




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)



DATE: **MAR 09 2013**


Office: TAMPA, FL

FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Tampa, Florida. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant's child is a U.S. citizen and her spouse is a lawful permanent resident. The applicant is applying for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to reside in the United States.

The field office director determined that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated February 14, 2012.

On appeal, counsel details the hardship that the applicant's spouse and child would experience if her waiver application is denied. *Brief in Support of Appeal*, undated.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's brief, the applicant's spouse's statement, statements of support and a counselor's evaluation. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

As mentioned in the initial AAO decision, the applicant's case arises within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which has recently reaffirmed the traditional categorical approach for determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, declining to follow the "administrative framework" set forth by the Attorney General in *Silva-Trevino*. See *Fajardo v. Attorney General*, 659 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2011). (finding the U.S. Congress to have intended that determinations of whether offenses are crimes involving moral turpitude be made using the traditional categorical/modified categorical approach). In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit defined the categorical approach as " 'looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.' " *Id.* at 1305 (quoting *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)). The court noted that where the statutory definition of a crime included "conduct that would categorically be grounds for removal as well as conduct that would not, then the record of conviction – i.e., the charging document, plea, verdict, and sentence – [might] also be considered." *Id.* (citing to *Jaggernaut v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 432 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2005)). Pursuant to *Fajardo v. Attorney General*, the AAO will limit any modified categorical inquiry in this matter to the applicant's records of conviction.

The record reflects that on April 8, 2005, the applicant was convicted of four counts of filing false insurance claims in violation of Florida Statutes Section 817.234(1)(a), and she was sentenced to three years of probation, community service, community control and monetary penalties. The record reflects that on April 8, 2005, the applicant was convicted of insurance fraud with staged accident in violation of Florida Statutes Section 817.234(9) and she was sentenced to three years of probation, community service, community control and monetary penalties. As the applicant has not contested her inadmissibility on appeal for these crimes, and the record does not show that determination to be in error, we will not disturb the finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

....

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse and

child are the qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to

speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

Counsel states that the applicant's spouse and child would suffer emotional and mental hardship if the applicant is removed to Cuba; the dire political and economic situation in Cuba is like no other on the planet; the applicant would be unable to provide for her family as she has no connections in Cuba; her family would lack access to stable medical care; the applicant's spouse and child cannot receive the same treatment that they would receive in the United States; she would have difficulty finding a home in Cuba; the applicant was diagnosed with a mood disorder and she cannot receive counseling in Cuba; and her family's political opinions are opposed to Cuba's totalitarian regime and they could face retaliation or persecution for expressing their opinion. The record reflects that the applicant was diagnosed with a mood disorder.

The record does not include supporting documentary evidence of most of counsel's claims. The AAO notes that without documentary evidence to support these claims, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The AAO finds that the record lacks sufficient documentary evidence of emotional, financial, medical or other types of hardship that, in their totality, establish that a qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship upon relocation to Colombia.

Counsel states that the applicant's spouse and child would suffer emotional and mental hardship if the applicant is removed to Cuba; the applicant's spouse depends on the applicant for daily companionship, cooking and child rearing; the applicant's child would suffer irreparable emotional and psychological harm if separated from the applicant, who has proved nurturing love and care since birth; the applicant puts her child to bed every night and prays with him; the applicant and her spouse have assets and debt together and her removal would cause financial hardship; the applicant's spouse would not be able to raise the child and keep the household afloat; the applicant would not be able to provide support from abroad due to Cuba's lack of a free market economy; it is important to the child's welfare and emotional development to have both parents present; and the applicant's spouse would have to live with the hardship of his son. The applicant's spouse states that the applicant is a wonderful mother and wife. The applicant's 2010 tax return reflects an income of approximately \$10,000.

The record reflects that the applicant's child is two years old and dependent on the applicant. The record does not include sufficient evidence to establish financial hardship upon separation.

However, based on the hardship factors mentioned, and the normal results of separation, the AAO finds that the applicant's child would experience extreme hardship if he remained in the United States. The record does not include sufficient evidence to make this finding for the applicant's spouse.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will remain in the United States and thereby suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of separation can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no intention to separate in reality. *See Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to separate and suffer extreme hardship, where relocating abroad with the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, *see also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from relocation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.