


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U. S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




**U.S. Citizenship
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Services**


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Date: MAY 05 2011 Office: MEXICO CITY

FILE: 

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Michael Shumway

f Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude and pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse.

In a decision, dated October 6, 2008, the acting district director found that the applicant had failed to establish that his spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility or that he warranted the favorable exercise of discretion. The Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) was denied accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B), dated October 18, 2008, the applicant's spouse states that on July 26, 2008 in El Salvador, the applicant was stabbed in the neck and almost died. She states that the two men who committed the crime are in El Salvador and the applicant is in fear for his life. She states that the two men have threatened to kill the applicant and that she is also in fear that he will be killed. Finally, she states that the applicant is submitting forms from the hospital and the police with the appeal.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection on April 13, 1994. In 2001 the applicant applied for and was granted Temporary Protected Status, which he held until 2002. The applicant remained in the United States until June 2007. Therefore, the applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date the unlawful presence provisions were enacted, until 2001, when he was granted Temporary Protected Status and from 2002, when his status expired, until June 2007, when he departed the United States. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of his June 2007 departure from the United States. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In addition, the record establishes that the applicant has a lengthy criminal record in Fairfax County, Virginia including 23 separate arrests on 32 charges. The record indicates that the applicant was convicted of the following charges: robbery with a firearm in 1995; petty larceny, grand larceny, and aggravated assault in 2001; and grand and petty larceny in 2003. The record also indicates that the applicant was sentenced to ten months in prison for his robbery conviction.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules

of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In the recently decided *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an "actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude." *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, "the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude." 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the "record of conviction" to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this "does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien's conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself." *Id.* at 703.

The AAO finds that the applicant's conviction for robbery with a firearm is a crime involving moral turpitude. Robbery has consistently been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude as the force or threatened force against the person of the victim and the intent to deprive him of his property unlawfully both supply the element of "evil intent." *Matter of Martin*, 18 I. & N. Dec. 226 (BIA 1982) (Colorado law); *Matter of Carballe*, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1986) (Florida Statute); *Ashby*

v. *INS*, 961 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1992); *Matter of Burbano*, Int. Dec. 3229 (BIA 1994); *Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS*, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994).

The AAO also finds that the applicant's two convictions for petty larceny are crimes involving moral turpitude. The AAO notes that petit larceny under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-96 provides:

Any person who:

1. Commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of less than \$5, or
2. Commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of less than \$200, except as provided in subdivision (iii) of § 18.2-95, shall be deemed guilty of petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.

In determining whether theft is a crime of moral turpitude, the BIA considers "whether there was an intention to permanently deprive the owner of his property." See *In re Jurado-Delgado*, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33 (BIA 2006). In *Foster v. Commonwealth*, 44 Va.App. 574, 606 S.E.2d 518, Va.App. (2004), the Court of Appeals of Virginia stated that petit larceny in Virginia is a common law crime that has been defined by case law as "the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently." (citations omitted). *Id.* at 577-81. In view of the fact that conviction for petit larceny under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-96 requires proving an intention to permanently deprive the owner of his property, the AAO finds that the offense of which the applicant was convicted under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-96 involves moral turpitude.

The AAO notes that because the applicant has been found to have been convicted of at least three crimes involving moral turpitude, no purpose would be served in discussing whether his other convictions were also for crimes involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(I), for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

- (1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that --
 - (i) . . . the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
 - (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
 - (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . ; and

(2) the Attorney General [Secretary], in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

Although the applicant is eligible for a waiver under section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act in regards to his 1995 conviction, he is not eligible for this waiver in regards to his 2001 and 2003 convictions. Thus, the applicant must demonstrate eligibility for a waiver under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

However, even if the applicant were able to satisfy the requirements of section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act, his waiver application would not be granted as the AAO finds that he is not deserving of a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion as he has been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime and is subject to section 212.7(d) of the Act. For waivers of inadmissibility, the burden is on the applicant to establish that a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is warranted in the exercise of discretion. *Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 299 (BIA 1996). The adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident must be balanced with the social and humane considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of this country. *Id.* at 300.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) provides:

The Attorney General [Secretary, Department of Homeland Security], in general, will not favorably exercise discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(2)) to consent to an application or reapplication for a visa, or admission to the United States, or adjustment of status, with respect to immigrant aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(2) of the Act in cases involving violent or dangerous crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of the application for adjustment of status or an immigrant visa or admission as an immigrant would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the alien's underlying criminal offense, a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be

insufficient to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act.

