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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Panama City, Panama, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED] Uran, a native and citizen of Columbia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is married to a naturalized citizen, [REDACTED]. She sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), which the OIC denied, finding that the applicant failed to establish hardship to a qualifying relative. *Decision of the OIC, dated November 16, 2005.* The applicant submitted a timely appeal.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides that any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, is inadmissible.

Unlawful presence accrues when an alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). The periods of unlawful presence under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) are not counted in the aggregate.¹ For purposes of section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, time in unlawful presence begins to accrue on April 1, 1997.²

The three- and ten-year bars of sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II), are triggered by a departure from the United States following accrual of the specified period of unlawful presence. If someone accrues the requisite period of unlawful presence but does not subsequently depart the United States, then sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II), would not apply. *See DOS Cable, note 1. See also Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 2006)*(departure triggers bar because purpose of bar is to punish recidivists). With regard to an adjustment applicant who had 180 days of unauthorized stay in the United States before filing an adjustment of status application, his or her return on an advance parole will trigger the three- and ten-year bar. Memo, Virtue, Acting Exec. Comm., INS, HQ IRT 50/5.12, 96 Act. 068 (Nov. 26, 1997).

The document in the record from the Embassy of the United States of America located in Bogota, Columbia, which is dated June 23, 2005, reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in June 1998 and departed from the United States on May 29, 2005. For purposes of calculating unlawful presence under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the applicant began to accrue time in unlawful presence from June 1998 to May 29, 2005. Thus, she accrued over six years of unlawful presence. When the applicant departed

¹ Memo, Virtue, Acting Assoc. Comm. INS, Grounds of Inadmissibility, Unlawful Presence, June 17, 1997 INS Memo on Grounds of Inadmissibility, Unlawful Presence (96Act.043); and Cable, DOS, No. 98-State-[REDACTED] (April 4, 1998) [hereinafter *Virtue Memo Unlawful Presence*].

² See DOS Cable, note 1; and IIRIRA Wire #26, HQIRT 50/5.12.

from the United States, she triggered the ten-year-bar, and consequently is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The AAO will now address the finding that a waiver of inadmissibility is not warranted.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides that:

- (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant is not a consideration under the statute, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, they are not included under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Thus, hardship to the applicant and her daughter will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in the present case is [REDACTED]. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the appeal brief, counsel states that [REDACTED] and his wife entered into a good faith marriage and the letter by [REDACTED] shows how he has suffered on account of separation from his wife. Counsel states that [REDACTED] is presently employed as a janitor earning \$33,600 a year, and finding comparable employment in Columbia would be difficult in light of Columbia’s economy and [REDACTED] age. Counsel states that although [REDACTED] is in good health, he would not have access to health insurance in Columbia, which he now receives through his job. Counsel further states that the applicant herself earned \$19,200 each year in the United States as a janitor. According to counsel, [REDACTED] is financially and psychologically strained as he must support a household in the United States, and his wife and her daughter in Columbia. Counsel asserts that taking employment away from [REDACTED] would constitute an “extreme hardship”; and he refers to *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) and *Bridges v. Wixon*, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) to support his assertion. Counsel states that [REDACTED] has lived in the United States for 18 years and the applicant for 7 years, and that they have close community ties which, if broken, would result in extreme hardship to them. Counsel indicates that because Columbia is a foreign country to [REDACTED] he would have difficulties adjusting.

In addition to other documents, the record contains a letter from the applicant and a letter and an affidavit from her husband. These documents convey that the couple has a close relationship.

“Extreme hardship” to the applicant’s husband must be established in the event that he joins the applicant; and in the alternative, that he remains in the United States. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors it considers relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566. The BIA indicated that these factors relate to the applicant’s “qualifying relative.” *Id.* at 565-566.

In *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996), the BIA stated that the factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists “provide a framework for analysis,” and that the “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” It further stated that “the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality” and then “determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994)).

The record fails to establish that the applicant’s husband would endure extreme hardship if he remains in the United States without his wife.

Counsel asserts that [REDACTED] does not have the finances to maintain two households. However, the record contains no documentation in support of this assertion, such as [REDACTED] earnings and the household expenses that are required to maintain him in the United States and his family in Columbia. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Furthermore, courts in the United States have universally held that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship. *See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic loss alone does not establish extreme hardship) and *Mejia-Carrillo v. United States INS*, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) (economic loss alone does not establish extreme hardship, but it is still a fact to consider). Additional factors are needed to combine with economic detriment in order to categorize [REDACTED] hardship as extreme.

