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U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:

CDJ 2004 710 114

Office: CIUDAD JUAREZ, MEXICO

Date: JUL 01 2009

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom,
Acting Chief Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year; and section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation.

The applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) of the Act. The OIC concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that her bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the OIC*, dated June 26, 2006. The applicant submitted a timely appeal.

On appeal, the applicant submits three letters. The letter dated June 28, 2006 by the applicant's daughter-in-law conveys that she needs the applicant to babysit and her son misses his grandmother. The undated letter by the applicant's grandson expresses that he misses his grandmother who had taken care of him while his mother worked. The third letter dated June 28, 2006, is written by the applicant's husband and is written entirely in Spanish. The regulation under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Bureau"] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

Because the letter has no English translation it will carry no weight in these proceedings. *See*, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3)

The AAO will first address the findings of inadmissibility

Inadmissibility for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9) of the Act. That section provides, in part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . and

again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

Unlawful presence accrues when an alien remains in the United States after period of stay authorized by the Attorney General has expired or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). The periods of unlawful presence under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) are not counted in the aggregate. For purposes of section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, time in unlawful presence begins to accrue on April 1, 1997.¹

The three- and ten-year bars of sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II), are triggered by a departure from the United States following accrual of the specified period of unlawful presence. If someone accrues the requisite period of unlawful presence but does not subsequently depart the United States, sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II), would not apply. See Memo, note 1.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records reflect that the applicant entered the United States without inspection on September 1999 and remained illegally until July 2005. The applicant therefore accrued five years of unlawful presence from September 1999 until July 2005, and triggered the ten-year-bar when she left the United States, rendering her inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

The waiver for unlawful presence is found under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), which provides that:

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

¹ Memorandum by Lori Scialabba, Assoc. Director, Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate and Pearl Chang, Acting Chief, Office of Policy and Strategy, Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act; AFM Update AD 08-03; May 6, 2009.

The applicant was found inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. That section reads:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that the applicant admitted to a consular officer that in September 1999 she attempted to procure admission into the United States from Mexico by presenting a “mica” (lawful permanent resident card) that did not belong to her. Based upon her admission, the OIC was correct in finding the applicant inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act for willfully misrepresenting the material fact of her identity in an attempt to procure admission into the United States.

Section 212(i) of the Act, which provides a waiver for fraud and material misrepresentation, states that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Since the waiver standard is the same for sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act, the discussion in this decision will apply to both waivers.

A waiver under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant and to his or her child is not a consideration under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act, and unlike section 212(h) of the Act where a child is included as a qualifying relative, children are not included under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act, and will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, who in this case is the applicant’s naturalized citizen spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is one of the favorable factors to be considered in determining whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

“Extreme hardship” is not a definable term of “fixed and inflexible meaning”; establishing extreme hardship is “dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* lists the factors considered relevant in determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship pursuant

to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors relate to an applicant's qualifying relative and include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 565-566.

The factors to consider in determining whether extreme hardship exists "provide a framework for analysis," and the "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). The trier of fact considers the entire range of hardship factors in their totality and then determines "whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." (citing *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994).

In addition to other documents, the record contains a birth certificate, a marriage certificate, a naturalization certificate, letters, and a statement of hardship.

The AAO has already described the content of the letters submitted on appeal. The statement of hardship dated October 26, 2005, by the applicant's spouse conveys that his wife's removal would impact him emotionally, psychologically, and financially. He states he cannot start his life over in Mexico and fulfill his dreams there.

Applying the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors here, extreme hardship to the applicant's qualifying relative must be established in the event that if she or he joins the applicant to live in Mexico, and alternatively, if she or he remains in the United States without him. A qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The applicant's spouse indicates that he will experience financial hardship if his spouse remains in Mexico; however, there is no documentation of applicant's spouse's income or his expenses, other than a real estate closing statement. The record lacks sufficient documentation to show that the monthly income of the applicant's spouse is not enough to meet his monthly financial obligations. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).

In his hardship statement the applicant's husband expresses concern about separation from his wife. Family separation must be considered in determining hardship. *See, e.g., Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States"). However, courts have found that family separation does not conclusively establish extreme hardship. *See, e.g., Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991) (separation of the applicant from his wife and child was not conclusive of extreme hardship as it "was not of such a nature which is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected from the respondent's bar to admission") (citing *Patel v. INS*, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1980) (severance of ties does not constitute extreme hardship); *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding separation of respondent from his lawful permanent resident wife

and two U.S. citizen children is not extreme hardship); and *Sullivan v. INS*, 772 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1985) (deportation is not without personal distress and emotional hurt). The AAO finds that the situation of the applicant's husband, if he remains in the United States without his wife, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship as required by the Act. The record before the AAO is insufficient to show that the emotional hardship that will be endured by the applicant's spouse is unusual or beyond that which is normally to be expected upon removal. *See Hassan, Patel, Shooshtary, Sullivan, supra.*

The applicant's husband states that he would experience extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico because he could not fulfill his dreams there. In *Shooshtary* the court states that "the extreme hardship requirement . . . was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy." The AAO finds that the applicant here fails to provide evidence and be specific about the hardship her husband would endure in Mexico. Consequently, the applicant fails to establish extreme hardship to her spouse if he were to join her to live in Mexico.

In the final analysis, the AAO finds that the requirement of significant hardships over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in removal has not been met so as to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. Having carefully considered each of the hardship factors raised, both individually and in the aggregate, it is concluded that these factors do not in this case constitute extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.