




(b)(6)



DATE: **JUL 20 2015**


FILE: [REDACTED]

RECEIPT #: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



Enclosed is the non-precedent decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for your case.

If you believe we *incorrectly* decided your case, you may file a motion requesting us to reconsider our decision and/or reopen the proceeding. The requirements for motions are located at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Motions must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) **within 33 days of the date of this decision**. The Form I-290B web page ([www.uscis.gov/i-290b](http://www.uscis.gov/i-290b)) contains the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. **Please do not mail any motions directly to the AAO.**

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Field Office Director, Atlanta, Georgia, denied the waiver application. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of The Gambia who was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen wife.

The field office director found that the applicant had not established that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. In addition, the field office director determined that the applicant had not established that he should be granted a waiver as a matter of discretion. The Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) was denied accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant submits a brief and a psychological evaluation in regard to the applicant's spouse.

The record was reviewed and considered in its entirety in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides in relevant part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if –

...

(1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . and

(2) the Attorney General [Secretary], in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the

United States, or adjustment of status. . . .

In regard to the field office director's finding of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, the record establishes that the applicant was convicted on [REDACTED] 2004, [REDACTED] 2005 and [REDACTED] 2006, of Trademark Counterfeiting in the Third Degree, a violation of section 165.71 of the New York Penal Law. The applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility. The applicant requires a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent or child of the applicant. In the present case, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative claimed by the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the BIA provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The BIA added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The BIA has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the BIA has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381,

383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido v. I.N.S.*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse contends that she will suffer extreme hardship were she to remain in the United States while the applicant relocates abroad due to his inadmissibility. The applicant’s spouse states that she has been with the applicant for over a decade and she does not know what she would do without him. A psychological evaluation of the applicant’s spouse states that she is suffering from major depressive disorder from fear the applicant will have to return to the Gambia, is scared about how she will manage financially, and is at risk of permanent depression if parted from the applicant. In addition, the applicant’s spouse contends that although she is employed, she relies on the applicant’s financial contributions.

We acknowledge the applicant’s spouse’s contentions and the findings of the psychologist that the applicant’s spouse will experience emotional hardship were she to remain in the United States while the applicant resides abroad, but the record does not establish the severity of this hardship or the effects on her daily life. We note that the record indicates that the applicant resides and is gainfully employed in New York while the applicant’s spouse resides and is gainfully employed in Georgia, and it appears they have lived in separate states since their 2009 marriage. Further, regarding the psychologist’s statement that the applicant’s spouse suffers from hypertension, no documentation has been submitted from the applicant’s spouse’s treating physician outlining her current medical condition and what hardships she will experience were her husband to reside abroad.

As for the financial hardship referenced, the applicant has not provided any documentation on appeal establishing the applicant’s and his spouse’s current income and expenses and assets and liabilities to establish that were the applicant to reside abroad, his spouse would experience financial hardship. Alternatively, the record does not establish that the applicant would be unable to obtain gainful employment in The Gambia that would permit him to assist his spouse as needed. Going on record

without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The applicant has thus not established that his spouse would experience extreme hardship were she to remain in the United States while the applicant relocates abroad due to his inadmissibility.

In regard to relocating abroad to reside with the applicant as a result of her inadmissibility, the applicant contends that his wife would experience hardship due to unfamiliarity with the country, culture, customs and the inability obtain gainful employment in The Gambia. The applicant further contends that his wife would experience hardship due to long-term separation from her children, her brother, her gainful employment and her community. In her own statement, the applicant's spouse states that she cannot relocate abroad as she is in charge of taking care of her disabled brother.

The record establishes that the applicant's spouse was born and raised in the United States. She has no ties to The Gambia and is unfamiliar with the country, culture and customs. Long-term separation from her family, including her children and siblings, her community, and her employment would cause her hardship. The applicant has thus established that his spouse would experience extreme hardship were she to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, also *cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

The record, reviewed in its entirety, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that she will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or is refused admission. There is no documentation establishing that the applicant's spouse's hardships are any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although we are not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the hardships she would face rise to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

In application proceedings, it is the applicant's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.