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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

H4

[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] RELATES)

Office: LOS ANGELES, CA

Date: **AUG 06 2010**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew,
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

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DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, Los Angeles, California, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on December 23, 2000, appeared at the San Ysidro, California port of entry. The applicant made an oral false claim to U.S. citizenship. The applicant was placed into secondary inspection. The applicant admitted that she had made a false claim to U.S. citizenship by claiming that she was born in Los Angeles, California. The applicant admitted that she did not have valid documentation to enter the United States. The applicant admitted that she knew that it was illegal for her to make the false claim to U.S. citizenship. The applicant failed to admit her true identity to immigration officers. The applicant was found to be inadmissible pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for making a false claim to U.S. citizenship and for being an immigrant without valid documentation. On December 24, 2000, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) under the name [REDACTED]

On December 5, 2002, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on her behalf by her U.S. citizen spouse. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in June 2001. On October 26, 2005, the applicant filed the Form I-212, indicating that she continued to reside in the United States. On July 20, 2009, the Form I-485 was denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), for illegally reentering the United States after having been removed. The field office director determined that the applicant was not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because she had not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. The field office director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. See *Field Office Director's Decision*, dated July 20, 2009.

On appeal, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive to apply *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), when the applicant, in filing the Form I-212, relied upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). Counsel contends that the applicant is not inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act.¹ See *Counsel's Brief*, dated September 18, 2009. In support of his

¹ While counsel contends that there is no clear and convincing evidence that the applicant made a false claim to U.S. citizenship, the record contains a Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings Under Section 235(b)(1) of the Act (Form I-867A), in which the applicant admits to making a false claim to U.S. citizenship. The applicant was served with documentation informing her that she was being removed from the United States on December 24, 2000, including the Form I-867A. If the applicant has lost this documentation she may request a copy of it by filing a Freedom Of Information Act Request (FOIA). Counsel has failed to make a proper inquiry in order to obtain such documentation.



contentions, counsel submits only the referenced brief. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision in this case.


Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
 - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
 - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the [Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

.....
(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

- (i) In general.- Any alien who-
 - (I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or
 - (II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters



or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

The AAO notes that a waiver to the section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility is available to individuals classified as battered spouses under the cited sections of section 204 of the Act. *See also* 8 U.S.C. § 1154. There are no indications in the record that the applicant is or should be classified as such.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless he or she has *remained outside* the United States for more than 10 years since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. *See Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007); and *Matter of Diaz and Lopez*, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010). Thus, to avoid inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, it must be the case that the applicant's last departure was at least ten years ago, the applicant has remained outside the United States since that departure, *and* that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has consented to the applicant's reapplying for admission. The applicant's last departure from the United States occurred on December 24, 2000, less than ten years ago, she has not remained outside the United States since that departure and she is currently in the United States.² The applicant is currently statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

On appeal, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive to deny the applicant's Form I-212 because of her reliance on *Perez-Gonzalez*.

² The applicant will be required to submit evidence establishing that she is currently outside the United States and has remained outside the United States for period of ten years when she becomes eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.




The applicant's Form I-212 was pending while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, counsel's contention that the applicant reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision is illogical.

Counsel's retroactivity arguments before the AAO mirror retroactivity arguments dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in *Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Security*, 2010 WL 1254137 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit, in *Morales-Izquierdo*, found that *Gonzales II* is a judicial interpretation of a federal statute, which places the decision on a fundamentally different plane from the body of retroactivity jurisprudence upon which counsel relies and that new judicial decisions interpreting old statutes have long been applied retroactively to all cases open on direct review, regardless of whether the events predate or postdate the statute-interpreting decision. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 10, 12. The Ninth Circuit held that applicants, even those eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act, are bound by *Gonzales II*, that *Gonzales II* is not impermissibly retroactive and that a Form I-212 waiver cannot cure inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act until an applicant, while residing outside the United States, applies for and receives advance permission, but only after ten years have elapsed since the applicant's last departure from the United States. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 1, 12.

In *Gonzales II*, the Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. The Ninth Circuit found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court found that it must defer to *Torres-Garcia* and that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative policy underlying the statute in general. Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, counsel's contention that the correct application of the statute is impermissibly retroactive is unfounded since the applicant's removal, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment.

Finally, the statute and case law clearly states that an alien who has been ordered removed and enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted may seek an exception to permanent grounds of inadmissibility when seeking admission more than ten years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States, if, the applicant receives permission to reapply for admission prior to reentering the United States.³ *Matter of Torres-Garcia, Supra.*; *Matter of Briones, Supra.*; *Matter of Diaz and Lopez, Supra.*; *Morales-Izquierdo, Supra.*

³ The AAO notes that the reentry after obtaining permission to reapply for admission must be a lawful admission to the United States; otherwise, the applicant has again illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and renewed his or her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.



Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that she is eligible for the benefit sought. The applicant in the instant case does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Thus, as a matter of law, the applicant is not eligible for approval of a Form I-212. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed as a matter of discretion.

Beyond the decision of the field office director, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act and no waiver is available. Therefore, the applicant is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States and no purpose would be served in the favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application to reapply for admission into the United States.⁴

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁴ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

