


(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



Date: **NOV 08 2013**


Office: HIALEAH, FL

FILE: 

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements.** See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael Shumway".

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Hialeah, Florida and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to remain in the United States with his U.S. citizen wife.

In a decision, dated April 24, 2013, the field office director found the applicant inadmissible for having been convicted of grand theft. In his decision, the field office director noted that the applicant's spouse has medical issues that are debilitating and that she would suffer financial difficulty in the event of separation. The field office director found that the record lacked documentation to show that his spouse's financial hardships would rise to the level of extreme and that the applicant's spouse's medical condition was affecting her daily activities. The field office director also stated that the applicant and his spouse would not be separated because there are no deportations to Cuba. She concluded that the applicant did not establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative as a result of his inadmissibility and that even if he did establish extreme hardship, he would not warrant the favorable exercise of discretion. The Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) was denied accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B), dated May 17, 2013, counsel states that the applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act and a waiver is not necessary. Counsel also states that should the AAO determine that the applicant does require a waiver, the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility, and he warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. No new evidence was submitted on appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

The record indicates that on October 16, 2007 the applicant was arrested and charged with grand theft in the second degree under Florida Statutes § 812.014. On March 31, 2008 he entered a plea of guilty to this charge, adjudication was withheld, and he was sentenced to 10 years probation. The AAO notes that second degree felonies in Florida are punishable for up to 15 years in prison.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules

of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)


The applicant's case arises within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which has reaffirmed the traditional categorical and modified categorical approach for determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, declining to follow the framework set forth by the Attorney General in *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008). See *Fajardo v. Attorney General*, 659 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). In rejecting the Attorney General's approach in *Silva-Trevino*, the Eleventh Circuit found that section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act unambiguously requires courts to apply only the categorical and modified categorical approaches, which do not permit an evaluation of information outside the record of conviction, in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude. *Id.* at 1307-08; see also *Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 439 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he determination that a crime involves moral turpitude is made categorically based on the statutory definition or nature of the crime, not the specific conduct predicated a particular conviction.”).

The Eleventh Circuit defines the categorical approach as “looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” *Id.* at 1305 (quoting *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)); see also *Itani v. Ashcroft*, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Whether a crime involves . . . moral turpitude depends upon the inherent nature of the offense, as defined in the relevant statute, rather than the circumstances surrounding a defendant's particular conduct.”); *Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 420 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e must determine whether an . . . offense . . . is a crime involving moral turpitude without reference to the facts underlying [the] conviction.”) However, where the statute under which an alien was convicted is “‘divisible’—that is, it contains some offenses that are [crimes involving moral turpitude] and others that are not[,] . . . the fact of conviction and the statutory language alone are insufficient to establish . . . under which subpart [the alien] was convicted.” *Jaggernaut v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 432 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2005). Under such circumstances, “the record of conviction – i.e., the charging document, plea, verdict, and sentence – may also be considered.” *Fajardo*, 659 F.3d at 1305 (citing *Jaggernaut*, 432 F.3d at 1354-55).

At the time of the applicant's conviction, Fl. Stat. § 812.014 provided, in pertinent parts:

(1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:

(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property.



(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.

In the instant case, the statute under which the applicant was convicted, Fl. Stat. § 812.014, involves both temporary and permanent deprivations, as well as appropriations. A plain reading of Fl. Stat. § 812.014 shows that it can be violated by knowingly obtaining or using the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently, deprive an individual of his or her property or appropriate the property to his or her own use. The BIA has determined that to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, a theft offense must require the intent to permanently take another person's property. See *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) ("Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended."). Therefore, the AAO does not find that a violation of Fl. Stat. § 812.014 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant was not convicted for a crime involving moral turpitude because Fl. Stat. § 812.014 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, having elements that involve moral turpitude and elements that do not. However, since the full range of conduct proscribed by the statute at hand does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, we will apply the modified categorical approach and look to the record of conviction. It is the applicant's burden to demonstrate that the crime is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The information (indictment) reveals that the applicant took cash from a Citgo gas station, and the order of supervision indicates that the applicant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$64,000. It is reasonable to assume that the applicant was convicted under the parts of the statute related to permanently depriving another person of a right to property. See, e.g., *Matter of Jurado*, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33-34 (BIA 2006) (the BIA found that violation of a Pennsylvania retail theft statute involved moral turpitude because the nature of retail theft is such that it is reasonable to assume such an offense would be committed with the intention of retaining merchandise permanently). Therefore, the AAO will not disturb the finding that the applicant was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

....

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's parents are the qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *Salcido-Salcido v. I.N.S.*, 138 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated

from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record of hardship includes: statements from the applicant's wife, mother-in-law, and father-in-law; financial documents, medical documents, and a country conditions report on Cuba.


We find that the current record does not establish that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme emotional and financial hardship as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility. The applicant's spouse states that the applicant is her sole source of emotional and financial support. The record also indicates that the applicant and his spouse live with his spouse's parents. The applicant's spouse's parents are 44 and 53 years old and although the applicant's father-in-law suffers from asthma and sleep apnea there is nothing in the record that would indicate that they are unable to help their daughter both emotionally and financially. The record indicates that the applicant's spouse has a medical condition that she describes as restricting her ability to work because she can only endure limited physical activities and that she often feels sick. The record also shows that the applicant owns a car washing business, from which the applicant's spouse receives her health insurance. We acknowledge the applicant's spouse's medical condition, but note that nothing in the record indicates that she would be unwilling or unable to take on responsibilities at her husband's small business in his absence, allowing for her to support herself and continue to receive health insurance.

Even if the United States could not and would not remove the applicant to Cuba, this alone does not necessarily preclude or render impossible relocation to that country by the applicant and his spouse. Nevertheless, the applicant has not indicated that he and his spouse would be allowed to relocate and, in fact, intend to relocate to Cuba if the application is denied. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). The applicant's spouse states that she cannot relocate to Cuba because she would be persecuted by the government there and because she could not receive appropriate medical care. However, we do not find that the applicant's spouse's statements, even when considered with the country conditions submitted, demonstrate specifically that she is likely to be persecuted or that appropriate medical care for her condition is unavailable. We acknowledge the general country conditions in Cuba, and the applicant's spouse's ties to the United States, but on the present record we find that the applicant has not demonstrated that his spouse would experience extreme hardship if she relocated Cuba.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen wife as required under section 212(h) of the Act. We note that the record contains 11 letters of recommendation regarding the applicant's rehabilitation, but as the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

(b)(6)



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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.