



U.S. Citizenship
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FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: ROME, ITALY

Date: **JUL 15 2008**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Rome, Italy, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Hungary who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more subsequent to April 1, 1997. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The record reflects that the applicant was admitted to the United States in B-2 temporary visitor status on January 13, 2000. The applicant and her spouse, [REDACTED] were married in the United States on March 2, 2002. The applicant departed the United States on February 18, 2004. The applicant's spouse filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) naming the applicant as beneficiary on October 8, 2004 at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, Hungary. The petition was approved the same day. The applicant filed an Application for Immigrant Visa (DS-230) and an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) on or about November 12, 2004.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the waiver application accordingly. *Decision of Acting District Director*, dated June 08, 2005.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse states that he has lived in the United States his whole life and he would have a hard time finding a job in a poor country such as Hungary because he doesn't speak Hungarian. On the Form I-290B, the applicant's spouse indicated that a brief and/or evidence would be submitted to the AAO within 30 days. On May 22, 2008, the AAO sent a notice by mail to the applicant and her spouse indicating that no such documentation had been received, and requesting that a copy of any additional brief or evidence along with evidence of the date it was originally filed be submitted within five business days. To date, no response to this notice has been received. Therefore, the record is considered complete. The record also contains a statement from the applicant's spouse. The entire record has been considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(1) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission

within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure of removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record reflects that the applicant was admitted to the United States in B-2 temporary visitor status on January 13, 2000. The applicant remained in the United States beyond her period of authorized stay until voluntarily departing on February 18, 2004. The applicant is now seeking readmission to the United States. Therefore, the applicant accrued unlawful presence from on or about June 12, 2000 through February 18, 2004, a period in excess of one year. The applicant has not disputed that she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant is not relevant under the statute and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative in the application. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act; *see also Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States,” and also, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). Separation of family will therefore be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

An analysis under *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* is appropriate. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

In his statement, the applicant’s spouse states that it would be impossible for him to move to Hungary because he has lived his whole life in the United States and doesn’t speak Hungarian. He asserts that he does not want to be separated from his family members with whom he is close, and that his parents will need him more as they age. He states that his spouse has family in Hungary, but she is not close to them. He states that he has a handyman business that he would lose if he relocated to Hungary. He contends that he would be unable to get a good job in Hungary because he doesn’t speak Hungarian. He indicates that his spouse is his best friend, and that being apart from her has made him very unhappy.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant’s spouse faces extreme hardship if the applicant is not granted a waiver of inadmissibility.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant’s spouse suffers emotionally as a result of separation from the applicant. However, there is insufficient evidence showing that the psychological consequences of separation in this case constitute extreme hardship when considered with other hardship factors, or that the applicant’s spouse would suffer hardship if he relocated to Hungary to be with the applicant. The hardship described by the applicant’s spouse is the typical result of removal or inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of

deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The applicant's spouse has not submitted evidence beyond his statements showing that he would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Hungary. The applicant's spouse has not submitted independent evidence to substantiate his claim that he owns a business that he would be forced to abandon or that he would be unable to secure employment in Hungary. Although the statements by the applicant's spouse are relevant and have been taken into consideration, little weight can be afforded them in the absence of supporting evidence. *Matter of Kwan*, 14 I & N Dec. 175 (BIA 1972) ("Information in an affidavit should not be disregarded simply because it appears to be hearsay; in administrative proceedings, that fact merely affects the weight to be afforded it."). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The AAO recognizes that the applicant will experience hardship if he chooses to move to a foreign country such as Hungary and is thus unable to see his family as often as he does now, but the applicant's statements in this case are inadequate to demonstrate that such hardship would be extreme.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.