Courts in the United States have stated that “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States,” and also, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted).

However, in *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit upheld the BIA’s finding that deporting the applicant and separating him from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it “was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the

respondent's bar to admission." (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship). In *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994), the court upheld the finding of no extreme hardship if Shooshtary's lawful permanent resident wife and two U.S. citizen children are separated from him. As stated in *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), "[e]xtreme hardship" is hardship that is "unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected" upon deportation and "[t]he common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship." (citing *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991)). In *Sullivan v. INS*, 772 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit stated that deportation is not without personal distress and emotional hurt; and that courts have upheld orders of the BIA that resulted in the separation of aliens from members of their families.

The letter and affidavit from ██████████ reflect that he is very concerned about separation from his wife. The AAO is mindful of and sympathetic to the emotional hardship that is undoubtedly endured as a result of separation from a loved one. After a careful and thoughtful consideration of the record, however, the AAO finds that the situation of ██████████, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship as defined by the Act. The record before the AAO is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship, which certainly will be endured by the applicant's husband, is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected upon deportation or exclusion. See *Hassan, Shooshtary, Perez, and Sullivan*.

The present record is insufficient to establish that ██████████ would endure extreme hardship if he joined his wife in Columbia.

The conditions in Columbia, the country where the applicant's husband would live if he joined her, are a relevant hardship consideration. While political and economic conditions in an alien's homeland are relevant, they do not justify a grant of relief unless other factors such as advanced age or severe illness combine with economic detriment to make deportation extremely hard on the alien or his qualifying relatives. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994)(citations omitted).

The AAO is not persuaded by counsel's assertion, which is that *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), and *Bridges v. Wixon*, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945), indicate that taking ██████████ away from his employment in the United States constitutes "extreme hardship."

In *Plasencia*, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed whether the language or history of the Act indicated that Plasencia's status as a permanent resident entitled her to a suspension of the exclusion hearing or required the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service to proceed, in determining whether she was inadmissible, only through a deportation hearing. Plasencia contended that a deportation proceeding would have entitled her to procedural protections and substantive rights not available in exclusion proceedings.

In *Bridges*, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the two grounds on which the deportation order of Harry Bridges rests.

The question here is not whether ██████████ is excludable or deportable from the United States. It is whether she has established "extreme hardship" to her husband if her waiver application were denied by the AAO. Thus, the holding in *Plasencia* and *Bridges* fails to establish that taking ██████████ away from his employment in the United States constitutes "extreme hardship."

Federal court decisions have shown that the difficulties ██████████ may experience in obtaining employment in Columbia and the general economic conditions in that country are insufficient to establish extreme hardship. *See, e.g., Carnalla-Munoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding the finding that hardship in finding employment in Mexico does not reach extreme hardship); *Kuciemba v. INS*, 92 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1996), (citing *Marquez-Medina v. INS*, 765 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir.1985) (“General economic conditions in an alien’s native country will not establish “extreme hardship” in the absence of evidence that the conditions are unique to the alien.”); *Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon*, 682 F.2d 143, 146 (7th Cir.1982) (claim by respondent that he had neither skills nor education and would be “virtually unemployable in Mexico” found insufficient to establish extreme hardship); *Santana-Figueroa v. INS*, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (“difficulty in finding employment or inability to find employment in one’s trade or profession is mere detriment”); and *Pelaez v. INS*, 513 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1975) (difficulty in obtaining employment is not extreme hardship).

Although counsel states that ██████████ living in the United States for 18 years would make adjustment to Columbia difficult, the AAO finds that such difficulties would be mitigated by the moral support of the applicant.

The AAO is not persuaded that ██████████ loss of health insurance constitutes extreme hardship. The loss of a job along with its employee benefits is not extreme or unique economic hardship, but is a normal occurrence when an alien is deported. *Marquez-Medina v. INS*, 765 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1985).

In considering the hardship factors raised here, the AAO examines each of the factors, both individually and cumulatively, to determine whether extreme hardship has been established. It considers whether the cumulative effect of claims of economic and emotional hardship would be extreme, even if, when considered separately, none of them would be. It considers the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and then determines whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with removal.

In the final analysis, the AAO finds that the requirement of significant hardships over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in removal has not been met so as to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. Having carefully considered each of the hardship factors raised, both individually and in the aggregate, it is concluded that these factors do not in this case constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.