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U. S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



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Date: JUL 20 2012 Office: MIAMI, FL

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
IN RE:

Applicant: 

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for waiver of inadmissibility was denied by the Field Office Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant does not dispute the finding of inadmissibility. The applicant's spouse is a U.S. citizen and her mother is a lawful permanent resident. The applicant is applying for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to reside in the United States.

The field office director determined that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated March 17, 2010.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the decision was erroneous as the field office director failed to consider all of the relevant hardship factors. *Form I-290B*, received April 10, 2010.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's brief, the applicant's statement, the applicant's spouse's statement, financial records, letters of support, medical records and photographs. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
  - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

The record reflects that on November 4, 2008 the applicant was convicted of grand theft 3<sup>rd</sup> degree in violation of Florida Statutes § 812.014, and she received two years of probation and monetary penalties.

Florida Statutes § 812.014 provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:

(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property.

(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.

(2) (c) It is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the property stolen is:

1. Valued at \$300 or more, but less than \$5,000.

The AAO notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, under which the applicant's case arises, has declined to follow *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008) in favor of the traditional categorical and modified categorical framework. *Fajardo v. Attorney General*, 659 F.3d 1301 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011). In the instant case, the Florida statute under which the applicant was convicted involves both temporary and permanent takings. A plain reading of Fl. Stat. § 812.014 shows that it can be violated by knowingly obtaining or using the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently, deprive an individual of his or her property or appropriate the property to his or her own use. The BIA has determined that to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, a theft offense must require the intent to permanently take another person's property. See *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) ("Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended."). As such, the crime does not categorically involve moral turpitude.

The Board has held that the courts and immigration authorities may look to the record of conviction if the statute under which an alien is convicted includes some offenses which involve moral turpitude and others which do not (i.e. a divisible statute), in order to determine the offense for which the alien was convicted. See *Matter of Short*, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989). The court in *Matter of Short* included the indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence in its definition of the record of conviction. *Matter of Short*, at 137-38. It is important to note that the record of conviction does not include the arrest report. See *In re Teixeira*, 21 I&N Dec. 316, 319-20 (BIA 1996).

The information for the applicant's criminal case reflects that the objects of the theft were merchandise and credit from a Macy's department store. In *In re Jurado-Delgado*, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33-34 (BIA 2006), the Board of Immigration Appeals found that violation of a Pennsylvania retail theft statute involved moral turpitude because the nature of retail theft is such that it is reasonable to assume such an offense would be committed with the intention of retaining merchandise permanently. The reasoning in *Jurado-Delgado* is applicable to the applicant's case in regards to her Florida conviction for grand theft as one of the objects of her theft was retail merchandise. In *Matter of Grazley*, the respondent was convicted under a Canadian theft statute which required the intent to deprive the owner, either temporarily or absolutely. *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. at 332. The BIA looked to the record of conviction to conclude that the respondent had intended a permanent taking (cash), thus finding moral turpitude. *Id.* at 332-333. In this case, the applicant's conviction for theft was also related to credit, which indicates a permanent taking. As such, the record reflects that the applicant committed a crime involving moral turpitude, and is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

. . . .

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse and mother are the qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying

relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

Counsel states that the applicant's spouse was born in the United States; he has no ties to Jamaica; his family resides in Florida; he suffers from high blood pressure for which he takes medication; the

economic and political situation in Jamaica would make it impossible for the applicant and her spouse to support themselves; the economic and political situation in Jamaica is highly unfavorable and dangerous for the applicant and her spouse; and the applicant's spouse will not be afforded necessary medical care. The record reflects that the applicant's spouse has been prescribed medicine for high blood pressure.

The applicant's spouse states that his three children, stepson, parents, siblings and extended family are U.S. citizens; and he could not afford private insurance and medical costs in Jamaica as he would not have a job.

The record reflects that the applicant's spouse has family ties in the United States and he does not have ties in Jamaica. However, the record indicates that his children are over the age of 18 and the record is not clear as to his emotional proximity to them. In addition, the record does not include supporting documentary evidence that he would have difficulty obtaining employment in Jamaica or that he would experience financial hardship there. The record does not include evidence that he would be unable to obtain medical care in Jamaica or of the severity of his medical issues. The record does not include evidence to support that he would have safety issues there. Going on record without supporting documentation will not meet the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The record does not include any assertions as to whether the applicant's mother would experience hardship if she relocated to Jamaica. The record lacks sufficient documentary evidence of emotional, financial, medical or other types of hardship that, in their totality, establish that a qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship upon relocating to Jamaica.

Counsel states that the applicant is a home health aide and she monitors her spouse's blood pressure, medication and diet; his health will suffer immensely without her; he will fall back into his unhealthy eating lifestyle; and the stress due to separation would elevate his blood pressure.

The applicant's spouse states that he has three children from previous relationships; the applicant has a child; he loves the applicant dearly and she is his emotional anchor; he would experience extreme emotional, financial and psychological hardship without the applicant; he could not afford to support two households; it has been tough to make ends meet with the recession and he needs the applicant's income; his blood pressure has become elevated knowing that the applicant may be deported; the applicant makes sure that he takes his medication and monitors his eating habits; and he could not travel to Jamaica due to limited resources. The record includes evidence that the applicant is employed and that her spouse has a past due bill on an account. Counsel states that the applicant's mother is 71 years-old and she relies on the physical and financial help of the applicant.

The record does not include supporting documentary evidence that the applicant's mother relies on the physical and financial help of the applicant. The record reflects that the applicant's spouse may have some difficulty without the applicant. However, the record lacks sufficient documentary evidence of emotional, financial, medical or other types of hardship that, in their totality, establish that a qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship upon remaining in the United States.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.