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DATE: Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

**MAY 03 2011**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Director, California Service Center and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant has two U.S. citizen daughters and one U.S. citizen son. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to reside in the United States.

In a decision, dated July 24, 2008, the Director states that due to the applicant's extensive arrest record, his Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) was denied based on discretion. The director then found that no purpose would be served in adjudicating the applicant's waiver application. The waiver application was denied accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B), dated August 8, 2008, the applicant states that he no longer can afford an attorney and that he is resubmitting all of the documents related to his waiver application on appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess

of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In the recently decided *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24

I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The AAO notes that the applicant has a lengthy arrest record dating from 1982 to 1990. These arrests include: four counts of sexual battery on a minor, eleven counts of lewd and lascivious assault on a child, two counts of indecent exposure, one count of aggravated battery, two counts of battery, one count of carrying a concealed weapon, one count of burglary, two counts of grand theft, and seven counts of unemployment compensation fraud. The record indicates that none of the above arrests resulted in a conviction. However, the record also indicates that on October 15, 1984 the applicant was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of § 784.07 of the Florida Statutes and resisting a law enforcement officer with violence in violation of § 843.01 of the Florida Statutes. On August 1, 1985 the applicant was convicted of petit larceny under §812.014(3)(B) of the Florida Statutes.

At the time of the applicant’s conviction, Florida Statutes § 843.01 provided, in pertinent part, that “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer . . . by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . . .”

Florida Statutes § 784.07 was violated by “knowingly committing . . . battery upon a law enforcement officer.” Section 784.03 of the Florida Statutes provided, in pertinent part:

(1)(a) The offense of battery occurs when a person:

1. Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or
2. Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.

Assault on a law enforcement officer has been found to be a crime involving moral turpitude where the perpetrator knows the victim to be a law enforcement officer performing his official duty and the assault results in bodily injury to the officer. *See Matter of Danesh*, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988) (distinguishing cases in which knowledge of the police officer’s status was not an element of the crime and where bodily injury or other aggravating factors were not present to elevate offense beyond “simple” assault); *see also Matter of O-*, 4 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 1951) (German law involving an assault on a police officer was not a crime involving moral turpitude because knowledge that the person assaulted was a police officer engage in the performance of his duties was not an element of the crime); *Matter of B-*, 5 I&N Dec. 538 (BIA 1953) (as modified by *Matter of Danesh*, *supra.*) (assault on prison guard not a crime involving moral turpitude because offense charged appeared to be only “simple” assault and no bodily injury was alleged); *Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson*, 12 F.2d 465 (D. Mass 1926) (assault on an officer was not a crime involving moral turpitude in spite of fact that defendant was armed with a razor because the razor was not used in the assault).

The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the phrase “knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer” in Florida Statutes § 843.01 imposes a requirement that a defendant have knowledge of the officer’s status as a law enforcement officer. *See Polite v. State of Florida*, 973 So.2d 1107, 1112 (Fla. 2007). The Florida Supreme Court has also ruled that knowledge of the officer’s status is an element of the crime of battery upon a law enforcement officer under Florida Statutes § 784.07. *See Street v. State*, 383 So.2d 900, 901 (Fla. 1980).

However, the AAO notes that Florida Statutes § 843.01 is violated by either “offering” to do violence, or by “doing” violence, and there is no requirement that the victim suffer bodily injury. Similarly, Florida Statutes § 784.07 is violated by either intentionally touching or striking an officer against his will or by intentionally causing bodily harm to an officer. Thus, based solely on the statutory language, it appears that Florida Statutes §§ 843.01 and 784.07 encompass (hypothetically) conduct that involves moral turpitude and conduct that does not.

In accordance with *Silva-Trevino*, the AAO must determine if an actual case exists in which these criminal statutes were applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. The AAO is aware of a prior case in which Florida Statutes § 843.01 has been applied to conduct not involving moral turpitude. In *Wright v. State*, 681 So.2d 852, 853-54 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1996), the court found that the state was not required to prove that the appellant, who had denied under oath that he had hit, kicked or otherwise resisted the officers apprehending him, had actually struck either of the officers because evidence that he “struggled, kicked, and flailed his arms and legs was sufficient to show that he offered to do violence to the officers within the meaning of section 843.01.” Similarly, in *Hendricks v. State*, 444 So.2d 542, 542-43 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1999), the court noted that the appellant had been charged and convicted of battery in the form of touching or striking a law enforcement officer, but not for intentionally causing bodily harm to an officer.

