U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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FILE: [redacted] Office: CUIDAD JUAREZ, MEXICO Date:

CDJ 2004 680 061

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is married to a naturalized citizen, He sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), which the OIC denied, finding that the applicant failed to establish hardship to a qualifying relative. *Decision of the OIC, dated September 12, 2005.* The applicant submitted a timely appeal.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides that any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, is inadmissible.

Unlawful presence accrues when an alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). The periods of unlawful presence under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) are not counted in the aggregate.[1] For purposes of section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, time in unlawful presence begins to accrue on April 1, 1997.[2]

The three- and ten-year bars of sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II), are triggered by a departure from the United States following accrual of the specified period of unlawful presence. If someone accrues the requisite period of unlawful presence but does not subsequently depart the United States, then sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II), would not apply. *See* DOS Cable, note 1. *See also Matter of Rodarte,* 23 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 2006)(departure triggers bar because purpose of bar is to punish recidivists). With regard to an adjustment applicant who had 180 days of unauthorized stay in the United States before filing an adjustment of status application, his or her return on an advance parole will trigger the three- and ten-year bar. Memo, Virtue, Acting Exec. Comm., INS, HQ IRT 50/5.12, 96 Act. 068 (Nov. 26, 1997).

The document in the record from the American Consulate General, dated March 3, 2005, reflects that the applicant was illegally present in the United States from October 1995 to February 2005. For purposes of calculating unlawful presence under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the applicant began to accrue time in unlawful presence from April 1, 1997 to February 2005. Thus, he accrued seven years of unlawful presence.

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[1] Memo, Virtue, Acting Assoc. Comm. INS, Grounds of Inadmissibility, Unlawful Presence, June 17, 1997 INS Memo on Grounds of Inadmissibility, Unlawful Presence (96Act.043); and Cable, DOS, No. 98-State-060539 (April 4, 1998) [hereinafter *Virtue Memo Unlawful Presence*].

[2] *See* DOS Cable, note 1; and IIRIRA Wire #26, HQIRT 50/5.12.

When the applicant departed from the United States, he triggered the ten-year-bar, and consequently is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The AAO will now address the finding that a waiver of inadmissibility is not warranted.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides that:

> (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.,* the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant and his children is not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, they are not included under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and his children will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant's spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion.. *See Matter of Mendez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In addition to other documents, the record contains two letters from and a letter from Ms. mother. The letter, dated August 20, 2005, from indicates that she has three young children who need someone to take them to school and pick them up, which she states she cannot afford. She indicates that her mother, who does not drive, takes care of the children while she works. Ms. states that she is a restaurant manager with McDonalds and her work schedule changes every week. She states that she often starts work at 5:00 A.M., which requires her to bring her children to her mother's house at 4:00 A.M., risking their safety as she does not have a car garage. states that she struggles financially without the applicant as she pays a mortgage, a truck loan, an Internal Revenue Service bill, truck insurance, an orthodontic bill, childcare, and grocery and utility expenses. submitted documents of her household expenses. indicates that the applicant had taken the children to school activities.

In the letter dated February 23, 2005, stated that before the applicant came into her life, she paid a person to take her children to school; and if she had to work early, she would wake them at 4:00 A.M., sometimes picking them up after midnight.

The letter from mother states that she cannot help dropping off or picking up the children from school as she does not drive. She states that her daughter cannot afford to pay someone to drop off and pick up the children from school, and that the applicant had done this for the children.

The letter from McDonald's Corporation, employer, states that she is employed as a restaurant manager and earns a base salary of $40,305.

"Extreme hardship" to the applicant's husband must be established in the event that he joins the applicant; and in the alternative, that he remains in the United States. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

"Extreme hardship" is not a definable term of "fixed and inflexible meaning"; establishing extreme hardship is "dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case." *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors it considers relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566. The BIA indicated that these factors relate to the applicant's "qualifying relative." *Id.* at 565-566.

In *Matter of O-J-O-,* 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996), the BIA stated that the factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists "provide a framework for analysis," and that the "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." It further stated that "the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality" and then "determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994).

Courts in the United States have stated that "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States," and also, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." *Salcido-Salcido v. INS,* 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS,* 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) ("We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.") (citations omitted).

The record reflects that [redacted] mother assists in caring for her daughters three children, but is not able to transport the children to and from school or to school activities. [redacted] stated that she often starts work at 5:00 A.M., and at times works until midnight. She indicated that her husband would care for the [redacted] children when she started work at 5:00 A.M., and would transport the children to school and to their extracurricular activities. Based on the evidence in the record, the AAO finds that the applicant's wife, a single parent of three young children, would experience extreme hardship if she remains in the United States without her husband.

Because [redacted] makes no claim of hardship if she were to join her husband in Mexico, the record is insufficient to establish that she would endure extreme hardship if she joined her husband in Mexico.

In considering the hardship factors raised here, the AAO examines each of the factors, both individually and cumulatively, to determine whether extreme hardship has been established. It considers whether the

cumulative effect of claims of economic and emotional hardship would be extreme, even if, when considered separately, none of them would be. It considers the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and then determines whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with removal.

In the final analysis, the AAO finds that the requirement of significant hardships over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in removal has not been met so as to warrant a finding of extreme hardship as required by the Act. Having carefully considered each of the hardship factors raised, both individually and in the aggregate, it is concluded that these factors do not in this case constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.