



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE:

Office: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Date: JUN 19 2006

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole in October 1985. On March 31, 1988, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) apprehended the applicant and an Order to Show Cause (OSC) for a hearing before an immigration judge was issued. On April 1, 1988, the applicant was released on \$1,000 bond. On May 10, 1988, the applicant failed to appear for a deportation hearing and she was subsequently ordered deported in absentia by an immigration judge, pursuant to section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act). On June 16, 1988, the applicant appeared at a CIS office to inform the Service that she was returning to Mexico and wanted the bond posted on her behalf to be returned. Since the applicant had been ordered deported in absentia, a Warrant of Removal/Deportation (Form I-205) was issued. The record reveals that the applicant departed the United States on or about June 17, 1988, and as such, self deported. The record further reveals that the applicant reentered the United States on April 15, 1991, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission, in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is the beneficiary of a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by her U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The District Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors, and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See District Director's Decision* dated December 19, 2003.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(ii) Other aliens. - Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has, (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief, in which he states that the applicant did not appear at her deportation hearing because she never received a notice for a hearing. In addition, counsel states that the evidence shows that the notice of hearing was forwarded to a wrong address most likely due to a typographical error. Additionally, counsel states that if the applicant were not forced to leave the United States in order to return her deceased sister to Mexico, she would have been entitled to reopen her deportation proceedings based on the fact that she never received a notice of the hearing due to a typographical error in her address.

The record indicates that the applicant was personally served with an OSC on March 31, 1988. Although counsel states that the applicant never received any correspondence regarding her deportation hearing, no documentation forwarded to the applicant was returned as undeliverable. The AAO notes that the OSC the applicant received, states that the date to appear before an immigration judge is: "to be scheduled." The record of proceedings does not include a notice for a master hearing or a notice scheduling the applicant for a deportation hearing. It is therefore not clear what address was used for service of the notice of the scheduled hearing, or whether the applicant ever received the notice to appear for a deportation hearing. However, this does not change the fact that the applicant was ordered deported from the United States on May 20, 1988. The AAO does not have jurisdiction over orders of deportation made in immigration courts. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, and the proceeding in the present case is limited to the issue of whether or not the applicant meets the requirements for a waiver of inadmissibility.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that:

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant, in the present matter, married her U.S. citizen spouse on January 14, 1998, approximately ten years after she was placed in deportation proceedings, and after she self deported. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware at the time of their marriage of the possibility of her being removed. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. Therefore, hardship to her spouse will not be accorded great weight.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties to a U.S. citizen, her spouse, an approved Form I-130, and the absence of any criminal record.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's initial illegal entry into the United States, her failure to appear for deportation proceedings, her failure to depart the United States after a final deportation order was issued, her illegal reentry after she self-deported and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee*, *supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after she was placed in deportation proceedings and after she reentered illegally, can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.