




U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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


DATE: JUN 20 2013 Office: SAN SALVADOR (PANAMA CITY)

FILE:




IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); and Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Panama City, Panama, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Colombia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude and under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen wife, daughter, and stepdaughter.

In a decision dated August 4, 2011, the field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the field office director abused her discretion in not considering the totality of the factors involved in the applicant's case when deciding whether the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility. Counsel also states that the applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act because his convictions do not involve crimes involving moral turpitude. Counsel does not address the applicant's inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

In her brief, counsel requests an oral argument. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(b) provides that the affected party must explain in writing why oral argument is necessary. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services has the sole authority to grant or deny a request for oral argument and will grant such argument only in cases that involve unique factors or issues of law that cannot be adequately addressed in writing. In this case, no cause for oral argument is shown. Consequently, the request is denied.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.-Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

....

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude. In evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

The record indicates that on April 12, 1994, the applicant was found guilty of assault-bodily injury under Texas Penal Code §22.01. On February 2, 1996, the applicant was again convicted of assault-bodily injury under Texas Penal Code §22.01.

At the time of the applicant’s convictions, section § 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code stated:

(a) A person commits an offense if the person:

- (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse;

It is noted that as a general rule, simple assault or battery is not deemed to involve moral turpitude for purposes of the immigration laws. *Matter of Fualaau*, 21 I&N Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 1996). However, this general rule does not apply where an assault or battery necessarily involved some aggravating dimension, such as the use of a deadly weapon or serious bodily harm. *See, e.g., Matter of Danesh*, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988), *Matter of Goodalle*, 12 I. & N. Dec. 106 (BIA 1967), *Matter of S-*, 5 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 1954), and *Nguyen v. Reno*, 211 F.3d 692 (1st Cir. 2000).

The Board of Immigration Appeals has also found:

[M]oral turpitude necessarily inheres in assault and battery offenses that are defined by reference to the infliction of bodily harm upon a person whom society views as deserving of special protection, such as a child, a domestic partner, or a peace officer, because the *intentional or knowing infliction of injury* on such persons reflects a degenerate willingness on the part of the offender to prey on the vulnerable or to disregard his social duty to those who are entitled to his care and protection.

Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968, 971 (BIA 2006) (emphasis added). The applicant's record of conviction for his 1994 conviction indicates that the applicant's offense involved family violence, but his plea for his 1996 conviction does not indicate that family violence was involved. Neither record indicates whether the applicant was acting intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. We note that assault crimes involving the aggravating factors of use of a deadly weapon or serious bodily injury are covered by aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.02. Upon reviewing the record and the statute of conviction, we find that the applicant's 1996 conviction was for simple assault and did not involve a crime of moral turpitude. We also find that although the record is not clear as to whether the applicant's 1994 conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, this conviction qualifies for the petty offense exception. The applicant was fined and sentenced to participate in a domestic violence treatment plan for this conviction and the maximum sentence for a Class A Misdemeanor under the Texas Penal Code does not exceed one year.

In *Matter of Garcia-Hernandez, supra*, the Board held that a respondent who was convicted of more than one crime, only one of which was a crime involving moral turpitude, was eligible for the petty offense exception provided for under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act. The Board reasoned that:

The "only one crime" proviso, taken in context, is subject to two principal interpretations: (1) that it is triggered . . . by the commission of any other crime, including a mere infraction; or (2) that it is triggered only by the

commission of another crime involving moral turpitude [W]e construe the “only one crime” proviso as referring to . . . only one crime involving moral turpitude.

Matter of Garcia-Hernandez at 594. Therefore, we find that the applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

However, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides:

(B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-

(i) In general.- Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 244(e) prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240), and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

(ii) Construction of unlawful presence.- For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.

...

(iv) Tolling for good cause.-In the case of an alien who-

(I) has been lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States,

(II) has filed a nonfrivolous application for a change or extension of status before the date of expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General, and

(III) has not been employed without authorization in the United States before or during the pendency of such application, the calculation of the period of time specified in clause (i)(I) shall be tolled during the pendency of such application, but not to exceed 120 days.

(v) Waiver.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection on or about August 1988. On December 28, 1988, the applicant filed an Application for Asylum (Form I-589). The applicant's Form I-589 was referred to an immigration judge and he was scheduled to appear in immigration court on February 16, 2000. The applicant failed to appear for his immigration hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. On April 23, 2007, the applicant was removed from the United States. Thus, the applicant accrued unlawful presence from February 16, 2000, the date the applicant's Form I-589 was denied and he was order removed, until April 23, 2007, the date he was removed from the United States. The applicant is therefore inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of his last departure. The applicant's qualifying relative is his U.S. citizen spouse.

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the

United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido v. I.N.S.*, 138 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1998)(quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant’s children would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien’s children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship. In the present case, the applicant’s spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant’s children will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant’s spouse.

The record of hardship includes: a statement from the applicant’s spouse, a psychological evaluation, numerous letters from the applicant’s spouse’s friends and from friends of the applicant in Colombia, statements from the applicant’s children, letters of employment for the

applicant, medical documentation, financial documentation, and country conditions information for Colombia.

The applicant's spouse states that she will suffer extreme emotional and financial hardship as a result of relocation. The record indicates that the applicant's spouse was born in the United States and has lived her whole life in the United States. She states that she has two U.S. citizen daughters who are college age and she would not want to leave them to relocate to Colombia. The record indicates through affidavits from the applicant's spouse's friends that the applicant's spouse has strong ties to her community and church in Texas. Letters, affidavits, and country conditions information in the record indicate that the applicant's spouse would suffer financially in Colombia in that she would find it difficult to find employment in Colombia and that the applicant would not earn enough money to support her there.