The AAO notes that the words “violent” and “dangerous” and the phrase “violent or dangerous crimes” are not further defined in the regulation, and the AAO is aware of no precedent decision or other authority containing a definition of these terms as used in 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). A similar phrase, “crime of violence,” is found in section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Under that section, a crime of violence is an aggravated felony if the term of imprisonment is at least one year. As defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16, a crime of violence is an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. We note that the Attorney General declined to reference section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act or 18 U.S.C. § 16, or the specific language thereof, in 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Thus, we find that the statutory terms “violent or dangerous crimes” and “crime of violence” are not synonymous and the determination that a crime is a violent or dangerous crime under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) is not dependant on it having been found to be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 or an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act. *See* 67 Fed. Reg. 78675, 78677-78 (December 26, 2002).

Nevertheless, we will use the definition of a crime of violence found in 18 U.S.C. § 16 as guidance in determining whether a crime is a violent crime under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), considering also other common meanings of the terms “violent” and “dangerous”. The term “dangerous” is not defined specifically by 18 U.S.C. § 16 or any other relevant statutory provision. Thus, in general, we interpret the terms “violent” and “dangerous” in accordance with their plain or common meanings, and consistent with any rulings found in published precedent decisions addressing discretionary denials under the standard described in 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Decisions to deny waiver applications on the basis of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) are made on a factual “case-by-case basis.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 78677-78.

The AAO finds that robbery with a firearm is a violent and dangerous crime and the applicant is thus subject to the heightened discretionary standard under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d).

Accordingly, the applicant must show that “extraordinary circumstances” warrant approval of the waiver. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Extraordinary circumstances may exist in cases involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or if the denial of the applicant’s admission would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. *Id.* Finding no evidence of foreign policy, national security, or other extraordinary equities, the AAO will consider whether the applicant has “clearly demonstrate[d] that the denial of . . . admission as an immigrant would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. *Id.*

In *Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga*, 23 I& N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001), the BIA determined that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in cancellation of removal cases under section 240A(b) of the Act is hardship that “must be ‘substantially’ beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.” However, the applicant need not show that hardship would be unconscionable. *Id.* at 61. The AAO notes that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard in cancellation of removal cases is identical to the standard put forth by the Attorney General in *Matter of Jean*, *supra*, and codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d).

The BIA stated that in assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, it would be useful to view the factors considered in determining extreme hardship. *Id.* at 63. In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the BIA provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established the lower standard of extreme hardship. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. The BIA added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not an exclusive list. *Id.*

In *Monreal*, the BIA provided additional examples of the hardship factors it deemed relevant for establishing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship:

[T]he ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives. For example, an applicant who has elderly parents in this country who are solely dependent upon him for support might well have a strong case. Another strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school. A lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. As with extreme hardship, all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

23 I&N Dec. at 63-4.

In the precedent decision issued the following year, *Matter of Andazola-Rivas*, the BIA noted that, "the relative level of hardship a person might suffer cannot be considered entirely in a vacuum. It must necessarily be assessed, at least in part, by comparing it to the hardship others might face." 23 I&N Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). The issue presented in *Andazola-Rivas* was whether the Immigration Judge correctly applied the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard in a cancellation of removal case when he concluded that such hardship to the respondent's minor children was demonstrated by evidence that they "would suffer hardship of an emotional, academic and financial nature," and would "face complete upheaval in their lives and hardship that could conceivably ruin their lives." *Id.* at 321 (internal quotations omitted). The BIA viewed the evidence of hardship in the respondent's case and determined that the hardship presented by the respondent did not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. The BIA noted:

While almost every case will present some particular hardship, the fact pattern presented here is, in fact, a common one, and the hardships the respondent has outlined are simply not substantially different from those that would normally be expected upon removal to a less developed country. Although the hardships presented here might have been adequate to meet the former "extreme hardship" standard for suspension of deportation, we find that they are not the types of hardship envisioned

by Congress when it enacted the significantly higher “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard.