Therefore, the AAO cannot find that the offenses described in Florida Statutes §§ 843.01 and 784.07 are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude. The AAO must therefore review the entire record, including the record of conviction and, if necessary, other relevant evidence, to determine if the applicant’s conviction under these statutes was for morally turpitudinous conduct. The AAO notes that the documents comprising the record of conviction are inconclusive as to whether the applicant caused bodily injury to the officer who arrested him. However, the arrest report, dated July 4, 1984, states that the applicant kicked the arresting officer in the groin with his right foot and stated that he would kill the officer upon his release from prison. Based on this evidence, the AAO determines that the applicant’s convictions for resisting a law enforcement officer with violence in violation of Florida Statutes § 843.01 and for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of Florida Statutes § 784.07 were based on conduct that caused bodily injury to a law enforcement officer. Consequently, these convictions are crimes involving moral turpitude that render the applicant inadmissible under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

At the time of the applicant’s conviction, Florida Statutes § 812.014 provided, in pertinent parts:

(1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:

(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property.

(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.

In the instant case, the Florida statute under which the applicant was convicted involves both temporary and permanent takings. A plain reading of Florida Statutes § 812.014 shows that it can be violated by knowingly obtaining or using the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently, deprive an individual of his or her property or appropriate the property to his or her own use. The BIA has determined that to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, a theft offense must require the intent to permanently take another person's property. *See Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) ("Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended."). Therefore, the AAO cannot find that a violation of Florida Statutes § 812.014 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

In *In re Jurado-Delgado*, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33-34 (BIA 2006), the Board of Immigration Appeals found that violation of a Pennsylvania retail theft statute involved moral turpitude because the nature of retail theft is such that it is reasonable to assume such an offense would be committed with the intention of retaining merchandise permanently. The reasoning in *Jurado-Delgado* is applicable to the applicant's conviction for petit larceny as the arrest report indicates that the applicant's crime was retail theft. The arrest report indicates that the applicant stole two bottles of cologne from the "Jefferson Store". He was thus convicted of knowingly taking the property of another with intent to permanently deprive that person of the property, a crime involving moral turpitude.

Thus, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and he has not disputed his inadmissibility on appeal.

The AAO notes that the applicant is not eligible for the petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act because the applicant was convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude.

The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that --

(i) . . . the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .; and

(2) the Attorney General [Secretary], in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

Section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act provides that the Secretary may, in her discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) of subsection (a)(2) if the activities for which the applicant is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the applicant's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status. An application for admission to the United States is a continuing application, and admissibility is determined on the basis of the facts and the law at the time the application is finally considered. *Matter of Alarcon*, 20 I&N Dec. 557, 562 (BIA 1992).

Since the criminal convictions for which the applicant was found inadmissible occurred more than 15 years ago, the inadmissibility can be waived under section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act. Section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act requires that the applicant's admission to the United States not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and that he has been rehabilitated. However, even if the applicant were able to satisfy the requirements of section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act, his waiver application would not be granted as the AAO finds that he is not deserving of a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion as he has been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime and is subject to section 212.7(d) of the Act. For waivers of inadmissibility, the burden is on the applicant to establish that a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is warranted in the exercise of discretion. *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 299 (BIA 1996). The adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident must be balanced with the social and humane considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of this country. *Id.* at 300.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) provides:

The Attorney General [Secretary, Department of Homeland Security], in general, will not favorably exercise discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(2)) to consent to an application or reapplication for a visa, or admission to the United States, or adjustment of status, with respect to immigrant aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(2) of the Act in cases involving violent or dangerous crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of the application for adjustment of status or an immigrant visa or admission as an immigrant would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the alien's underlying criminal offense, a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be insufficient to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act.

The AAO notes that the words "violent" and "dangerous" and the phrase "violent or dangerous crimes" are not further defined in the regulation, and the AAO is aware of no precedent decision or other authority containing a definition of these terms as used in 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). A similar phrase, "crime of violence," is found in section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Under that section, a crime of violence is an aggravated felony if the term of imprisonment is at least one year. As defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16, a crime of violence is an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, *or* any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. We note that the Attorney General declined to reference section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act or 18 U.S.C. § 16, or the specific language thereof, in 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Thus, we find that the statutory terms "violent or dangerous crimes" and "crime of violence" are not synonymous and the determination that a crime is a violent or dangerous crime under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) is not dependant on it having been found to be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 or an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act. *See* 67 Fed. Reg. 78675, 78677-78 (December 26, 2002).

Nevertheless, we will use the definition of a crime of violence found in 18 U.S.C. § 16 as guidance in determining whether a crime is a violent crime under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), considering also other common meanings of the terms "violent" and "dangerous". The term "dangerous" is not defined specifically by 18 U.S.C. § 16 or any other relevant statutory provision. Thus, in general, we interpret the terms "violent" and "dangerous" in accordance with their plain or common meanings, and consistent with any rulings found in published precedent decisions addressing discretionary denials under the standard described in 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Decisions to deny waiver applications on the basis of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) are made on a factual "case-by-case basis." 67 Fed. Reg. at 78677-78.

