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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:



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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on August 21, 1995, at the San Ysidro, California, Port of Entry, represented herself to be a citizen of the United States in order to gain admission into the United States. The applicant was found to be inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or other valid entry document. The applicant was placed in exclusion proceedings and on August 24, 1995, an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded and deported from the United States. Consequently, on the same date the applicant was removed to Mexico. The record reflects that the applicant reentered the United States on or about September 16, 1995, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission, in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by her U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) and seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The District Director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), applies in this matter and the applicant is not eligible for any relief or benefit from her application. The District Director then denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See District Director's Decision* dated June 30, 2004.

Section 241(a) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(5) reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering.- if the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.

On appeal, counsel notes that on the denial of the Form I-212, the District Director used Service number [REDACTED] which is different from the applicant's Service number [REDACTED]. In addition, counsel asserts that section 241(a)(5) of the Act does not apply to the applicant because she was not removed after April 1, 1997, the effective date of section 241(a)(5) of the Act. Additionally, counsel states that section 241(a)(5) of the Act applies to reinstatement of removal orders only, and it does not reinstate the applicant's exclusion in 1995, which was prior to the effective date of section 241(a)(5) of the Act. Finally, counsel states that the District Director erroneously denied the Form I-212 pursuant to section 241(a)(5) of the Act and requests that the AAO reverse the District Director's decision.

The AAO notes that a file under number [REDACTED] was created on behalf of the applicant and it was consolidated into service file [REDACTED]. The AAO finds the use of [REDACTED] on the denial letter,

instead of [REDACTED] to be a harmless error since both numbers relate to the applicant and it does not affect the outcome of the decision.

The record of proceeding clearly reflects that the applicant was deported from the United States on August 24, 1995, and that she illegally reentered on September 16, 1995. The applicant's illegal reentry to the United States occurred prior to the April 1, 1997, enactment date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3009.

The issue of whether section 241(a)(5) provisions of the Act apply retroactively to illegal reentries made prior to April 1, 1997, has been the subject of conflicting decisions by the Circuit Courts. However, on June 22, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States held in *Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez*, 548 U.S. ____ (2006), that section 241(a)(5) of the Act applies to those who entered before IIRIRA and does not retroactively affect any right of, or impose any burden on the individual.

The applicant, in this case, has failed to establish that she had a reasonable expectation of relief from deportation at the time of her illegal reentry to the United States prior to April 1, 1997. At the time of her September 16, 1995, reentry the applicant had no reasonable expectation that she would be able to collaterally attack her prior deportation order or that she was entitled to the prior procedural inefficiencies in the administration of immigration laws. The applicant, therefore, had no reasonable expectation of adjustment of status relief under pre-IIRIRA laws. Thus, as applied to the applicant, section 241(a)(5) of the Act does not impose any new duties or new liabilities. Therefore, section 241(a)(5) of the Act applies to the applicant.

The AAO notes, however, that the applicant's prior deportation order was not reinstated at the time she filed the Form I-212, and, therefore, the AAO will weigh the discretionary factors in this case.

The AAO conducts the final administrative review and enters the ultimate decision for CIS on all immigration matters that fall within its jurisdiction. The AAO reviews each case *de novo* as to all questions of law, fact, discretion, or any other issue that may arise in an appeal that falls under its jurisdiction. Because the AAO engages in *de novo* review, the AAO may deny an application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law, without remand, even if the district or service center director does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).

To recapitulate, on Augusts 24, 1995, an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded and deported from the United States. Therefore, the applicant is clearly inadmissible under sections 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act and must receive permission to reapply for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent

removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has; (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years in others; (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States; (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on deterring aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that:

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married her U.S. citizen spouse on January 7, 1997, approximately one and one half years after she was placed in exclusion proceedings and sixteen months after she illegally reentered subsequent to her deportation. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware at the time of their marriage of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of her being removed. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. Therefore, hardship to her spouse will not be accorded great weight.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, her U.S. citizen spouse and children, an approved Form I-130, and the absence of a criminal record.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's attempt to enter the United States by misrepresenting a material fact, her illegal reentry after her deportation, her periods of unauthorized employment, and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after she was placed in deportation proceedings, and after illegal reentry subsequent to her deportation can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.