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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:

Office: NEWARK, NJ

Date:

MAR 01 2011

IN RE:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Newark, New Jersey, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Syria who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant's spouse and three children are U.S. citizens. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated July 29, 2008.

On appeal, counsel states that the field office director erred as a matter of law in several points in the decision. *Form I-290B*, dated August 21, 2008.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's brief, birth certificates of the applicant's children, pictures, church letters, financial documents, statements from the applicant and his spouse, a house deed, and country conditions information on Syria. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

The record reflects that the applicant was convicted on April 28, 1997 under the former New Jersey Statutes Title 2C, Section 20-4 of three counts of theft by deception. He received five years probation and 100 hours of community service for each count. At the time he was convicted, this statute stated:

A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception. A person deceives if he purposely:

- a. Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person's intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;
- b. Prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction; or
- c. Fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.

The term “deceive” does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing or exaggeration by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.

The AAO finds that this is a crime involving moral turpitude as it involves deception. *See generally Matter of McNaughton*, 16 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978). As such, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for committing a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

. . . .

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his mother-in-law can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse and children are the only qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in

the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the

consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The first part of the analysis requires the applicant to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the event of relocation to Syria. Prior counsel states that the applicant's spouse has no family outside of the United States. *Prior Counsel's I-601 Brief*, dated December 23, 2005. Counsel states that the applicant's spouse and children have never been to Syria and do not speak Arabic. *Brief in Support of Appeal*, dated September 2008. The applicant's spouse states that she and her children do not speak Arabic, her mother could not make the trip at her age, she cannot imagine her children starting over in a language that they do not speak, all of her children's potential opportunities are in the United States, and her children would be ridiculed for being American. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement*, dated September 22, 2008. The BIA found that a fifteen-year-old child who lived her entire life in the United States, was completely integrated into the American lifestyle and was not fluent in Chinese would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Taiwan. *Matter of Kao and Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2001). The AAO notes that the applicant's oldest child is 14 years old. Counsel states that the applicant's spouse's widowed mother lives with her and is entirely dependent on her and the applicant for support. *Brief in Support of Appeal*.

Counsel states that the entire family attends [REDACTED] the practice of [REDACTED] is a sacred and integral part of the life of the applicant and his family; the applicant's spouse is [REDACTED]; actively practicing her religion in Syria would be prohibited or severely curtailed; and it is more likely than not that the applicant's family would be subjected to persecution in Syria which punishes proselyting. *Id.* The applicant's spouse's pastor states that he is the pastor of the [REDACTED] the applicant's spouse has been a member of this community her entire life; her three children were baptized in this church; the children are enrolled in the religious education program; the applicant's spouse has been a religious education teacher for five years; and the family attends liturgy regularly. *Letter from [REDACTED]* dated September 12, 2008.

The applicant has submitted the U.S. Department of State 2007 International Religious Freedom Report for Syria, which reflects that the government monitored the activities of all groups, including religious groups, and discouraged proselytism; and there were occasional reports of minor tensions between religious groups. Prior counsel states that it would be dangerous for the applicant's family to accompany him to Syria and he cites to a U.S. Department of State Travel Warning for Syria. *Prior Counsel's I-601 Response*, dated November 8, 2007. The record includes the November 13, 2006 U.S. Department of State Travel Warning for Syria. The AAO notes that there is no longer a travel warning for Syria. Counsel states that the applicant's two sons would be inducted into the Syrian army once they turn 18, as the Syrian military is a conscripted force and requires all males to serve 24 months in the military once they turn 18. *Brief in Support of Appeal*. The AAO notes that the record is not clear as to the Syrian military policy. However, based on the hardship factors

supported by the record and the relevant case law, the AAO finds that the applicant's oldest child would experience extreme hardship upon relocation to Syria.

The second part of the analysis requires the applicant to establish extreme hardship in the event that a qualifying relative remains in the United States. Counsel states that the applicant owns his own business and home in New Jersey, he is the sole provider for his family, and his spouse is a full-time homemaker. *Brief in Support of Appeal*. The applicant's spouse states that the applicant runs their family jewelry business; it took the applicant 12 years to build the business; the applicant does everything from designing the jewelry to buying the stones; he runs the store and keeps the books; they will lose their thriving business; and no one else is capable of running the business. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement*. The tax returns submitted reflect that the applicant's spouse owns the jewelry business and both she and the applicant receive officer compensation. Prior counsel states that the applicant pays a \$4,300 monthly mortgage and a \$21,000 annual property tax. *Prior Counsel's I-601 Brief*. The record includes a deed which reflects that the applicant and his spouse own a property with a \$869,000 purchase price.

The applicant's spouse states that she cares for the three children and her mother; her mother is entirely dependent on them for support; they will have no means of support without the applicant; and they would have to sell their home. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement*. The applicant's spouse states that the applicant is a wonderful father to their children, and he never misses their sporting events or their daughter's dance recitals. *Id.*

Considering the applicant's close relationship with his oldest child, the financial issues presented and the normal effects of a permanent separation from a parent, the AAO finds that the applicant's oldest child would suffer extreme hardship if he remains in the United States.

As the AAO has found extreme hardship to the applicant's oldest child, it will not make a finding regarding the other qualifying relatives.

The AAO additionally finds that the applicant merits a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion. In discretionary matters, the alien bears the burden of proving eligibility in terms of equities in the United States which are not outweighed by adverse factors. *See Matter of T-S-Y-*, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957).

In evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion, the factors adverse to the alien include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record, and if so, its nature and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of the alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where alien began residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence

of property or business ties, evidence of value or service in the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to the alien's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends and responsible community representatives).

See Matter of Mendez-Moralez, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). The AAO must then “[b]alance the adverse factors evidencing an alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on the alien’s behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of the country.” *Id.* at 300 (citations omitted).

The adverse factors in the present case are the applicant’s crimes, unauthorized period of stay and unauthorized employment.

The favorable factors include the presence of the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse and children, and the extreme hardship to his child if his waiver request is denied.

The AAO finds that the violations committed by the applicant cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, the AAO finds that taken together, the favorable factors in the present case outweigh the adverse factors, such that a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.