The AAO finds that resisting a law enforcement officer with violence is a violent and dangerous crime. Accordingly, the applicant must show that "extraordinary circumstances" warrant approval of the waiver. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Extraordinary circumstances may exist in cases

involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or if the denial of the applicant's admission would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. *Id.* Finding no evidence of foreign policy, national security, or other extraordinary equities, the AAO will consider whether the applicant has "clearly demonstrate[d] that the denial of . . . admission as an immigrant would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a qualifying relative. *Id.*

In *Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga*, 23 I& N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001), the BIA determined that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in cancellation of removal cases under section 240A(b) of the Act is hardship that "must be 'substantially' beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country." However, the applicant need not show that hardship would be unconscionable. *Id.* at 61. The AAO notes that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard in cancellation of removal cases is identical to the standard put forth by the Attorney General in *Matter of Jean*, *supra*, and codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d).

The BIA stated that in assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, it would be useful to view the factors considered in determining extreme hardship. *Id.* at 63. In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the BIA provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established the lower standard of extreme hardship. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. The BIA added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not an exclusive list. *Id.*

In *Monreal*, the BIA provided additional examples of the hardship factors it deemed relevant for establishing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship:

[T]he ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives. For example, an applicant who has elderly parents in this country who are solely dependent upon him for support might well have a strong case. Another strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school. A lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. As with extreme hardship, all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

23 I&N Dec. at 63-4.

In the precedent decision issued the following year, *Matter of Andazola-Rivas*, the BIA noted that, “the relative level of hardship a person might suffer cannot be considered entirely in a vacuum. It must necessarily be assessed, at least in part, by comparing it to the hardship others might face.” 23 I&N Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). The issue presented in *Andazola-Rivas* was whether the Immigration Judge correctly applied the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard in a cancellation of removal case when he concluded that such hardship to the respondent’s minor children was demonstrated by evidence that they “would suffer hardship of an emotional, academic and financial nature,” and would “face complete upheaval in their lives and hardship that could conceivably ruin their lives.” *Id.* at 321 (internal quotations omitted). The BIA viewed the evidence of hardship in the respondent’s case and determined that the hardship presented by the respondent did not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. The BIA noted:

While almost every case will present some particular hardship, the fact pattern presented here is, in fact, a common one, and the hardships the respondent has outlined are simply not substantially different from those that would normally be expected upon removal to a less developed country. Although the hardships presented here might have been adequate to meet the former “extreme hardship” standard for suspension of deportation, we find that they are not the types of hardship envisioned by Congress when it enacted the significantly higher “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard.

23 I&N Dec. at 324.

However, the BIA in *Matter of Gonzalez Recinas*, a precedent decision issued the same year as *Andazola-Rivas*, clarified that “the hardship standard is not so restrictive that only a handful of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relative with a serious medical condition, will qualify for relief.” 23 I&N Dec. 467, 470 (BIA 2002). The BIA found that the hardship factors presented by the respondent cumulatively amounted to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her qualifying relatives. The BIA noted that these factors included her heavy financial and familial burden, lack of support from her children’s father, her U.S. citizen children’s unfamiliarity with the Spanish language, lawful residence of her immediate family, and the concomitant lack of family in Mexico. 23 I&N Dec. at 472. The BIA stated, “We consider this case to be on the outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases in which the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard will be met.” *Id.* at 470.

An analysis under *Monreal-Aguinaga* and *Andazola-Rivas* is appropriate. See *Gonzalez Recinas*, 23 I&N Dec. at 469 (“While any hardship case ultimately succeeds or fails on its own merits and on the particular facts presented, *Matter of Andazola* and *Matter of Monreal* are the starting points for any analysis of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”). The AAO notes that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the

United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The record of hardship includes: a letter from counsel; a letter from the mother of the applicant's children; letters from the applicant's children; copies of child support payments; documentation showing deductions made by the applicant in support of his children's medical, dental, and life insurance; and a 2007 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practice in Cuba.

In an affidavit, dated June 19, 2008, the mother of the applicant's children states that their two daughters live with her and their son lives with the applicant. She states that the applicant is an active parent and is very close to his son. She states that she feels her children will go through extreme damage without their father in their lives, that he is the moral center of the family, and their only means of financial support.

The AAO notes that the record also includes letters from the applicant's children supporting their mother's statements in regards to the applicant being an involved parent, documentation to show that the applicant supports his children with weekly child support payments of \$540, and a 2007 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Cuba.

The AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as a result of his inadmissibility. The current record does not indicate that the applicant's children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as a result of separation. The record reflects that the applicant supports his children financially, but does not provide enough financial documentation to indicate how the children would suffer in the event this support was no longer available. The record also does not give any indication as to whether the applicant's children would be able to visit him upon his return to Cuba. Furthermore, although the applicant submitted country condition information for Cuba, he has not specifically addressed how his qualifying relatives would experience hardship if they relocated to Cuba. Therefore, the record does not show that the difficulties, considered in the aggregate, would rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. *Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga*, 23 I&N Dec. at 62.

In sum, although the applicant has submitted documentation to demonstrate that he satisfies the section 212(h)(1)(A) waiver requirements. His waiver application will not be granted as the AAO finds that he did not demonstrate that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d).

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.