We note that on April 11, 2013 the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Colombia, stating that violence linked to narco-trafficking continues to affect some rural areas and parts of large cities, recommending that U.S. citizens in Colombia exercise caution and remain vigilant as terrorist and criminal activities remain a threat throughout the country. The warning states that explosions occur throughout Colombia on a regular basis, including some in the capital and that small towns and rural areas of Colombia can still be extremely dangerous due to the presence of terrorists and narco-traffickers, including armed criminal gangs that are active throughout much of the country. The warning asserts that terrorist groups and other criminal organizations continue to kidnap and hold civilians, including foreigners, for ransom or as political bargaining chips and that U.S. government officials and their families are restricted in their modes of transportation and in which routes they travel. Thus, taking into consideration the applicant's spouse's strong ties to the United States, the difficulty of her finding employment to help support her family in Colombia, the safety and security concerns in Colombia, and the presence of two U.S. citizen daughters in the United States, we find that the applicant has shown that his spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocation.

We also find that the applicant's spouse is suffering extreme hardship as a result of separation. We note that the applicant and his spouse have been married for approximately 17 years. The record indicates through affidavits and financial documentation that the applicant's spouse has been in and out of work as a temporary technician, that she has been sending money to Colombia to help support the applicant, and when the applicant was in the United States he was employed as a truck driver from 1997 to 2007. The record also indicates, through a psychological evaluation, that the applicant's spouse and daughter are suffering depression as a result of separation. More specifically, the evaluation diagnoses the applicant's spouse with serious Major Depressive Disorder and states that the potential for the applicant's spouse to attempt suicide is high. Although this information was gathered by a psychiatrist during one interview on September 13, 2011, the record also includes numerous affidavits and statements to support the applicant's spouse's mental state. Therefore, we find that taking the applicant's spouse's emotional and financial hardships together, the applicant has shown that she is suffering extreme hardship as a result of separation.

In this case, the record contains sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has established extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act.

Extreme hardship is a requirement for eligibility, but once established it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). For waivers of inadmissibility, the burden is on the applicant to establish that a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is warranted in the exercise of discretion. *Id.* at 299. The adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident must be balanced with the social and humane considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of this country. *Id.* at 300.

The AAO notes that *Matter of Marin*, 16 I & N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978), involving a section 212(c) waiver, is used in waiver cases as guidance for balancing favorable and unfavorable factors and this cross application of standards is supported by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, the BIA, assessing the exercise of discretion under section 212(h) of the Act, stated:

We find this use of *Matter of Marin*, *supra*, as a general guide to be appropriate. For the most part, it is prudent to avoid cross application, as between different types of relief, of particular principles or standards for the exercise of discretion. *Id.* However, our reference to *Matter of Marin*, *supra*, is only for the purpose of the approach taken in that case regarding the balancing of favorable and unfavorable factors within the context of the relief being sought under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act. *See, e.g., Palmer v. INS*, 4 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.1993) (balancing of discretionary factors under section 212(h)). We find this guidance to be helpful and applicable, given that both forms of relief address the question of whether aliens with criminal records should be admitted to the United States and allowed to reside in this country permanently.

Matter of Mendez-Morales at 300.

In *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, in evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion, the BIA stated that:

The factors adverse to the applicant include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of an alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. . . . The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where the

alien began his residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and service to the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to the alien's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible community representatives).

Id. at 301.

The BIA further states that upon review of the record as a whole, a balancing of the equities and adverse matters must be made to determine whether discretion should be favorably exercised. The equities that the applicant for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief must bring forward to establish that he merits a favorable exercise of administrative discretion will depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the ground of exclusion sought to be waived and on the presence of any additional adverse matters, and as the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence. *Id.* at 301.

The favorable factors include the applicant's family ties to the United States, the hardship his wife and children would face if he were to be prohibited from residing in the United States, the lack of a criminal record since 1996, the applicant's steady record of employment, his statements of regret for his actions, and, as evidenced by numerous letters in the record, the applicant's attributes as a supportive father, loving husband, and trusted employee.

The unfavorable factors in the applicant's case include his illegal entry into the United States, his failure to appear at his removal hearing, his unlawful presence in the United States, his unauthorized employment in the United States, and his criminal record including two convictions.

Although the applicant's violations of immigration law and criminal record cannot be condoned, the positive factors in this case outweigh the negative factors. In these proceedings, the burden of establishing eligibility for the waiver rests entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case, the applicant has met his burden and the appeal will be sustained.

The AAO notes that the field office director denied the applicant's Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) in the same decision as his waiver application. The Form I-212 was denied solely based on the denial of the Form I-601. As the AAO has now found the applicant eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, it will withdraw the field office director's decision on the Form I-212 and render a new decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states:

Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General [now, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security] has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

As noted above, on April 23, 2007, the applicant was removed from the United States. As such, he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act and must request permission to reapply for admission.

A grant of permission to reapply for admission is a discretionary decision based on the weighing of negative and positive factors. The AAO has found that the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion related to the adjudication of the Form I-601. For the reasons stated in that finding, the AAO finds that the applicant's Form I-212 should also be granted as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the Forms I-601 and I-212 applications are approved.