business.

In his brief dated December 17, 2003, counsel states that the applicant's spouse relies on the applicant for economic and emotional support. Counsel states that the applicant's spouse is currently pregnant and in treatment for depression and anxiety relating to her fear that she and the applicant will become separated or that she will have to leave the United States and leave their businesses behind. Counsel states that returning to India after they have put much effort into establishing a life in the United States would be devastating and heartbreaking to the applicant's family.

The AAO notes that the record includes a copy of a prescription for Zoloft prescribed to the applicant's spouse and dated November 30, 2007. The record contains a business card of a [REDACTED] with Trinity Counseling Center. The record also indicates through a letter from the applicant's spouse's obstetrician that the applicant was pregnant with her second child and that child was due on June 7, 2008. In the letter dated November 29, 2007, [REDACTED] states that the applicant's spouse developed major depression, is under the care of a psychiatrist, and is taking antidepressants. He states that the depression is related to the applicant's immigration situation. [REDACTED] the applicant's spouse's psychologist, states in a letter dated November 29, 2007, that the applicant is quite depressed, that her sleep and appetite are both impaired and her energy level is low. He states that her depression is related to possibly being separated from the applicant and that other than her husband, the applicant's spouse has no other means of support. He suggests that the applicant be prescribed an antidepressant.

In an affidavit dated December 13, 2007, the applicant's spouse states that she owns three convenience stores called [REDACTED] and the applicant is the business manager for these stores. She states that she initially worked part-time in the stores but when she became pregnant she stopped working and currently has no part in running the businesses. She states that if the applicant returns to India it will be very hard on her because she will have to run the stores and raise their son at the same time. She also states that her English skills are not very good and it would be hard for her to manage the employees. She states that as her pregnancy progresses she feels running the businesses will become harder and harder. The applicant's spouse also states that the locations of her stores are not safe and that her husband is able to protect the stores. She states that she is afraid that if her

husband returns to India she, her family, and her stores will no longer be safe. She states that she may have to sell her businesses and find employment, which will be hard because of her children.

The applicant's spouse also states that she is depressed, seeing a psychologist, and on Zoloft. She states that if her husband returns to India she fears she will not be able to pay her bills, including her medical bills.

The AAO notes that the record includes police reports showing that on March 29, 2007 one of the applicant's spouse's stores was robbed by knifepoint and \$500 dollars was taken. On July 30, 2007 the applicant's spouse's store was robbed again by gunpoint and \$500 was taken. Police reports in the record also show that on June 19, 2007 a couple in a car parked in the parking lot of a [REDACTED] Jack's was robbed by gunpoint, on February 9, 2007 another woman was robbed in the parking lot of [REDACTED] by gunpoint, on June 19, 2007 merchandise was stolen from the store, and on November 4, 2005 a store was robbed by gunpoint.

In her affidavit the applicant's spouse also states that it would be very hard for her and her son to relocate to India to be with the applicant. She states that she has worked hard for the past nine years to build a life in the United States and that returning to India and starting over again would be much harder than in the United States. The applicant's spouse also expresses fears about the medical care in India and the economic and security situation in India.

The AAO finds that the applicant has established that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of separation, but has not shown that she would suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocation. The record indicates through statements and supporting documentation that the applicant's spouse is suffering from depression related to the possible separation from the applicant. Exacerbating the applicant's spouse's situation is that she is not employed, she is pregnant, and she must care for her son. The record indicates that the applicant's spouse's depression is serious enough that she has been prescribed an anti-depressant. Thus, the AAO finds that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship upon separation.

However, the record does not include documentation to support the assertions made regarding extreme hardship upon relocation. The applicant and his spouse state that they own three convenience stores, but do not include documentation to support these statements. A police report, dated November 4, 2005 indicates that a [REDACTED] owns the [REDACTED]. In addition, the applicant's spouse indicates that the only person she has in the United States is the applicant and her child. Moreover, the applicant submits no documentation to support the applicant's spouse's assertions regarding the medical care, economic, and/or security situation in India. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse in the event she relocates to India to be with the applicant. To be eligible for a waiver the applicant must show that his qualifying relative will suffer extreme hardship as a result of separation and as a result of relocation. The applicant has failed to show that his spouse would suffer extreme hardship upon relocation. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) and 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.