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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

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[REDACTED]

FILE:

[REDACTED]

Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA

Date:

AUG 16 2010

IN RE:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, San Francisco, California, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) dismissed a subsequent appeal. The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reconsider. The motion to reconsider will be dismissed. The order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on February 4, 2000, appeared at the Calexico, California port of entry. The applicant presented an I-586 border crossing card bearing the name [REDACTED]. The applicant was placed into secondary inspection. The applicant admitted that she was not the true owner of the document and that she did not have valid documentation to enter the United States. The applicant failed to provide her true identity to immigration officers. The applicant was found to be inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for attempting to enter the United States by fraud. On February 4, 2000, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) under the name [REDACTED].

On June 17, 2007, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on her behalf by her naturalized U.S. citizen spouse. On the same day, the applicant filed the Form I-212, indicating that she resided in the United States. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant reentered the United States without inspection on February 14, 2000. On June 2, 2009, the Form I-485 was denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen stepchild.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), for illegally reentering the United States after having been removed. The field office director determined that the applicant was not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because she had not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. The field office director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Field Office Director's Decision*, dated June 2, 2009.

On appeal, counsel contended that the field office director erred in finding the applicant ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because the applicant, despite having entered the United States without inspection after having been removed, should be permitted to seek permission to reapply for admission because she is eligible to apply for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act. Counsel contended that section 245(i) of the Act should trump the requirements of section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Act mandating that an applicant reside outside the United States for a period of ten years after his or her last departure. *See Counsel's Brief*, dated July 21, 2009. In support of his contentions, counsel submitted only the referenced brief.

On October 6, 2009, the AAO dismissed the applicant's appeal because she is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act and is not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because she has not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. *Decision of AAO*, dated October 6, 2009.

In the motion to reconsider, counsel contends that the field office director and AAO incorrectly applied *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), to the applicant because it is impermissibly retroactive and the applicant relied upon *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). Counsel contends that the applicant is eligible for a waiver of the ten year bar under section 212(a)(9)(C)(iii) of the Act because she was under the undue influence and abuse of an alien smuggler when she presented herself at the Calexico, California port of entry.¹ On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant's due process rights were violated when she was summarily removed.² Counsel contends that the field office director and the AAO violated the applicant's Fifth Amendment rights as the retroactive application of *Gonzales II* infringes on the fundamental right to keep a family together.³ Counsel contends that the applicant's spouse will suffer hardship if the applicant is denied admission to the United States. See *Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider*, dated November 15, 2009. In support of his motion to reconsider, counsel submits the referenced brief and psychological documentation. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision in this case.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a) provides, in pertinent part:

(3) *Requirements for motion to reconsider.*

A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
 - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

¹ Counsel's contention is unpersuasive and illogical. The Act clearly requires an applicant under section 212(a)(9)(C)(iii) of the Act to be a VAWA self-petitioner and counsel does not provide evidence that the petitioner filed a Form I-360 petition seeking classification as a VAWA self-petitioner pursuant to section 204(a)(1)(A) or (B) of the Act.

² The AAO does not review any matters that fall under 8 C.F.R. § 235.

³ Constitutional issues are not within the appellate jurisdiction of the AAO.

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the [Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

....

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

In support of the motion to reconsider, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive and violate the applicant's due process rights to apply *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007).

The applicant's Form I-212 was filed while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, the applicant could not have reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision.

The retroactivity arguments set forth by counsel in the motion to reconsider and on appeal in *Gonzales II* mirror retroactivity arguments dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in *Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Security*, 2010 WL 1254137 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit, in *Morales-Izquierdo*, found that *Gonzales II* is a judicial interpretation of a federal statute, which places the decision on a fundamentally different plane from the body of retroactivity jurisprudence upon which counsel relies and that new judicial decisions interpreting old statutes have long been applied retroactively to all cases open on direct review, regardless of whether the events predate or postdate the statute-interpreting decision. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 10, 12. The Ninth Circuit held that applicants, even those eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act, are bound by *Gonzales II*, that *Gonzales II* is not impermissibly retroactive and that a Form I-212 waiver cannot cure inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act until an applicant, while residing outside the United States, applies for and receives advance permission, but only after ten years have elapsed since the applicant's last departure from the United States. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 1, 12.

In *Gonzales II*, the Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. The Ninth Circuit found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court found that it must defer to *Torres-Garcia* and that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative policy underlying the statute in general. Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, any contention that the correct application of the statute is impermissibly retroactive is unfounded since the applicant's removal, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment.

Finally, the statute and case law clearly states that an alien who has been ordered removed and enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted may seek an exception to permanent grounds of inadmissibility when seeking admission more than ten years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States, if, the applicant receives permission to reapply for admission

prior to reentering the United States.⁴ *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007); and *Matter of Diaz and Lopez*, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010); *Morales-Izquierdo*, *Supra*.

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that the contentions submitted in the motion to reconsider meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider. Accordingly, the motion to reconsider is dismissed and the order dismissing the appeal is affirmed.

ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. The order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

⁴ The AAO notes that the reentry after obtaining permission to reapply for admission must be a lawful admission to the United States; otherwise, the applicant has again illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and renewed his or her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.