


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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
*Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)*  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services


Date: **MAY 07 2013** Office: LOS ANGELES, CA

FILE: 

IN RE: 

PETITION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

  
INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg", with a long, sweeping underline.

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Thailand who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure a benefit under the Act through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant is the mother of a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility so that she may reside in the United States.

In a decision, dated July 15, 2010, the field office director found that the applicant did not qualify for a section 212(i) waiver because she did not establish that she has a qualifying relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. The field office director noted that children are not qualifying relatives under section 212(i) of the Act. The Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) was denied accordingly.

We note that the field office director's decision states that the applicant was convicted of falsification of entry documents, but does not state or give any details of how the applicant attempted to procure a benefit under the Act through fraud or misrepresentation. We find that the record does not show that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act as there is no record of her attempting to procure a benefit under the Act through misrepresenting a material fact. However, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude.

On appeal, counsel notes that the field office director incorrectly identified the applicant's ground of inadmissibility as being section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. She states that the purpose of the waiver application was to overcome the applicant's inadmissibility for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(A)(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before

the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

(B) Multiple criminal convictions.-Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than purely political offenses), regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 years or more is inadmissible.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record indicates that on October 26, 2004, the applicant was convicted of Falsification of Entry Documents under 18 U.S.C. §541 in connection with events that occurred on or about September 24, 1991. The applicant was sentenced to 5 years of probation and was ordered to pay restitution. The maximum sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §541 is two years. We note that the Complaint in the applicant’s case indicates that she falsified documentation regarding the importing of merchandise to the United States from the People’s Republic of China. The Complaint indicates that the applicant falsified the quantity and value of the merchandise being imported, thus paying less than the duty legally due on the merchandise.

18 U.S.C. §541 states:

Whoever knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares, or merchandise, at less than the true weight or measure thereof, or upon a false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the amount of duty legally due, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

We find that 18 U.S.C. §541 requires knowing conduct to conceal the true nature and/or value of a product being imported to the United States and, as such, “is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind” constituting a crime involving moral turpitude. *See, e.g., Omagah v. Ashcroft*, 288 F.3d 254, 262 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (finding that crimes that do not involve fraud, but that include “dishonesty or lying as an essential element” also tend to involve moral turpitude); *see also Itani v. Ashcroft*, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (“Generally a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is considered to be one involving moral turpitude.”). The AAO concludes, therefore, that the applicant has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that --

(i) . . . the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .; and

(2) the Attorney General [Secretary], in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

Section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act provides that the Secretary may, in her discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) of subsection (a)(2) if the activities for which the applicant is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the applicant's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status. The AAO notes that an application for admission or adjustment of status is considered a "continuing" application and "admissibility is determined on the basis of the facts and the law at the time the application is finally considered." *Matter of Alarcon*, 20 I.&N. Dec. 557, 562 (BIA 1992) (citations omitted).

Since the events that led to the applicant's criminal conviction occurred more than 15 years ago, the inadmissibility can be waived under section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act. Section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act requires that the applicant's admission to the United States not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and that she has been rehabilitated. The applicant has submitted documentation to demonstrate that she satisfies these requirements.

The record indicates that the applicant's conviction in 2004, stemming from events in 1991, is the applicant's only criminal conviction or arrest. The record indicates, through an affidavit from the applicant's son, that his mother is a hardworking person and his education and career would not have been possible without her emotional support. The record also indicates that the applicant's mother is the Chief Financial Officer for a corporation that she manages with her son and that they employ about 20 people in California. We note that the corporation managed by the applicant is the same corporation that was involved with her falsification of entry documents. However, the record indicates that this corporation has had no other problems with law enforcement since 1991.

The AAO additionally finds that the applicant merits a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion. In discretionary matters, the alien bears the burden of proving eligibility in terms of equities in the United States which are not outweighed by adverse factors. *See Matter of T-S-Y*, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957).

In evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion, the factors adverse to the alien include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record, and if so, its nature and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of the alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where alien began residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value or service in the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to the alien's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends and responsible community representatives).

*See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). The AAO must then, "[B]alance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on the alien's behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of the country." *Id.* at 300. (Citations omitted).


The adverse factor in the present case is the applicant's 2004 conviction for falsification of entry documents.

The favorable factors in the present case are the applicant's family ties to the United States; hardship that the applicant's two children would face if she were to be removed from the United States, the applicant's economic ties to the United States and her employment of about 20 people in California; the lack of a criminal record since the events occurring in 1991; and, as evidenced in statements from the applicant's children, the applicant's attributes as a hard worker and loving mother.

The AAO finds that the crime committed by the applicant is serious in nature and cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, the AAO finds that taken together, the favorable factors in the present case outweigh the adverse factors, such that a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

In proceedings for an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case, the applicant has met her burden that she merits approval of her application.

(b)(6)



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**ORDER:** The appeal is sustained.