

Administrative Review
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Department of Homeland Security

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

Hg

[Redacted]

Date: **JUN 22 2012** Office: BOSTON, MA FILE: [Redacted]

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:
[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

f Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting Field Office Director, Boston, Massachusetts, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of India who was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The director stated that the applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that his bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submitted the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse's affidavit dated August 31, 2011. In the affidavit the applicant's spouse states that she married the applicant on [REDACTED] and that she has a close relationship with him and their family has a strong bond. She conveys that their first child was born on [REDACTED] and they expect the birth of a second child in March 2011. The applicant's wife declares that she is a shift leader at [REDACTED] and her husband is a chef at a restaurant. She asserts that if the applicant left the United States and returned to India she would suffer extreme hardship as she has two U.S. citizen children and has lived in the United States for a long time and that it is her home and she cannot return to India. She contends that her parents live in the United States and she would have no support network in India. The applicant's wife declared that she is mentally anguished due to the uncertainty of her family's future.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

The record reflects that on March 9, 2000 the applicant pled guilty to or admitted to sufficient facts for the crime "indecent assault and battery on person fourteen or older" in violation of [REDACTED] ch. 265, § 13H. The judge placed the applicant on supervised probation for one year. The applicant was further sentenced to undergo sexual offender evaluation and after care and have no contact with the victim.

The director found the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. As the applicant has not disputed inadmissibility on appeal, and the record does not show the finding of inadmissibility to be erroneous, we will not disturb the finding of the director.

The waiver for inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is under section 212(h) of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

...

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

A section 212(h) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant is not a consideration under the statute and will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to the qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21

I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

In rendering this decision, the AAO will consider all of the evidence in the record.

The record contains employment letters. The letter dated January 26, 2011 reflects that the applicant’s wife earns \$8.50 per hour as a shift leader with [REDACTED]. The letter dated January 31, 2011 stated that the applicant has been employed at [REDACTED] as a chef earning \$600 per week. The income tax return for 2010 reflects that the applicant and his wife had a combined income of \$17,067, but no documentation was submitted for the specific earnings of the applicant. The record also contains a birth certificate of the applicant’s U.S. citizen son, who was born on July 25, 2009; and a letter from a registered nurse dated August 29, 2011 stating that the applicant’s wife is pregnant and has an estimated delivery date of March 8, 2012.

The asserted hardships of remaining in the United States without the applicant are emotional in nature. The applicant’s spouse stated that she and the applicant have a two-year-old son and expect the birth of a second child in March 2012, and that she has a close relationship with the applicant and would be destroyed if her husband is forced to return to India. In view of the tender age of the applicant’s children, we find that they would experience substantial hardship if they remain in the United States without their father.

The asserted hardships in relocating to India are not having a support network of family members in India, and having to adjust to life in India after having lived in the United States for a substantial period of time. While we acknowledge that the applicant’s spouse will endure the hardships of separating from family members in the United States and having to adjust to life in India after living in the United States, when these hardships are considered together, they do not “take the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” See *Matter of O-J-O-*, *supra*. The burden of proof in this proceeding lies with the applicant, and “while an analysis of a given application includes a

review of all claims put forth in light of the facts and circumstances of a case, such analysis does not extend to discovery of undisclosed negative impacts.” *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will remain in the United States and thereby suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of separation can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no intention to separate in reality. *See Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to separate and suffer extreme hardship, where relocating abroad with the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, *see also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from relocation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relatives in this case.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the waiver application will be denied.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.