23 I&N Dec. at 324.

However, the BIA in *Matter of Gonzalez Recinas*, a precedent decision issued the same year as *Andazola-Rivas*, clarified that “the hardship standard is not so restrictive that only a handful of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relative with a serious medical condition, will qualify for relief.” 23 I&N Dec. 467, 470 (BIA 2002). The BIA found that the hardship factors presented by the respondent cumulatively amounted to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her qualifying relatives. The BIA noted that these factors included her heavy financial and familial burden, lack of support from her children’s father, her U.S. citizen children’s unfamiliarity with the Spanish language, lawful residence of her immediate family, and the concomitant lack of family in Mexico. 23 I&N Dec. at 472. The BIA stated, “We consider this case to be on the outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases in which the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard will be met.” *Id.* at 470.

An analysis under *Monreal-Aguinaga* and *Andazola-Rivas* is appropriate. See *Gonzalez Recinas*, 23 I&N Dec. at 469 (“While any hardship case ultimately succeeds or fails on its own merits and on the particular facts presented, *Matter of Andazola* and *Matter of Monreal* are the starting points for any analysis of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”). The AAO notes that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

The record of hardship includes: a Notice of Appeal to the AAO from the applicant’s spouse; medical documentation and police records from El Salvador in the Spanish language; photographs of stitches in the applicant’s neck from the reported stabbing; and a statement from the applicant’s spouse.

In her statement, dated February 14, 2008, the applicant’s spouse states that the applicant is a diabetic and needs to be on medication. She also describes how the applicant loves El Salvador, is helping to better the town he lives in by repairing roads and a church, and if allowed in the United States, would return to El Salvador often to visit the country and family. The applicant’s spouse also states that she has been to El Salvador two times and enjoys the country very much. She states that she and the applicant have had a plan for the past two years to buy land and build a home in El Salvador so that they would have a place to stay when they visited his family. She states that she plans on returning often to El Salvador. On the other hand, the applicant’s spouse states that she is having financial difficulty in the United States without the applicant as she went from a two family income to one and she also needs to help support the applicant in El Salvador. She states that she has been to the hospital several times with severe headaches and chest pains, which are stress related.

As stated above, in her Notice of Appeal to the AAO, the applicant’s spouse states that on July 26, 2008 in El Salvador, the applicant was stabbed in the neck and almost died. She states that the two men who committed the crime are in El Salvador and the applicant is afraid for his life. She states that the two men have threatened to kill the applicant and that she is also in fear that he will be

killed. In support of these assertions the applicant has submitted a medical document, police documents, and photographs of the injuries. Although the AAO can find, based on the photographs submitted, that the applicant's neck was wounded and needed stitches, the AAO cannot ascertain the nature of this injury and the circumstances surrounding this injury because the applicant failed to submit certified translations of the medical and police documents. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3).

The AAO has reviewed the record and finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his spouse is suffering exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as a result of his inadmissibility. Although the AAO acknowledges that the applicant has suffered a serious injury to his neck, a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship cannot be made on that fact alone. The current record indicates that the applicant and his spouse enjoy visiting El Salvador, the applicant has family in El Salvador, and they even have plans to purchase land and build a house in El Salvador. The AAO finds that these statements indicate that it would not be exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for the applicant's spouse to relocate to El Salvador to be with the applicant. The AAO finds that the record also does not establish that the applicant's spouse is suffering exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as a result of being separated from the applicant. The current record does not include documentation to support the statements made by the applicant's spouse regarding the applicant fearing for his life in El Salvador. In addition, the record does not include documentation to support the applicant's spouse's assertions regarding her financial situation or her health status, including the statements concerning her visits to the hospital. The AAO notes that going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Therefore, the current record does not show that the hardship suffered by the applicant's spouse would rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. *Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga*, 23 I&N Dec. at 62. In sum, the applicant did not demonstrate that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d).

The AAO also notes that the record indicates in a Consular Officer's memorandum, dated September 9, 2008 that on the applicant's immigrant visa application and during his immigrant visa interview the applicant misrepresented his criminal record in stating that he had only been arrested on one occasion for a misdemeanor driving while under the influence.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the

Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The AAO finds that the record establishes that the applicant is also inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for having attempted to procure admission to the United States by misrepresenting his criminal record.

However, the AAO also finds that because the applicant has not demonstrated that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), and a waiver therefore cannot be granted, no purpose would be served in discussing his meeting the requirements of extreme hardship under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) or section 212(i) of the Act for his inadmissibilities under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) and 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.