

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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
DATE: OCT 12 2012 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Perry Rhew", with a long, sweeping underline.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for waiver of inadmissibility was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Canada who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant's spouse, mother and father are U.S. citizenS. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States.

The director found that as the applicant was previously admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident and was subsequently convicted of an aggravated felony, he is statutorily ineligible for a section 212(h) waiver; and the director denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Director's Decision*, dated July 21, 2010.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that the AAO should use its discretion to allow him to be reunited with his family. *Form I-290B Attachment*, received August 23, 2010.

The record includes, but is not limited to, the applicant's Form I-290B and attachment, his spouse's statement and his criminal record. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dcc. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an "actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude." *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703. Finally, in all such inquiries, the burden is on the alien to establish “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is “not inadmissible.” *Id.* at 709 (citing *Kirong v. Mukasey*, 529 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008)).

The record reflects that the applicant was convicted of theft of property of the value of \$750 or more but less than \$20,000 in violation of Texas Penal Code § 31.03 on January 11, 1996, and he was sentenced to three years in prison, which were suspended, and monetary penalties. The applicant does not contest the finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. The AAO finds that the applicant committed a crime involving moral turpitude and that he is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. As such, the AAO will not address whether the applicant’s May 4, 1989 convictions in Canada for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, theft under \$1000 and assault with a weapon involve moral turpitude.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that –

- (i) . . . the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien’s application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
- (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
- (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

(2) the Attorney General [Secretary], in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection.

Section 101(a)(43) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(43) The term "aggravated felony" means-

....

(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment at least 1 year;. . .

The record reflects that the applicant was granted lawful permanent resident status on September 10, 1976. He was subsequently ordered removed from the United States on April 24, 1997 and was removed on May 6, 1997. The AAO notes that the applicant's conviction under Texas Penal Code § 31.03 constitutes an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act as he committed a theft offense for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year.

The applicant is ineligible for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act because he committed an aggravated felony subsequent to his admission to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Since the applicant is ineligible for a waiver, the AAO need not address the applicant's waiver claims.

The applicant asserts that *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) is applicable to his case. However, the AAO notes that *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr* deals with section 212(c) relief in deportation proceedings. The case before the AAO is a section 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility, therefore, *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr* is not

pertinent in this case. It is further noted that the applicant invites the AAO to assess the facts and procedure that preceded and led to his removal, yet the AAO has no jurisdiction over matters of removal and the underlying facts are not before us.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.