



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

(b)(6)

DATE: **MAY 09 2013** Office: INDIANAPOLIS, IN

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Indianapolis, Indiana, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant has two U.S. citizen children and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act in order to remain in the United States.

In a decision, dated December 28, 2011, the field office director found the applicant inadmissible for having been convicted of attempting to defraud the U.S. government and for issuing worthless checks. The field office director also found that the applicant had not shown that his U.S. citizen daughters would face extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility and dismissed the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits additional documentation of hardship and indicates that the field office director's decision was erroneous in not finding hardship to the applicant's two children.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of—

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(h) Waiver of subsection (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (B), (D), and (E).—The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in [her] discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I)...of subsection (a)(2) if—

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that—

(i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien...

(2) the [Secretary], in [her] discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as [she] may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the

language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” *Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. *Id.* at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record indicates that the applicant has a long criminal record in the United States.

On February 24, 1992, the applicant pled guilty to violations of 8 U.S.C §1325(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §1028(a)(4)(B)(3) for showing false identification in an attempt to enter the United States. He was sentenced to 90 days in jail and three years probation for these offenses. On or about September 18, 1999, the applicant pled guilty to reckless driving under Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) §55-10-205 and assault causing bodily injury under TCA §39-113101(a)(1). On September 10, 2002, the applicant pled guilty to writing worthless checks under TCA §39-14-121. On April 4, 2003, the applicant pled guilty to theft of property under TCA §39-14-103 and was sentenced to 6 months in prison.

We find that the applicant has been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude and is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. We find further that the applicant’s conviction in 1999 for reckless driving and assault causing bodily injury indicate that he may be subject to the heightened discretionary standard of 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) for being convicted of a violent or dangerous crime. However, we also find that discussing the applicant’s eligibility for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act would serve no purpose as the applicant is also inadmissible

under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act for having attempted to procure admission by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen and has failed to establish a qualifying relationship to be eligible to apply for a waiver of this inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

(ii) Falsely claiming citizenship. –

(I) In General –

Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act . . . is inadmissible.

....

(iii) Waiver authorized. – For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The record indicates that on February 23, 1992 at the Falfurria Texas Border Patrol Check Point the applicant presented a birth registration card for Pharr, Texas in the name of a [REDACTED] born on [REDACTED] in an attempt to gain admission to the United States. Upon further questioning, the applicant showed his Mexican passport to authorities and stated that he found the other documents in the Rio Grande. The applicant is therefore inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for having falsely claimed to be a U.S. citizen in an attempt to procure admission to the United States.

The AAO notes that aliens making false claims to U.S. citizenship on or after September 30, 1996 are ineligible to apply for a Form I-601 waiver. *See* Sections 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 afford aliens in the applicant's position, those making false claims to U.S. citizenship prior to September 30, 1996, the eligibility to apply for a waiver.

In considering a case where a false claim to U.S. citizenship has been made, Service [CIS] officers should review the information on the alien to determine whether the false claim to U.S. citizenship was made before, on, or after September 30, 1996. If the false claim was made before the enactment of IIRIRA, Service [CIS] officers should then determine whether (1) the false claim was made to procure an immigration benefit under the Act; and (2) whether such claim was made before a U.S. Government official. If these two additional requirements are met, the alien should be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and advised of the waiver requirements under section 212(i) of the Act.

Memorandum by Joseph R. Greene, Acting Associate Commissioner, Office of Programs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated April 8, 1998 at 3. Although the applicant's false claim to U.S. citizenship does not preclude him from being eligible for a waiver, his lack of a qualifying relative does. The record does not show that the applicant has a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse and/or parent.

In this case, there is no evidence the applicant has a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent. Therefore, he does not have a qualifying relative under the statute and, thus, is ineligible for a waiver. In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden, and he does not qualify for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.