U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(b)(6)

DATE: SEP 29 2014 Office: OAKLAND PARK, FL File:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case. This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, Oakland Park, Florida, denied the waiver application and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). A motion was granted and the prior decision of the AAO was affirmed. The matter is again before the AAO on motion. The motion will be granted and the prior AAO decisions will be withdrawn as the waiver application is no longer necessary.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to remain in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director,* August 6, 2011.

A subsequent appeal was dismissed by this office based on a finding that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative had not been established. *Decision of the AAO,* dated March 9, 2013.

A motion was granted by this office and our prior decision to dismiss the appeal was affirmed based on a finding that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative had not been established. *Decision of the AAO,* dated February 5, 2014.

On motion, counsel asserts that as a result of recent decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the applicant can no longer be found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. *See Form I-290B,* dated March 5, 2014. In support, counsel submits a brief and copies two unpublished BIA decisions. We concur with counsel as discussed in detail below.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

> (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
>
> (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stated in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992):

> [M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

> In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

The record establishes that on August 1, 2008, the applicant was convicted in Florida for Grand Theft in the Third Degree, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.014, for her conduct on June .

Fla. Stat. § 812.014 states in relevant part:

> (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:
>
> (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property.
>
> (b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.

For cases arising in the Eleventh Circuit, the determination of whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude begins with a categorical inquiry that "depends upon the inherent nature of the offense, as defined in the relevant statute, rather than the circumstances surrounding a defendant's particular conduct." *Itani v. Ashcroft*, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2002); *see also Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 439 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)); *Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 420 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2004). However, where the statute under which an individual was convicted is "'divisible'—that is, it contains some offenses that are [crimes involving moral turpitude] and others that are not[,] . . . the fact of conviction and the statutory language alone are insufficient to establish . . . under which subpart [the alien] was convicted." *Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 432 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2005). Under such circumstances, "the record of conviction – i.e., the charging document, plea, verdict, and sentence – may also be considered." *Fajardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 659 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing *Jaggernauth*, *supra*, at 1354-55). The Eleventh Circuit does not permit inquiry beyond the record of conviction. *See Fajardo*, *supra*, at 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008)).

A plain reading of Fla. Stat. § 812.014 shows that it can be violated by knowingly obtaining or using the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently, deprive an individual of his or her property or appropriate the property to his or her own use. The BIA has determined that to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, a theft offense must require the intent to permanently take another person's property. *See Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330

(BIA 1973) ("Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended."). As the minimum conduct needed for a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.014 does not involve moral turpitude, we cannot find that a violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.014 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

In a 2013 decision, the Supreme Court held that sentencing courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements. *Descamps v. United States,* 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). The Court noted that the modified categorical approach was developed so that when a statute was divisible and referred to several different crimes, "courts could discover which statutory phrase, contained within a statute listing several different crimes, covered a prior conviction." *Id.* at 2284-85 (quoting *Nijhawan v. Holder,* 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)); *see also Johnson v. United States*, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010) ("[T]he 'modified categorical approach' that we have approved permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction.").

In *Matter of Chairez-Castrejon*, the BIA revisited its method of determining whether a statute is divisible and held that the approach to divisibility applied in *Descamps* also applied in the immigration context. 26 I&N Dec. 349, 352-5 (BIA 2014) (reconsidering *Matter of Lanferman,* 25 I & N Dec. 721 (BIA 2012), and ultimately "withdraw[ing] from that decision to the extent that it is inconsistent with *Descamps.*"). The BIA noted that after *Descamps,* a criminal statute is divisible "only if (1) it lists multiple discrete offenses as enumerated alternatives or defines a single offense by reference to disjunctive sets of 'elements,' more than one combination of which could support a conviction; and (2) at least one, but not all, of those listed offenses or combinations of disjunctive elements is a categorical match" to the relevant generic offense. *Id.* at 353. The BIA further explained that for purpose of determining whether a statute is truly divisible, an offense's elements are those facts about the crime which "[t]he Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find . . . unanimously[1] and beyond a reasonable doubt." *Id.* at 353 (quoting *Descamps* at 2288 (citing *Richardson v. United States*, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)). The BIA found that a statute was not divisible merely because it "disjunctively enumerated intent, knowledge, and recklessness as alternative mental states" and further stated that the statute "can be 'divisible' into three separate offenses with distinct mens rea only if . . .jury unanimity regarding the mental state" was required. *Id.* at 352-354. As it had not been established that jury unanimity was required, the BIA held that the alternative mens rea were merely alternative "means" of committing the crime rather than alternative "elements" of the offense. *Id.* at 355.

As noted above, in the present matter the applicant's conviction for grand theft is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute includes intent either to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of the property. It is thus necessary to determine whether the statute is divisible into separate offenses with distinct mens rea, or whether intent to

[1] The BIA noted that in states where jury unanimity is not required, "we deem the 'elements' of the offense to be those facts about which the jury was required to agree by whatever vote was required to convict in the pertinent jurisdiction." 26 I&N Dec. at 353, n. 2.

temporarily or permanently deprive are merely alternative means of committing the offense. To do so, we turn to the Florida Supreme Court's Standard Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases. Specifically, to prove the crime of Theft, the jury instructions state, in pertinent part:

> [T[he State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
>
> 1. (Defendant) knowingly and unlawfully [obtained or used] [endeavored to obtain or to use] the (property alleged) of (victim).
>
> 2. [He] [She] did so with intent to, either temporarily or permanently,
>
> a. [deprive (victim) of [his] [her] right to the property or any benefit from it.]
>
> b. [appropriate the property of (victim) to [his] [her] own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it.]

Based on the Florida Supreme Court's Standard Jury Instructions, a jury in a case concerning an alleged violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.014 does not need to be unanimous regarding whether the defendant intended to either "temporarily or permanently" deprive or appropriate property. A jury could convict a defendant of Fla. Stat. § 812.014 without agreeing on whether the defendant had the intent to permanently deprive or appropriate property or, alternatively, temporarily deprive or appropriate property, so rather than describing two separate types of theft offenses, the statute describes different *means* to commit the one offense. While the language at issue — "with intent to, either temporarily or permanently," — may be disjunctive, it does not render the statute divisible so as to warrant a modified categorical inquiry, and the use of the modified categorical approach is not permissible. As a modified categorical approach is unavailable because the statute is not divisible, we are unable to determine that the applicant was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

As the offense defined by Fla. Stat. § 812.014 is neither a categorical crime involving moral turpitude nor divisible as defined in *Descamps* and *Chairez-Castrejon*, we find that the applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act and the waiver application is not necessary.

In application proceedings, it is the applicant's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has been met. Accordingly, the motion will be granted and our prior decisions will be withdrawn as the waiver application is no longer necessary.

ORDER: The motion is granted and the prior AAO decisions are withdrawn as the waiver application is no longer necessary.