



U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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FILE:



Office: MADRID, SPAIN

Date: JUN 28 2005

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.



Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Assistant Officer in Charge, Madrid, Spain and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Portugal who was admitted into the United States in April 2000, as a non-immigrant visitor under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP). The applicant departed the United States sometime in July 2000 and reentered in August 2000. On December 16, 2002, in the Circuit court for Frederic County, State of Maryland the applicant was convicted for the offense of reckless endangerment in violation of Article 27, Section 12A2 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The applicant was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment suspended. On February 25, 2003, the applicant was removed to Portugal for having remained in the United States longer than permitted. He married a U.S. citizen on December 12, 2002, and he is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by his U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to travel to the United States to reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and stepchildren.

The Assistant Officer in Charge determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors, and denied the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. *See Assistant Officer in Charge's Decision* dated July 28, 2004.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

....

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal the applicant states that he started working in the United States and his employer told him that he would take care of all the paperwork. In addition he states that after he married, his wife filed a Form I-130. He further states that he is a law-abiding citizen and a hard working person. The applicant does not dispute the fact that he was convicted of a crime in involving moral turpitude but he states that he is not an aggravated felon because crimes like murder, drug trafficking, child pornography, tax evasion, smuggling are aggravated felonies and he is not like that. In addition the applicant states that his spouse would suffer financially, as she had to sell her company in order to support the family and without his financial support she will not be able to pay her bills that have accumulated since his removal. Furthermore the applicant states that if she remains in Portugal with him she will lose her children and her extended family and friends and the lifestyle she has been accustomed to.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See *Shoostary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied.

As noted above the applicant was convicted for the offense of reckless endangerment.

Section 101(a)(43) of the Act defines the term "aggravated felony":

(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment at least 1 year;

In the instant case the applicant's conviction is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this

country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens, his spouse and stepchildren, the approval of a petition for alien relative and the favorable recommendations from family and friends.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's overstay after his initial lawful admission, his illegal stay and employment in the United States, his lengthy presence in the United States without authorization and his criminal record. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.