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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
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Services

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


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
Office: NEWARK, NJ

FILE: 

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Newark, New Jersey. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Peru who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The record indicates that the applicant is married to a United States citizen, is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), has one U.S. citizen child, and one lawful permanent resident child. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to reside in the United States with her family.

In a decision dated October 29, 2009 the field office director found that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on her qualifying relatives and that the unfavorable factors in her case outweighed the favorable factors. The Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) was denied accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B), dated November 17, 2009, counsel states that the field officer director made an erroneous conclusion of fact when she did not fully consider the medical and financial implications of the applicant's inadmissibility and found that the applicant's spouse and child would not suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts

that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, per *Jean-Louis v. Holder*, 582 F.3d 462 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2009), makes a categorical inquiry, which consists of looking “to the elements of the statutory offense . . . to ascertain that least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.” *Id.* at 465-66. The “inquiry concludes when we determine whether the least culpable conduct sufficient to sustain conviction under the statute “fits” within the requirements of a CIMT.” *Id.* at 470.

However, if the “statute of conviction contains disjunctive elements, some of which are sufficient for conviction of [a CIMT] and other of which are not . . . [an adjudicator] examin[es] the record of conviction for the narrow purpose of determining the specific subpart under which the defendant was convicted.” *Id.* at 466. This is true “even where clear sectional divisions do not delineate the statutory variations.” *Id.* In so doing, an adjudicator may only look at the formal record of conviction. *Id.*

The record indicates that in 2000 and 2001 the applicant was convicted of shoplifting under New Jersey Statute 2C:20-11B(1). The BIA has determined that to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, a theft offense must require the intent to permanently take another person’s property. See *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) (“Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended.”). In *In re Jurado-Delgado*, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33-34 (BIA 2006), the Board of Immigration Appeals found that violation of a Pennsylvania retail theft statute involved moral turpitude because the nature of

retail theft is such that it is reasonable to assume such an offense would be committed with the intention of retaining merchandise permanently. The reasoning in *Jurado-Delgado* is applicable to the applicant's case. She was thus convicted on two occasions of knowingly taking the property of another with intent to permanently deprive that person of the property, a crime involving moral turpitude, and is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. The AAO also notes that the applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility on appeal.

The AAO also notes that the applicant is not eligible for the petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act because she was convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

. . . .

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

Section 212(h) of the Act provides that a waiver of inadmissibility is dependent first upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. In this case, the relatives that qualify are the applicant's spouse and children. Hardship to the applicant is not considered under the statute and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the BIA provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. The BIA added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not an exclusive list. *See id.*

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

The AAO notes that in *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States”, and that, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted). Although the present case did not arise in the Ninth Circuit, separation of family will be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors.

The AAO notes further, however, that U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court defined “extreme hardship” as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The Court emphasized that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The record of hardship includes medical documentation and financial documentation.

Counsel claims that the applicant’s spouse and child would suffer financially and medically as a result of separation. She states that the applicant is the only caretaker for her spouse who suffers from diabetes and her son who suffers from hyperactivity and attention deficit disorder. Counsel asserts that if the applicant is removed from the United States, her spouse would then have to rely on the care of a therapeutic center, which would require him to stop working. She states that if the applicant’s spouse does not work he will not be able to support himself, his children, and the applicant in Peru.

Financial documentation in the record indicates that the applicant’s spouse has numerous debts, including a mortgage.

Medical documentation in the record supports the assertions regarding the applicant’s spouse having diabetes and requiring pharmacological interventions, a strict diet, regular exercise, and foot care for his disease. The record also supports the assertion that the applicant’s child suffers from hyperactivity and attention deficit disorder. Finally, the psychological evaluation indicates

that the applicant's spouse is under extreme stress, feels anxious, and is depressed as a result of his wife's immigration status.

However, the current record does not support a finding that the applicant spouse and/or children would suffer extreme hardship as a result of her inadmissibility. Although the record undeniably indicates that the applicant's spouse suffers from diabetes and the applicant's child suffers from hyperactivity and attention deficit disorder, the record does not establish how in the applicant's absence these medical issues would cause the applicant's spouse and child to suffer extreme hardship. The record does not indicate that the applicant's spouse is unable to care for himself and his disease. In fact, the applicant's spouse states that he currently keeps a rigorous work schedule, implying that he is able to fully care for himself. Similarly, the financial documentation in the record does not indicate how the applicant's spouse would then suffer financial hardship without the applicant in the United States. The record does not indicate how much the applicant contributes to the household income.

Furthermore, the applicant does not make any claims in regards to the extreme hardship her spouse and/or children would suffer as a result of relocating to Peru. Thus, the AAO cannot make a finding that it would be extreme hardship for the applicant's spouse and child to relocate to Peru.

Therefore, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.